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Abstract of Bachelor’s Thesis: 
The concept of common humanity and humanitarian intervention 
 
This thesis explores the rise in the use of the term ‘common humanity’ in justifying humanitarian 
intervention and the effectiveness of its use. The concept of common humanity is a rising 
phenomenon in international politics which makes it important to critique it.  A theoretical analyse of 
current literature surrounding humanitarian intervention and the concept of humanity is used. The 
thesis structure starts by establishing the use of the concept in international politics and in particular 
humanitarian interventions. I then go on to critically analyse the liberal and cosmopolitan thought 
that gave rise to the concept of common humanity being used in international politics and its 
justification for humanitarian intervention. The third chapter analyses the criticisms made of the 
concept from a communitarian, realist, and poststructuralist perspective. Finally, the concept of 
common humanity is applied to the practical case of humanitarian intervention in Libya, in order to 
assess its effectiveness and applicability to international politics. The conclusion reached is that the 
concept has been unsuccessful in practical real world scenarios as demonstrated in Libya. This does 
not rule out future use of the concept as it can continue to develop into an accepted norm of 
international politics but in contemporary international politics the term is problematic, and 
potentially dangerous. 
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Introduction 
Since its inception the concept and implementation of humanitarian intervention has had a 
polarizing effect in international relations. Those for and against the use of force for humanitarian 
purposes have made strong cases for their stance and a wealth of academic scholarship on the 
subject has emerged. The polarization of opinion has at least partly arisen as a consequence of the 
failures of humanitarian interventions, as there has not been a case of intervention that has been 
devoid of criticism, and all humanitarian interventions have had issues regarding their legitimacy and 
their effectiveness. One issue of particular importance revolves around the way in which the concept 
of ‘common humanity’ has been used to legitimise humanitarian interventions. This thesis examines 
the rise in the concept of common humanity and how this is now being used to push for a world in 
which universalism is at the fore, where human rights are respected and all states have certain 
obligations to the international community. This concept implies that there is a unity shared 
between all people of the world and so when this humanity is violated, for example by the 
commitment of mass atrocities in conflict situations, there is an obligation to intervene in the state 
responsible in order to stop the atrocities. These interventions are argued to be humanitarian in 
nature as the primary goal is to prevent suffering of the local population.  
For the purposes of this thesis, humanitarian intervention is defined as, “[a] state using military force 
against another state when the chief publicly declared aim of that military action is ending human-
rights violations being perpetrated by the state against which it is directed.” (Marjanovic, 2011, para. 
2). Debates over the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention emerged most forcefully in the 1990s. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union “[n]ew conflicts arose or old conflicts reappeared that were 
previously suppressed by the static nature of the Cold War system. In addition, globalization, whose 
roots can be found in the 1980s, accelerated a development of regional and ethnic upheaval, 
particularly in the periphery of the international system” (Krieg, 2012, p. ix). The international 
community sought a solution to the problem:  
In face of rising internal conflicts devastating entire regions and populations, the United Nations and 
the then leading super power, the United States, were seeking new approaches to address these 
conflicts. The rather state-centric and sovereignty-based international system underwent a regime 
change allowing for the occurrence of a new phenomenon in international law: military humanitarian 
intervention. (Krieg, 2012, p. ix).  
With the end of the Cold War these principles came to the fore in international politics and a 
broader enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention followed. This depends upon a strong concept of 
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common humanity as the presumed obligation to intervene necessarily stems from a sense of 
universal community and responsibility. 
Before exploring the concept of common humanity in depth, some form description and definition is 
needed to demonstrate what exactly the proponents of the concept mean when they call for the 
utilization of such a notion in international politics. Philosophers, such as Smart, argue that in the 
ever globalised world, with more travel and communication between different peoples taking place, 
cultural and religious barriers are beginning to break down and a greater sense of international 
community is taking its place. The result of this is the world becoming more open and people are 
developing more empathy and compassion for others of different religious, cultural, and ethnic 
backgrounds (Smart, 1981, p. 313). Additionally, after Singer analysed the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals, he concluded that the international community is starting to reflect 
the concept of common humanity as there is much greater emphasis on the welfare of people in 
distant lands (Singer, 2002, p. 213). These theorists have analysed the contemporary world and 
believe that the world is becoming a more unified space, with more unified people. Perhaps the best 
way of capturing the concept of common humanity comes in Orford’s critique that: 
Universality of human rights solicits a sense of One-ness among the many, in which corporeal 
boundaries are blurred and bodily borders dissolved. Thus, this fantasy promotes, not difference, but 
sameness: specifically a shared identity among all rights-bearers, each having the same claim to the 
procedural safeguards and substantive entitlements which rights grant (Orford, 2003, p. 212).  
Because of this ‘sameness’, states and people see themselves as part of a world defined by 
universalism.  
Kofi Annan, who is further discussed later, describes the potential for international politics to be 
governed by the concept of common humanity. When the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) became 
an aspirational part of the UN in 2005, Annan spoke of the opportunity the world had to transform 
itself into one common entity, arguing that “common interest... should bind all States together... as 
should... our common humanity” (Annan, 2005, p. 3). It was argued that this interconnected world, 
founded upon universalism, would strengthen world security and enhance all states’ interests 
(Annan, 2005, p. 6). The concept of common humanity is, therefore, built upon the belief that 
humanity transcends international borders; it is what should be guiding international politics. This 
becomes pertinent when a state engages in acts of violence that breach the expected standards 
attached to the concept of common humanity. 
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Kofi Annan summarizes the concept of common humanity best. At the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1999 Annan stated, “[i]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault 
on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?” (Annan, 2000, p. 
48). At the same assembly responding to the inaction of Rwanda and reaction to Kosovo it was made 
clear that, “[we must] [f]ind common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter, and acting in 
defence of our common humanity” (ICISS, 2001, p. 2). Elaborating on this, he alluded to when there 
is an obligation to intervene for the concept of common humanity: 
Humanitarian intervention is a sensitive issue... [b]ut surely no legal principle – not even sovereignty – 
can ever shield crimes against humanity. Where such crimes occur and peaceful attempts to halt them 
have been exhausted, the Security Council has a moral duty to act on behalf of the international 
community. The fact that we cannot protect people everywhere is no reason for doing nothing when 
we can. Armed intervention must always remain the option of last resort, but in the face of mass 
murder it is an option that cannot be relinquished. (Annan, 2000, p. 48).  
The belief the proponents of the concept of common humanity hold is that all people are holders of 
human rights. This goes beyond holding legal status; it is embedded in their ‘person’. Thus, 
traditional concepts of sovereignty and international law need to be flexible in order to reflect this 
concept of common humanity.  
A variety of other ideas stem from Annan’s arguments based on the concept of common humanity, 
including the claim that there is a willingness from the populaces of states to heed this call of 
common humanity. From this perspective, all people are under the auspices of a state and in that 
regard all people share the same existence, being subject to a greater authority. Because of this, the 
notion that people suffering in distant lands is ‘none of our business’ is rejected as all people live 
under a sovereign state and this ties us together (Edkins, 2003, p. 256). Being  subjects of a 
government, in other words, creates a form of solidarity, to the extent that when someone sees 
people suffering at the hands of a state they respond out of a protest against the system we are all a 
part of (Edkins, 2003, p. 256).  
An alternative explanation of people acting because of the concept of common humanity is altruism. 
Monroe, in an important work, defines altruism as acting to help someone regardless of the 
consequences to the actors well being (Monroe, 1996, p. 6). Such a perspective requires a sense of 
identification that ultimately transcends attachments to any form of gender, religious, national, and 
ethnic group (Monroe, 1996, p. 204). This strong belief of belonging to humanity results in people 
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participating in altruistic acts (Monroe, 1996, p. 206). The testimony of people that have acted 
altruistically provides evidence that some people do see themselves as part of common humanity. 
These examples are, however, all at the individual level, not the state level.   
This provides a brief background to the topic introducing the phenomenon of humanitarian 
intervention and its relationship to the concept of common humanity. This thesis examines how 
humanitarian interventions have been justified on the grounds that other states have committed 
human rights abuses that have violated our common humanity. This phenomenon has gradually 
emerged in international politics and is need of critical assessment in order to establish its 
usefulness to international politics. 
Research Questions 
This thesis has been undertaken as it is important to critique the emerging concept of common 
humanity in international politics. The emergence of the term has raised important questions that 
need to be considered. The first question that arises is where has the term come from and its 
current standing in international politics? Secondly what are the theoretical stances on the concept 
is there support for the term or is it criticized? Once the foundational work of the thesis is in place a 
case study is used in order to analyse the practicality of deploying this theoretical concept. What are 
the practical implications of using such a concept to guide international politics? Can it be 
successfully implemented or does it face difficulties? If it is utilized in a practical situation is it 
successful, or unsuccessful, and why? These are the sort of questions that the thesis seeks to answer 
in order to better understand the politicization of the concept of common humanity and its 
applicability to international politics.  
Methodology 
This thesis is composed of a theoretical analysis which is then illustrated by reference to a case 
study. The first three chapters focus on analysing the concept of common humanity by examining 
the positions of prominent thinkers both supportive and critical of the concept. As such, these 
chapters function as an extended literature review, providing an overview of the most influential 
writers on the concept of common humanity and drawing out the key themes and ideas surrounding 
the subject. Additionally, there has been little research that has directly explored the relationship 
between the concept of common humanity and humanitarian intervention so there is not much 
literature to set the scene. Krieg (2012), Wheeler (2005), are amongst the few theorists who make 
direct references to the concept, while others refer to it in passing. However, there are not 
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substantive studies that explore the concept. Because of this the first few chapters piece together 
the emergence of the concept of common humanity and its standing in international politics. 
The final chapter analyses a practical example of the use of the concept of common humanity in the 
form of a case study on Libya. A case study analysis is a useful way in testing the concept of common 
humanity in international relations. This is an effective way of assessing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the deployment of a theoretical concept to a practical situation. The case study 
analysis used in this thesis takes the form of a theory-infirming study. This type of case study is one 
that raises doubts about the viability of a theory. 
Outline of Thesis 
This thesis is structured around a detailed study of the theoretical arguments for and against the 
concept of common humanity and a case study designed to illustrate the benefits and challenges of 
the concept in a practical situation. The first chapter establishes the emergence of common 
humanity and the attempt at codification into international politics through the Responsibility to 
Protect. The subsequent two chapters detail the theories of those who support the concept of 
common humanity and those who are critical of it. Finally, the last chapter is a case study on Libya 
and explores the applicability of deploying the theoretical notion of common humanity to practical 
interventionist military operations. 
The first chapter establishes the concept of common humanity and how it has been used to justify 
humanitarian interventions. The emergence of the concept was gradual, with it slowly gaining 
momentum until it became especially prominent in the 1990s. This culminated with the 
Responsibility to Protect, which aims toward the codification of the concept of common humanity in 
international norms and laws. The primary purpose of this chapter is to establish the existence of the 
concept of common humanity and demonstrate that it has been invoked in international politics. 
The detailed theoretical analysis of the concept comes in the subsequent chapters. 
The second chapter examines the proponents of the concept of common humanity and its 
implementation in interventions. Liberalism and cosmopolitanism are the key strands of thought 
that support universal values in international politics and belief that they can be spread throughout 
the international system. There is the belief that international politics should be formed around a 
universal conception of humanity as this notion of humanity is applicable to all human beings. Such 
is the commitment to the belief in universalism there is support for humanitarian intervention when 
a state violates these universal values and ‘shock the conscience of humankind’.   
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However, there is criticism of the concept of common humanity being used in international politics 
and in justifying humanitarian intervention. The criticism comes from those that believe the use of 
humanity is not something desirable in international politics. This chapter approaches the concept of 
common humanity from a communitarian, realist, and poststructuralist position. There is criticism of 
the concept of humanity from a theoretical foundation, which emphasises difference in international 
politics and rejects that there is a universal conception of humanity. The rejection of common 
humanity means that from a practical point of view the concept can lead to the exploitation of those 
who hold a different sense of identity, values, and morality. These critics are obviously not against 
humanity uniting to tackle world issues together but are sceptical about the implementation of 
humanity in international politics, believing it to be too forceful. Because of the scepticism towards 
the concept there is a reluctance to embrace humanitarian intervention based upon the grounds of 
common humanity. 
After establishing the tension and controversy surrounding the use of the term common humanity in 
justifying interventions, the final chapter is a case study illustrating the difficulties of the concept of 
common humanity in action. In 2011 Libya fell into a civil war after protests turned violent. The UN 
Security Council authorized military intervention, calling upon the Responsibility to Protect as a 
legitimate claim to intervene, Resolution 1973 authorized the UN to “take all necessary measures to 
protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack” (United Nations Security 
Council: Resolution 1973, 2011, p. 3). However, other reasons for the intervention were also cited 
showing that it is not possible to intervene solely because of humanitarian concerns. The 
intervention in Libya was hailed as a success of RtoP and humanitarianism in the immediate 
aftermath by some commentators, such as James Pattison (2011, p. 273), Ramesh Thakur, and 
Thomas Weiss (as cited in Graubart, 2013, p. 70). However, this was premature, with the situation 
quickly descending into chaos. Upon closer inspection the principles of common humanity were not 
well represented in the practical application of military force. The intervention showcases the pitfalls 
of common humanity when it is taken from theoretical debates and practically applied in 
international politics.  
The aim of this research is to critically explore the concept of common humanity, as it is an easy way 
of legitimising interventions by calling upon our common human decency in order to stop atrocities 
being committed in the world. There has emerged a new way of justifying war in international 
politics but it is concerning that the method of legitimizing war draws from humanitarianism, two 
rather incompatible phenomena; the suffering of powerless people is used as a mobilizing tool for 
war. Without critiquing the use of common humanity as a justification for war, it might remain an 
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unquestioned part of international relations. On the surface the notion of fighting for the welfare of 
citizens who are powerless to help themselves sounds noble and ethical, but in reality the situation 
is much more complicated. The question that arises is whether or not the concept of common 
humanity can successfully or usefully be deployed in a situation concerning humanitarian 
intervention. 
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Chapter One: Introduction: Political Uses of Common Humanity in 
International Relations and the Rise of the Responsibility to Protect 
In this chapter I will demonstrate that common humanity, the human conscience, and crimes that 
shock the conscience of mankind are all concepts that have risen into the sphere of international 
politics in response to gross human rights violations. These terms are used to appeal to our sense of 
togetherness and challenge the international community to stop these atrocities, with military force 
if need be. Secondly, I will examine the rise of these concepts. The formation of the United Nations 
was important for the concept of common humanity as it marked a turning point in international 
relations with inter-governmental institutions rising to the fore. Since the end of the Cold War the 
importance placed in a cooperative international community has grown further and there has been 
the emergence of invoking the concept of common humanity or human conscience in order to justify 
humanitarian interventions. Finally I will look at the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect, or 
RtoP, which stands as the most prominent doctrine of intervention premised on universal values and 
a sense of common humanity today. 
Part One: Establishing Common Humanity in International Politics 
The political use of the term common humanity came to the fore in the 1990s with humanitarian 
interventions being justified on moral grounds. In the 1990s the interventions into Somalia, Bosnia, 
and Kosovo, were all justified on grounds of morality, invoking rhetoric in line with common 
humanity, and human conscience. Since the end of the Cold War the international community has 
been more concerned with humanitarian intervention with a focus on relieving the suffering of 
victims of internal conflicts or disasters (Hoffmann, 1993, p. 8). This has continued into this century 
with more interventions being justified on humanitarian grounds as will be seen in the case of Libya 
in chapter four. The way humanitarian interventions have been justified demonstrates that the 
concept of common humanity has been used extensively in international politics. 
The enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention in the early 1990s was exemplified by the mission in 
Somalia. In 1992 the UN Security Council passed a resolution allowing the deployment of troops into 
Somalia in order to ensure that humanitarian assistance would not be intercepted by Somali war 
tribes and get through to those that needed it. Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali believed 
that it was necessary to send a military force in order to keep stability while aid was given to those 
that required it. This operation was named UNOSOM (“United Nations Operation in Somalia I 
(UNOSOM I) ” n.d.). President George H. W. Bush addressed the nation stating that the United States 
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was “doing God’s work”, and that there was an obligation to help: “[t]he people of Somalia, 
especially the children of Somalia, need our help. We must give them hope. America must act” 
(“Address on Somalia (December 4, 1992) George H. W. Bush,” 2015, para. 7). The objective of the 
mission was labelled humanitarian, with the US government claiming that they had witnessed 
shocking images from Somalia but they had the ability to save thousands of innocent people from 
death (“Address on Somalia (December 4, 1992) George H. W. Bush,” 2015). The rhetoric given by 
the United States in regards to Somalia is very much in line with the concept of common humanity. 
President Bush’s speech alludes to ‘conscience shocking acts’ when he states the shocking nature of 
the imagery that the United States had witnessed on television as well as the ability for the United 
States to help those that could not protect themselves. In the months after the intervention, the 
then US Permanent Representative to the UN, Madeline Albright, stated that “[t]hese are missions 
that must be undertaken for the sake of common humanity” (US Department of State, 1993, para. 
23). Additionally, UNESCO held a symposium on the future of Somalia in regards to ways Somalia 
could be rebuilt, rehabilitated, and reintegrated into the international community, declaring that, 
“peace building, an activity concerning the human conscience... is a task which is incumbent on 
UNESCO” (Sayyad, 1995, para. 1). The concept of common humanity was not only invoked to justify 
the intervention, it was also used in regards to post intervention Somalia. This was widely 
considered to be the first example of humanitarian intervention in the post Cold-War world but it 
would certainly not be the last. 
The war in Bosnia waged between April 1992 and December 1995 was a civil war built on ethnic 
divisions. The international community, particularly Western states, were slow to respond to the 
atrocities although various NGOs and IGOs pushed states to acknowledge that genocide was 
occurring  (Campbell, 2001, p. 60). The rest of the international community followed suit, in 1992 the 
United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution claiming that the ethnic cleansing occurring 
was a form of genocide (Campbell, 2001, p. 60). In 1993 the International Court of Justice ordered 
Serbia and Bosnia to stop acts of genocide, stating that "[g]reat suffering and loss of life has been 
sustained by the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in circumstances which shock the conscience of 
mankind and flagrantly conflict with moral law” (“World Court reaffirms Bosnia genocide order,” 
1993, para. 5). State leaders also chipped in, with President Clinton stating, “I think it is a challenge 
to all of us, to the United States and to the West to take further initiatives in Bosnia and I accepted it 
as such... We must find in our diversity our common humanity” (Benac, 1993, para. 10-12). Clinton 
drew on the sentiment of the concept of common humanity claiming that, “liberty, democracy and 
peace are more and more the aspirations of people everywhere in the world. It is the power of our 
ideas, even more than our size, our wealth and our military might, that makes America a uniquely 
10 
 
trusted nation” (“Transcript of President Clinton’s speech on Bosnia,” 1995, para. 6). Despite the 
condemnation of the events unfolding in Bosnia, it took until 1995 for the international community 
to respond with military force to the crisis, taking the form of NATO airstrikes (Campbell, 2001, p. 
66). In the aftermath of the genocide the UN Security Council created the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, with Judge Goldstone bringing charges of crimes against 
humanity and genocide against Serb leaders as well as war crimes against all three parties fighting 
(Campbell, 2001, p. 62). As in Somalia, the reaction to atrocities in Bosnia was heavily premised upon 
the concept of common humanity.  
In relation to the NATO-led Kosovo intervention in 1999, Clinton stated that the United States would 
act in order to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo (“Clinton’s Statements on Kosovo,” 
1999),  and that, “[i]f the world community has the power... we ought to stop Genocide and ethnic 
cleansing.” (Campbell, 2001, p. 89).  The US and NATO began military operations against Milosevic, 
with Clinton appealing to common humanity, arguing that “Americans, Europeans, Serbs, Kosovars- 
must join together... and to start accepting that our differences are less important than our common 
humanity” (“The White House”, 1999, para. 13). In justifying the actions of NATO, Clinton stated 
that, “[w]hat NATO did here this weekend was to reaffirm our commitment to a common future, 
rooted in common humanity. Standing against ethnic cleansing is both a moral imperative and a 
practical necessity” (“Transcript of Clinton Remarks at Close of the Washington Summit,” 1999, para. 
5). Other NATO allies also used the rhetoric of universal values. Tony Blair, for example, stated, 
“[t]his is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil of 
ethnic cleansing stand.” (Hehir, 2012, p. 37). The atrocities taking place in Kosovo were met with 
condemnation, even if the response was belated. There was a clear emphasis on preventing further 
atrocities being committed that violated the universal values of common humanity.  
The concept of common humanity was invoked in humanitarian interventions during the 1990s and 
would continue to be invoked in subsequent interventions. The proponents of the concept of 
common humanity saw Kosovo as a turning point from states being interested solely in their 
interests to showing a universal concern for human security and a move towards a global civil 
society (Hehir, 2012, p. 37). Even in Iraq, after weapons of mass destruction were not found 
following the 2003 US-led invasion, the focus then shifted to justifying the war on humanitarian 
grounds. The United States justified the intervention on the grounds that Saddam was committing 
gross human rights abuses and was a dictator that had to be removed in order for democracy and 
human rights to replace his tyranny (Kahler, 2011, p. 21). This is the same rhetoric that was used in 
line with other humanitarian interventions in previous circumstances, as has been established in 
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Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo (Kahler, 2011, p. 21). This section has demonstrated that the concept of 
common humanity has been a significant part of the international community’s rhetoric justifying 
humanitarian interventions. This was also the case in Libya, which is the case study that I will later 
explore in depth where the concept of common humanity was invoked.  
Part Two: The Rise of Common Humanity 
It has been established that the concept of common humanity has been used in international 
politics, but where did this term come from? Having established the references to common 
humanity in justifying humanitarian interventions, it is necessary to consider the origins of the 
concept. There have been barbaric acts committed throughout history and although the word 
‘genocide’ was not coined until 1944, it is obviously not a new phenomenon. The twentieth century 
stood out because of the way in which the international realm was structured. There was a shift 
from independence to a world built upon interdependence with the terms such as ‘civilization’ and 
‘humanity’ frequently being used to describe the contemporary world (Campbell, 2001, p. 17). Post 
World War Two was a time when state sovereignty began to be questioned and human rights 
started to be put into international declarations (Powell, 2012, p. 303). All of the following played an 
important role in establishing the importance of individual rights in the international arena: the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the four Geneva Conventions and two Protocols on 
international humanitarian law in armed conflict, the 1948 convention on the prevention and 
punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the 1966 International Covenants on Civil, Political, Social, 
Economic and Cultural Rights, as well as the 1998 Rome Statute, and the Ottawa Convention on 
landmines (Welsh & Banda, 2010, p. 216). After the Second World War, the allies saw collective 
security as the best way to avoid a future world war and to avert genocide and other atrocities 
(Campbell, 2001, p. 18). The foundations for the rise of common humanity were created in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, however, it was not until the close of the Cold War that the 
idea really took off. There was a new found opportunity for human rights to take precedence over 
other affairs as there were no interstate conflicts taking place between major powers. 
Stepping back, first of all, to the pre-WWII period, a major step for the concept of common humanity 
entering into international politics was the Martens Clause, and from there various important events 
led to it gathering further significance. The Martens Clause was an early example of the concept of 
human conscience, or common humanity being used in a legal sense. The aim of the clause was to 
serve the cause of humanity (Pustogarov, 1999, p. 127). The Martens Clause was part of the Hague 
Conventions of 1899, a pioneering piece of international law as it was an early example of the world 
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powers coming together to create laws in regards to conflict and international relations. The 
Martens Clause was altered by the time of the 1905 Hague Conventions and it read: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High contracting Parties think it right to 
declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents 
remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the 
usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of the 
public conscience. (“The Avalon Project - Laws of War,” n.d., para. 8) 
The Martens Clause is referring to the rules of conflict established from customary international law, 
specifically stating how citizens should be treated if they take up arms against an occupying force. 
However, the importance to my thesis lies in the terminology used in this declaration. It implies that 
there is a universal standard of morality by referring to the principles of customary law that are 
created by civilized nations, the laws of humanity, and the public conscience (Pustogarov, 1999, p. 
131). The Martens Clause was a very early example of the concept of common humanity being 
referred to in international relations and it would not be the last as it would emerge again during the 
First World War. 
Early in the twentieth century mass atrocities were committed by the Ottomans against Turkish 
Armenians that subsequently led to a failed tribunal against the perpetrators. The Armenian 
Genocide of 1915 resulted in the deaths of between 800,000 and 1.5 million Armenian civilians 
(Campbell, 2001, p. 17; Bloxham & Göçek, 2008, p. 345). This sparked outrage through parts of the 
international community. British Prime Minister W.E Gladstone , for example, called upon the British 
people and organizations to help the Armenian people, stating that the British should help out of the 
“language of humanity, justice and wisdom” (Tusan, 2014, p. 13). In May 1915 Europe released a 
joint declaration accusing Turkey of ‘crimes against humanity and civilization’, with this being the 
first time a state was accused of committing crimes against humanity in regards to a civilian 
population (Tusan, 2014, p. 14). Following the end of the war and the resulting Paris Peace 
Conference and treaty of Sèvres,  the allies created the Ottoman War Crimes Tribunals that had a 
‘vague’ and ‘flimsy’ legal case for the prosecution (Malta Independent, 2012). These spanned from 
spring 1919 to July 1922. By spring 1919, the Ottomans, at the request of the British, “had arrested 
more than 100 high-profile suspects including government ministers and military officers.” (Tusan, 
2014, pp. 14-15). However, “[t]he lack of concrete evidence and an appropriate legal framework 
with supranational jurisdiction resulted in the Turkish detainees being repatriated and freed in 
exchange for 22 British prisoners held by Mustafa Kemal.” (Malta Independent, 2012, para. 2). The 
Turkish authorities convinced the British that they would bring those guilty to justice and so were 
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left to try the guilty through their own courts. Three officials were executed and a further sixty-three 
cases were made but only a small percentage were convicted and most of those that were convicted 
never served time (Tusan, 2014, p. 14). This was an early stepping stone for the concept of common 
humanity and for states being accountable to the international community. There were obvious 
issues with the tribunals as the international community was not effective in trialling members of 
another state but there were important steps made towards the concept of common humanity by 
using the term ‘crimes against humanity and civilization’. This demonstrated the idea that people are 
endowed with certain rights that cannot be violated by states. 
The notion of crimes against humanity came to the fore in the aftermath of the Second World War, 
when the International Military Tribunal (IMT) was created to prosecute the members of the Nazi 
party who were accused of participating in the Holocaust and other international crimes. The 
tribunal was decided upon in the London Agreement 8 August 1945 just before the UN Charter came 
into force, on 24 October 1945, which resulted in the tribunal being left to the allied victors. Great 
Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States were the four states left to ensure justice 
was carried out on behalf of the international community (Rhea, 2008, p. 362). The notion of crimes 
against humanity came to the fore in this tribunal: “[f]or the first time in history high-ranking leaders 
of the Nazi regime, and military and civilians of all ranks who were known to be associated with 
crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, were deemed accountable for 
their acts.” (Rhea, 2008, p. 362) This was a way in which the perpetrators of the crimes could be 
punished for the actions against their victims but also the wider international community. The 
actions of the Nazis were so depraved that the whole international community was a victim, it was 
argued (Rhea, 2008, p. 361). The tribunal was not without its critics, and “[t]he very notion that the 
winners of World War II prosecuted the losers still haunts the IMT today as ‘victors’ justice’ has 
become almost synonymous with Nuremberg” (Rhea, 2008, p. 362). However, despite the criticism, 
this was the first example of prosecuting people for committing crimes against their own people as it 
was not previously illegal in international law, and set a precedent for the future (Renzo, 2012, p. 
446; Sadat, 2013, p. 337). The precedent of the international community trying those of another 
state was an important step in the development of common humanity thinking, as were the 
Nuremberg Principles.  
The Nuremberg Principles came out of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg which 
guided the future of international law regarding conflicts. It took time for the Nuremberg Principles 
to emerge from the aftermath of the tribunal with them eventually becoming part of international 
law in 1950 after they were ratified by the United Nations (The Nuremberg Principles, 1950). 
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Principle One established the importance of international law over other states, reinforcing the 
importance of the international community: “[a]ny person who commits an act which constitutes a 
crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment” (The Nuremberg 
Principles, 1950). Principle Six is also important as it introduces the notion of crimes against 
humanity alongside the ‘crimes against peace’, and ‘war crimes’. The article on crimes against 
humanity details what constitutes a breach of international law:  
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done against a civilian 
population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such 
persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war 
crime (The Nuremberg Principles, 1950).  
In summary the three main elements of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg that were 
incorporated into international law were: crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity with these all applicable to present and future United Nations members (The Nuremberg 
Principles, 1950). In response to the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime the allied powers 
responded with a clear statement of what constituted an atrocity by creating the Nuremberg 
Principles. These principles reflect the values of common humanity with the IMT setting the 
precedent in regards to international criminal law, as well as humanitarian and human rights law 
(Rhea, 2008, p. 371). The atrocities committed in the Second World War mobilized the international 
community to ensure that events such as the Holocaust would never happen again. There was 
greater commitment to universal principles post WWII than post WWI.  
The establishment of the UN after the Second World War signalled the start of an international 
order that had an emphasis on universal values. The UN Charter was signed on 26 June 1945, with 
the UN being formed on 24 October 1945. The UN Charter contains a number of articles that align 
with the concept of common humanity. Article One outlines the guiding principles and values of the 
UN: 
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for 
the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or 
other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or 
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; 
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; 
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3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, 
or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends. (Charter 
of the United Nations, 1945, p. 3).  
The UN Charter outlines that the international community should acknowledge that all people of 
the word are embedded with the same rights and that these should be respected by the 
international community. 
The post-WWII world saw the seeds of common humanity taking shape. On December 10, 1948, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was passed by the United Nations General Assembly. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights refers to a human conscience encompassing all of humankind 
that had been ‘outraged’ by the barbarous acts committed during the Holocaust. In addition it 
stressed in the preamble that human rights should be protected by the rule of law (Van Dijk, 
Flinterman, & Janssen, 1998, p. 1). The declaration detailed that “[a]ll human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights.” (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, art. 1). As well as 
this, “[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” (The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 1948, art. 2), and finally, “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of person” (The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, art. 3). This introduced universal standards to all 
people and reflected the notion that there was common humanity amongst all people and this 
should be shown in the form of an international declaration. 
After the groundbreaking events of the formation of the UN, the acceptance of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and the post Second World War military tribunals, there was a lull in 
the movement of humanitarian values. Many cases of atrocities being committed were ignored as 
there were more state-specific concerns at the time. For example, during this time the Soviet Union 
killed millions of people, and even if the broader international community had known about the 
Gulags there still would not have been any talk of an intervention during this time of tension 
between the two hegemonic powers (Werth, 2008, p. 400). Mass atrocities were also happening in 
China under Mao Zedong during the Cold War period, but remained relatively inconsequential in 
international politics, despite estimates suggesting that between 44 and 72 million people were 
killed during Mao’s reign (Margolin, 2008, p. 438). To exemplify the lack of interest in human rights, 
common humanity, and humanitarian intervention during the Cold War, the United States Secretary 
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of State George Shultz actually criticized the Australian Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, for his efforts 
in trying to indict the leading members of the Khmer Rouge for crimes against humanity (Kiernan, 
2008, p. 481). All of these examples demonstrate humanitarianism was largely put to one side during 
the Cold War period.1 As a consequence of the veto power maintained by the two power blocs, the 
Security Council was paralyzed, leaving it unable to uphold human rights laws, and the prohibitions 
against genocide, crimes against humanity, and crimes of aggression (Campbell, 2001, p. 20). This is 
not to say that there were no declarations on the status of human rights during the Cold War, but 
they were not as frequent. 
Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, first tabled in 1949 but not entering into force until 1978, was 
one such example of a treaty signed during the Cold War. This concerned the plight of civilians 
caught in the crossfire of civil wars, introducing humanitarian concerns towards those in intra-state 
conflicts who were previously considered to be out of the jurisdiction of the international 
community (Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 1978). This 
protocol stressed that human rights offered protection from abuse and in cases where the law does 
not apply “the human person remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the 
dictates of the public conscience” (Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, 1978, para. 4). This draws upon the notion of a human conscience and common morality by 
calling upon our ‘human’ principles in order to protect those in conflict zones. However, despite all 
of these declarations, the idea of humanitarian intervention was specifically ruled out with the 
words, “[n]othing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directly or 
indirectly... in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in 
the territory of which that conflict occurs.” (Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, 1978, art. 3.2). Despite this, Protocol II still adds further evidence that there was a 
continued shift towards common humanity in international politics. 
This was made further apparent in the Helsinki Accords that were signed in 1975 stressing the 
importance of human rights. The accords state, “[t]he participating states will respect human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” And further to this “participating States will 
act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1975, 
pp. 6-7). However, the focus of this was on Europe and relieving tensions during the Cold War 
                                                          
1
  There were examples of Vietnam intervening in Cambodia and India in East Pakistan during this period buy 
they were not authorized by the international community. 
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between the West and the Eastern Bloc rather than on the status on human rights worldwide with 
this being made apparent by the conference only concerning Europe, North Africa, the US and 
Canada (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1975, p. 2). Even so, this demonstrates 
that human rights were still of concern during the Cold War, they were just overshadowed by the 
superpowers being more concerned with their own potential humanitarian disasters than the 
problems of the outside world. 
With the end of the Cold War there was an absence of super power tension so attention could be 
given to other issues that affected the international community:  
Against the background of the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc, the disappearance of the ‘Communist 
peril’ and early traces of globalization, the leaders of the United Nations and the Western powers were 
seeking a new approach to international relations in an arena that was believed to have the potential to 
become more peaceful and more stable. (Krieg, 2012, p. 133). 
The 1990s saw thousands of people dead as a result of genocides that had a great impact on the 
international community leading to changing perceptions in regards to intervening in other states’ 
affairs. In Bosnia, between 1992 and 1995, over 200,000 people were killed as a result of ethnic 
cleansing, while during a ten week spell in 1994 Rwanda experienced the loss of approximately 
800,000 people (Campbell, 2001, p. 1). These atrocities would go on to affect policy makers of states 
and the United Nations significantly. The Vienna Declaration ratified by the General Assembly on 25 
June 1993 was the first piece of treaty law produced in the 1990s that represented the notion of 
common humanity, but it would not be the last. It reiterated the intentions of the UN Charter and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, claiming that “all human rights derive from the dignity 
and worth inherent in the human person” (Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 1993, para. 
2). The declaration also says that all states are charged with the responsibility to conform to the UN 
charter, “to develop and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion” (Van Dijk et al., 1998, p. 137). The Vienna 
Declaration was a statement of intent following the Cold War; it reaffirmed the intention of the 
United Nations to enforce human rights for all based on the belief that there existed common 
humanity between all peoples. However, despite all of the declarations marking a shift towards the 
concept of common humanity, the cases of Bosnia and Rwanda highlighted the difficulties in 
applying the concept to a scenario in the real world.  
As discussed above, the response to the atrocities being committed in Bosnia was slow but gradually 
the international community reacted, condemning the perpetrators and putting a select few of them 
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on trial. However, despite being indicted for genocide there was a lack of prosecution against the 
perpetrators of the crimes, especially with the case of Milosevic (Campbell, 2001, p. 86). The legal 
verdicts given at the end of the tribunals demonstrated the lack of a legal framework that could be 
used to try individuals. In fact, the ICTY and ICJ had difficulty in coming to a decision in regards to 
genocide having been committed and only those killed at Srebrenica were deemed to have been 
victims of genocide (Hayden, 2008, p. 506). The failure to prosecute those that had committed 
atrocities and the time it took to respond to the atrocities alerted the international community to 
the need for reform. 
Rwanda was another instance where there was not an immediate response to the atrocities being 
committed, but the aftermath had a significant impact on the international community’s position in 
regards to humanitarian intervention and the concept of common humanity. During the genocide 
the international community did not intervene in an attempt to stop the genocide and the United 
States would later claim ignorance of the situation, although reports indicate that they were well 
aware of the situation and chose not to act as it was not in their interests (Campbell, 2001, p. 79). 
However, in the aftermath the ICTR was created to prosecute those in high up positions that 
participated in the planning of genocide, although the tribunal was criticized for its corruption, 
expense, disorganisation, and slow pace (Straus, 2008, p. 535). As with Bosnia, there were many 
issues with the legal proceedings, and the continued failure of ad hoc military tribunals led to 
change, although it would not be until 1998 that the Rome Statute was passed and the ICC formed 
declaring that murder, enslavement, torture, rape, and enforced prostitution all to be considered 
crimes against humanity (Renzo, 2012, p. 443).2 The atrocities committed during the Rwandan 
genocide were not met with a strong response from the international community at the time but it 
did lead to international guilt over the situation. This manifested itself in discourse surrounding 
humanitarian intervention and the concept of common humanity.  
In response to the lack of a response in Rwanda and the belated response in Bosnia the international 
community reacted quicker to the atrocities being committed in Kosovo. The NATO allies were 
concerned about the same thing happening in Kosovo as happened in Bosnia (Campbell, 2001, p. 
93). In September of 1998 the United Nations Security Council demanded that the Serbians stop all 
offensives against civilians in Resolution 1199, and when they did not the United Nations Security 
Council authorized a NATO bombing campaign (Campbell, 2001, pp. 87-88). There was no legal right 
                                                          
2 This formed the International Criminal Court replacing the ad hoc military tribunals of the 1990s (Campbell, 
2001, p. 100).  
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to intervention being invoked but it did get acceptance from the wider international community with 
it being described as morally justified even if it was not legal (Kahler, 2011, p. 25). This was a big step 
for the concept of common humanity entering into international politics; the international 
community decided it would not sit idly by while atrocities were committed. In light of the events in 
Kosovo  there was the potential for normative consensus to shift towards making humanitarian 
intervention legal, drawing from the notion of common humanity (Stromseth, 2003, p. 233). Kofi 
Annan and the ICISS would take up this opportunity.  
Certain deeds have long been considered outside of human decency, but the idea of codifying the 
notion of humanity into international law and applying it to international politics has only really 
been considered for a hundred years or so. The end of the Second World War was the catalyst for 
the shift towards promoting common humanity in international relations. After the Second World 
War the General Assembly and the International Law Commission both acknowledged the existence 
of crimes against humanity, and by 1993 the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, signed by 
193 countries, declared that human rights were universal and were a birthright, although individual 
states were still considered responsible for upholding the human rights of their citizens and not the 
international community (Duke, 1994, p. 38). Despite this, there was no further codification of 
crimes against humanity until the tribunals in the 1990s concerning the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda respectively (Sadat, 2013, p. 341). The cases of genocide, or ethnic cleansing, in the 
1990s demonstrated to the international community an inability to understand the gravity of the 
situations or to coordinate an adequate response (Campbell, 2001, pp. 99-100), and in response Kofi 
Annan campaigned for the promotion of human rights and a stop to genocide, ethnic cleansing and 
other crimes that ‘violate our common humanity’ (ICISS, 2001, p. VII). Annan used his position on the 
UN to campaign for a framework in which humanitarian intervention could be legitimised; this took 
the form of The Responsibility to Protect.  
Part Three: Common Humanity and the Responsibility to Protect 
The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) was the culmination of years of concern about the atrocities 
being committed by states against their people. RtoP distinguishes itself from the previous 
declarations, mentioned above, that promote human rights as it attempts to provide a framework in 
which the international community can intervene in an outside state in order to uphold human 
rights. RtoP took a while to establish itself in international politics but by 2005 over 150 
governments at the UN World Summit adopted it as part of the outcome documents (Piiparinen, 
20 
 
2012, p. 410). This was when RtoP went from being a proposal to it being a declaration representing 
the values of the UN. It is built upon the foundations of common humanity and for this reason it 
represents an important step in international politics. 
An important part of RtoP is that it authorizes the use of military force if all other avenues have been 
exhausted, which to some extent clarifies the ambiguity of the United Nations Charter’s position on 
intervention. The UN Charter still remains superior to all other international law as demonstrated in 
Article 103 of the UN Charter; “[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members 
of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” (Charter of the United Nations, 
1945, p. 19). Yet the United Nations Charter does contain a contradiction which has led to much 
debate surrounding the concept of common humanity and its importance to the international 
community. The charter proposes two concepts that are incompatible with each other. On the one 
hand the United Nations was created with the hope of building a world based upon collective 
security whilst maintaining that each state is free to rule from outside influence (Czernecki, 2002, p. 
393). The preamble to the UN Charter clearly demonstrates this tension, there is a commitment to 
“reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person” in 
addition to promising to “practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good 
neighbours.” This has created a political dilemma: “[h]ow should states behave in cases where 
maintaining faith in human rights meant refusing to be a good neighbour to genocidal and tyrannical 
states?” (Bellamy, 2013, p. 9). It is clear that the UN Charter supports both universal rights and state 
sovereignty without acknowledging that these two concepts may clash. If human rights are being 
violated by a state one of the only ways to stop them is by intervening which violates the 
sovereignty of the state in question, alternatively if human rights are being violated and the rest of 
the world looks on without an intervention then the sovereignty of the state in question is being 
upheld but the United Nations provisions about human rights are not being upheld.  
Regarding humanitarian intervention, cases have been made both for and against legitimacy based 
upon what the UN Charter states. The non-interventionists look towards Articles 2(4) and 2(7) that 
suggest that there is no legality in launching an intervention, with these two articles stating that it is 
prohibited to use, “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state”, and that states cannot involve themselves in affairs, “which are... within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (Czernecki, 2002, pp. 395-396). Many agree with this position, 
alluding to the numerous declarations promoting state sovereignty (Enabulele, 2010, pp. 417-418), 
and yet others disagree.  
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The other side of the argument favours intervention and argues that the UN Charter does permit 
humanitarian intervention. Many see the human rights elements of the United Nations Charter as 
being intended to stop events such as the Holocaust from happening again and cite Article 55 as 
proof that there is indeed a responsibility to observe the rights of human beings and Article 56 to 
enforce that these rights are upheld by the international community (Czernecki, 2002, p. 397). 
Added to this Article 2(4) makes force with an unlawful purpose illegal, whilst other forms of force 
are acceptable, potentially opening the way for humanitarian intervention (Czernecki, 2002, p. 397). 
The ambiguity and contradictory nature of the United Nations Charter coupled with the rise in 
human rights discourse, as mentioned in the previous section, left the door ajar for proponents of 
humanitarian intervention to argue their case. The Responsibility to Protect is an attempt to address 
the contradiction of the UN Charter by arguing that intervention is sometimes permissible. 
While serving as Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan called for the international 
community to stand up for human rights in the face of atrocities being committed. This 
demonstrated the new age in terms of what should be done in the face of gross human rights 
violations. Annan called for state boundaries to no longer hinder the ability of the international 
community to intervene in order to save lives (Annan, 1999, p. 118):  
It is not the deficiencies of the Charter which have brought us to this juncture, but our difficulties in 
applying its principles to a new era; an era when strictly traditional notions of sovereignty can no longer 
do justice to the aspirations of peoples everywhere to attain their fundamental freedoms. (Tanguy, 
2003, p. 141).  
Both Rwanda and Kosovo were used as examples of the Security Council’s poor response to 
atrocities and called for the United Nations to evolve in order to better respond to such atrocities. 
On this, Annan states that we must, “find common ground in upholding the principles of the charter, 
and acting in defence of our common humanity.” (ICISS, 2001, p. 2). Kofi Annan encouraged change 
in regards to theorizing about intervention. The individual welfare of citizenry was considered hugely 
important in his eyes, whereas traditional thinking had been more concerned with state power and 
its interactions on the world stage. The 1990s was the decade where the concept of common 
humanity really took off with ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ becoming an in vogue notion of 
sovereignty (Moses, 2013, p. 113), one that was compatible with human rights. It would be Canada 
that took up the call of Kofi Annan by establishing the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) which was created to address the issue of protecting people without 
violating a state’s sovereignty (ICISS, 2001, p. 2). Gareth Evans, a leading proponent of the concept 
of common humanity, was the leading figure of the ICISS and argued the case for humanitarian 
22 
 
intervention in the face of mass atrocities. Evans, like Annan, believed that mass atrocities have 
“demeaned our sense of common humanity” (Evans, 2011, para. 3), and in response the ICISS 
formulated the Responsibility to Protect as a way of preventing and responding to atrocities being 
committed against innocent people (Welsh & Banda, 2010, p. 216). 
Principles of RtoP and Common Humanity 
An evaluation of the key elements of RtoP demonstrates how important the concept of common 
humanity was to the foundations of the ICISS report. The ICISS created parts that would guide the 
implementation of RtoP and, in theory, ensure that it would be used appropriately by the 
international community reflecting the concept of common humanity. The first element of RtoP is 
the prevention of atrocities. The idea here is that sovereign states should seek to ensure the 
protection of human rights, and in cases where they needed assistance it should be given by the 
international community (ICISS, 2001, p. 19). If prevention measures fail then reaction is the next 
stage, the international community is obliged to come to assistance (ICISS, 2001, pp. 29-31), 
although the resort to force is only to be undertaken in extreme circumstances when all other 
avenues have been unsuccessful, and when there have been clear examples of  violence that “shock 
the conscience of mankind” (Hehir, 2012, p. 46). The third element of RtoP after prevention and 
reaction is rebuilding. It is not only enough to intervene in a state to stop atrocities there is then a 
responsibility to rebuild a state when the intervention is complete to ensure peace and stability 
(ICISS, 2001, p. 39). Post intervention it is necessary to maintain international support in order to 
ensure security as the region will be susceptible to fragmentation and disorder (ICISS, 2001, pp. 40-
41).  
These three elements demonstrate the importance of common humanity to the foundation of RtoP 
and were reaffirmed in the UN World Summit Outcomes Document in 2005:  
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, 
including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and 
will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help 
States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning 
capability. (United Nations General Assembly: 2005 World Summit Outcome, 2005, p. 30). 
When a state breaks its obligation to protect its citizens it relinquishes its power to the international 
community. The concept of common humanity is present here as the international community has a 
responsibility to take control of the situation in order to ensure people are protected:  
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The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the 
Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII... We also intend to 
commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting 
those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. (United Nations General Assembly: 
2005 World Summit Outcome, 2005, p. 30). 
The UN Summit in 2005 was a further commitment on behalf of UN member states to the concept of 
common humanity. This was made apparent through RtoP being included in the outcomes 
document. The three elements discussed all draw from common humanity. They encourage the 
international community to work together in order to uphold universal values across the world. 
Under no circumstances should human beings suffer if the international community can do anything 
to stop it. This section of RtoP best demonstrates how it is built upon the concept of common 
humanity.  
A sense of common humanity is also recognisable in just war theory, which lies at the heart of the 
RtoP. Krieg states that “[i]n regards to interventions for humanitarian purposes, the righteousness of 
the motivation of the intervener becomes a critical criterion in just war theory.” (Krieg, 2012, p. 
134). The ICISS report argues that in certain circumstances there is a legitimate reason to go to war. 
A scale of morality is drawn in which there is a right and wrong side and if morality is on a states side 
they can launch a ‘moral war’.  Early theorists such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero came to 
the conclusion that peace was the norm for humanity and that war was the exception, hence war 
had to be justified (Begby, Reichberg, & Syse, 2012, p. 316), while other scholars and theologians 
such as Aquinas, Gratian, Grotius, and Vattel all believed that wars of defence were morally 
permissible (Neff, 2012, p. 82; Reichberg, 2007, pp. 8, 7, 31). Two criteria were made by the ICISS 
with regards to a just cause for a humanitarian intervention:  
Large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either 
of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation: or large scale 
‘ethnic cleansing,’ actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror 
or rape. (ICISS, 2001, p. 32).  
This demonstrates the just cause for a war: it is immoral to launch a war of aggression but if it is for 
the sake of morality then it is deemed, by this report at least, to be a legitimate avenue to pursue. 
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Clearly  the authors of the ICISS report were influenced by just war theory as the conditions: right 
authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects of 
success are all tenets of traditional just war theory (Friberg-Fernros, 2011, p. 164). The harking back 
to just war theory is another attempt on behalf of the ICISS to justify war on moral grounds and 
legitimize interventions in defence of our common humanity.  
The belief from RtoP proponents in the possibility of a just war means traditional state sovereignty 
can be violated if it is for greater good of humanitarianism. The Responsibility to Protect promotes 
sovereignty as responsibility, over any other notion of sovereignty with sovereignty as responsibility 
being by the most compatible form of sovereignty with human rights. Where traditional notions of 
sovereignty grant the right to independence and territorial integrity sovereignty as responsibility 
demands respect for civilians, as made clear by Deng et al.: 
If a state fails to fulfil its obligations to its citizens, ‘the right to inviolability should be regarded as lost, 
first voluntarily as the state itself asks for help from its peers, and then involuntarily as it has help 
imposed on it in response to its own inactivity or incapacity and to the unassuaged needs of its own 
people’... The international community expects states to bring their domestic law and conduct in line 
with established international standards; if they do not, other nations have a responsibility to interfere 
in the offending state’s internal affairs. (as cited in Etzioni, 2006, p. 73).  
The ICISS backed this up, claiming sovereignty as responsibility means that states are responsible for 
protecting their citizens and are held to account by the international community and UN (ICISS, 
2001, p. 13). The ICISS decided to adopt a definition of sovereignty as responsibility (ICISS, 2001, p. 
8). This form of sovereignty heavily reflects the principles of common humanity as it expects all 
members of the international community to conform to a set universal standard regarding the 
treatment of human beings. If they do not conform then an intervention can be justified for the sake 
of common humanity. 
The writers of the ICISS report envisioned RtoP becoming an international norm and that it would 
eventually become part of customary international law (Welsh & Banda, 2010, p. 227), although it is 
questionable as to whether this has really been the case. At the 2005 UN Summit there was 
recognition that RtoP could be used in ways that were not covered in the United Nations Charter. 
However, this recognition took place in the General Assembly which is not a law making body, 
although international consensus can be determined in the General Assembly and if state practice 
follows the ideals professed then customary law can follow (Welsh & Banda, 2010, p. 229). With this 
in mind the outcome at the 2005 United Nations Summit is best seen as an indication of ‘soft law’ on 
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behalf of the members of the General Assembly, soft law is law in that it is written but is open to 
interpretation. This form of law is not legally binding but it does open the way for future 
developments in terms of making binding treaties and altering state practice and opinio juris, leading 
to the formation of new norms (Welsh & Banda, 2010, p. 230). From this position it seems likely 
RtoP will continue to grow as the foundation has been laid in international law, and the UN has 
continued to support RtoP since Ban Ki Moon took over the role of UN Secretary General, stating 
that “inaction is not an option” (Pattison, 2013, p. 577). However, worryingly since its inception 
there has been a development away from what the ICISS originally intended, the shift has entailed a 
greater emphasis on forced regime change in comparison to what the ICISS intended (Piiparinen, 
2012, p. 411). The Responsibility to Protect has developed since it was first discussed in 2001; it has 
been formally recognized by the UN and has continued to be supported by the new Secretary-
General as an important part of international politics. 
The Responsibility to Protect was helped significantly by the indecisive and ambiguous language 
used in the UN Charter, which allowed for questions surrounding the enforcement of human rights 
and the fluidity of sovereignty to be raised. Kofi Annan took advantage of the ambiguity of the UN 
Charter and argued that RtoP was not breaking current international law; in fact it reflected the 
principles and values of the international community. The Responsibility to Protect argues that the 
international community cannot stand by and watch atrocities unfold from a distance; there is a 
duty to intervene to stop such injustices. In cases of severe atrocities it becomes legitimate to violate 
a state’s sovereignty in order to protect lives, even harms such as high collateral damage become 
acceptable in these situations as is it is imperative that the state committing abuses is stopped 
(Pattison, 2013, p. 571). Furthermore, this positive duty considers crimes against humanity outside 
the realms of domestic law because of their severity and suggests that interventions in these 
situations are, ‘promoting and encouraging respect for human rights’ as well as ‘restoring 
international peace and security’ (Christopher, 1996, p. 108). In justifying their claims the RtoP 
proponents drew upon just war theory and redefined the concept of sovereignty in order for it to be 
more palatable with humanitarian intervention. There is no way of consistently upholding RtoP and 
in many ways it is as aspirational as the UDHR in shifting towards a world that respects human rights 
but it is clear that it is heavily influenced by the concept of common humanity as seen by the 
language used by its proponents. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the emergence of the concept of common humanity in international 
politics. Since the turn of the twentieth century the concept has been a part of the rhetoric used by 
states in justifying their decisions to punish those guilty of mass atrocities. Sections of the 
international community have championed the actions of humanitarian intervention, portraying 
them as noble acts that must be carried out in order to protect those that cannot protect 
themselves. Over time, the concept of common humanity slowly permeated international politics, 
eventually culminating in the formulation and promotion of the Responsibility to Protect. Advocates 
of the Responsibility to Protect have defended the use of force arguing that it is now a necessary 
part of international relations in order to protect the universal rights inherent in all people. This 
chapter demonstrates that there has been a shift towards politicizing notions of humanity in order 
to justify wars. The importance of this to the thesis is that it establishes the phenomenon of the 
concept of common humanity and how it has become a significant justification in the waging of 
contemporary wars, particularly those presented as humanitarian interventions. In building upon 
this overview of the emergence of common humanity in international politics, the next chapter will 
explore the variety of theories that rely upon a concept of common humanity and examine the place 
of such theories in contemporary international relations thought. 
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Chapter Two: The Proponents of Common Humanity 
The thought of sitting idly by as innocent civilians are subjected to gross atrocities is considered by 
many to be abhorrent behaviour that is now outdated. In an increasingly interconnected world, 
where there is instantaneous knowledge of what is happening in other parts of the world, ignorance 
is no longer an acceptable excuse. In such a context the concept of common humanity has a strong 
moral and political appeal. However, the theoretical foundations of the concept need to be explored 
and assessed. Along with the rise in liberalism, theories of cosmopolitanism have emerged which 
build upon liberal discourse, with many cosmopolitans arguing people belong to a single community 
and share a common morality. In this chapter I will explore the variety of theories that depend on a 
concept of common humanity and consider some of the implications of this, particularly in relation 
to the carrying out of military humanitarian interventions. First, I will outline some of the theoretical 
foundations of liberal thought relevant to the concept of common humanity, then proceed on to 
cosmopolitanism, before finishing the chapter with a discussion of how these strands of liberal and 
cosmopolitan thought have manifested in the form of justifying humanitarian intervention for the 
sake of common humanity. 
Part One: Liberalism, Human Rights and Common Humanity 
Liberal thought has been instrumental in the concept of common humanity rising to prominence in 
international politics. While the key historical milestones have been mentioned in the previous 
chapter, here I provide an overview of how the concept of common humanity is closely tied to 
liberal theory. It should be noted that liberalism encompasses a wide range of thought, values, and 
principles. Liberalism is a notoriously diverse and often an ambiguous school of thought, making it 
difficult to identify an ‘essential’ version. As Bell notes, “[s]elf-declared liberals have supported 
extensive welfare states and their abolition; the imperial civilising mission and its passionate 
denunciation; the necessity of social justice and its outright rejection; the perpetuation of the 
sovereign state and its transcendence; massive global redistribution of wealth and the radical 
inequalities of the existing order.” (Bell, 2014, p. 683). 
Amidst this ambiguity and complexity, it is necessary to establish how liberal political theory stands 
in relation to universal values and the concept of common humanity. John Locke’s classical liberal 
writings, of the late seventeenth century, relate to the concept of common humanity by 
emphasising the importance of liberty to all people. In developing his political theory, Locke argued 
that “[w]e must consider what state all men are naturally in... a state of perfect freedom to order 
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their actions and dispose of their possessions and person, as they think fit, within the bounds of the 
law of nature; without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.” (Locke, 2005, p. 
18). This depiction of the state of nature leads to Locke’s belief in “[m]en being... by nature all free, 
equal, and independent” (Locke, 2005, p. 58). This freedom and liberty that all people are born with 
can only be given up by consent, as “[t]he only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural 
liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a 
community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living.” (Locke, 2005, p. 58). Freedom and 
liberty are, therefore, natural qualities belonging to all people and these rights can only be given up 
if they choose, for example, to give up their rights in the form of a social contract. However, even 
when one gives up their liberty and freedom, the state still has responsibilities to uphold to its 
citizens:  
But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they 
had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society... the society, or legislative constituted by them, 
can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good... And so whoever has the legislative 
or supreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws... by 
indifferent and upright judges... all this to be directed to no other end but the peace, safety, and public 
good of the people. (Locke, 2005, pp. 73-74).  
This demonstrates that citizens are ordained with certain rights at birth and that even when they 
give up their absolute freedom and liberty, the state they belong to still has an obligation to work for 
their citizens’ common good. These points made by Locke relate to a concept of common humanity 
as they allude to the belief that all people have the same rights and states are obliged to respect 
these rights.  
John Stuart Mill also wrote on the liberty of citizens and the state they belonged to during the 
nineteenth century. One of the key arguments made in his work Liberty is the importance of 
freedom to the citizens of a state. States should not unnecessarily interfere with their citizens; for 
example the freedom of speech, opinion and press should all be upheld (Mill, 1977). It is only 
permissibly to curtail freedom and liberty when it comes to action. This means that someone is 
entitled to their opinion, but this cannot lead to an action that harms another person: 
The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other 
people. But if he refrains from molesting others... the same reasons which show that opinion should be 
free, prove also that he should be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at 
his own cost. (Mill, 1977, p. 260). 
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So as long as harm is not done freedom and liberty should prevail for the citizens of a state. Mill 
concludes with two points regarding the actions of citizens. First, “[t]he individual is not accountable 
to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself” (Mill, 
1977, p. 292) and “[s]econdly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the 
individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if society is 
of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection.” (Mill, 1977, p. 292). Mill’s work 
on liberty relates to the concept of common humanity as it details the freedom and liberty people 
should hold as well as certain responsibilities governments hold in order to protect their citizenry. In 
many ways Mill’s stance is similar to that of Locke.3 Both interpretations place the state as being 
subservient to its citizens’ wellbeing, the priority of which stems from the universal rights of free 
individuals. The state is of value, in other words, only when it serves the interests of humanity. 
This liberal thought of freedom and equality extends directly into international politics with the work 
of Immanuel Kant, which is heavily tied to the concept of common humanity. Kant, widely regarded 
as a progenitor of cosmopolitan thought, wrote a treatise on how the world could attain ‘perpetual 
peace’ through a liberal framework. He believed that war, not peace was the natural condition and 
because of this he felt the need to write his treatise (Kant, 1996). The first condition to achieve 
peace was that, “[t]he civil constitution in every state shall be republican”. This was based upon the 
principles of ‘freedom’, ‘a single common legislation’, and ‘equality’, which according to Kant come 
from the concept of ‘right’. In the eyes of Kant this would lead to perpetual peace as in a republican 
state, “[t]he consent of the citizens of a state is required in order to decide whether there shall be 
war or not... nothing is more natural than that they will be very hesitant to begin... since they would 
have to decide to take upon themselves all the hardships of war.” (Kant, 1996, pp. 322-323). The 
second article for attaining perpetual peace lays out that, “[t]he right of nations shall be based on a 
federalism of free states.” This required states to form into something similar to a ‘league of nations’ 
where each state, “for the sake of its security... enter... into a constitution similar to a civil 
constitution, in which each can be assured of its right (Kant, 1996, pp. 325-326). Kant believed 
federalism could lead to perpetual peace: 
For if... powerful and enlightened people can form itself into a republic... this would provide a focal 
point of federative union for other states, to attach themselves to it and so to secure a condition of 
freedom of states... by further alliances of this kind, it would gradually extend further and further. 
(Kant, 1996, p. 327).  
                                                          
3
 Mill’s Liberty has been criticised for being a contradiction to his previous writings, however, this work is 
relevant to the argument at hand. 
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The third article proposed by Kant is that “[c]osmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of 
universal hospitality.” This argues that states are obliged to be hospitable to those entering into 
their state and cannot be treated with ‘hostility’, all have the right to visit another state, “by virtue 
of the right of possession in common of the earth’s surface” (Kant, 1996, p. 329). Kant views this as a 
way in which the world will naturally become more intertwined: 
In this way distant parts of the world can enter peaceably into relations with one another, which can 
eventually become publicly into relations with one another, which can eventually become publically 
lawful and so finally bring the human race ever closer to a cosmopolitan constitution. (Kant, 1996, p. 
329).   
The first article sets up a world made up of republics that according to Kant are far less likely to 
resort to war. The following two articles explain how this can create a world that is built upon 
interconnectedness and universalism thus reducing the risk of war. This liberal world view was 
ahead of its time in many ways containing many elements related to the concept of common 
humanity. It focuses on creating a homogenous world political system based upon liberal principles 
and values that can be exported around the world in order to prevent war.  
Kant’s legacy has been instrumental to the rise of discourses concerning human rights and common 
humanity in international relations. Brown discusses the re-emergence of Kantian thinking alongside 
the rise deontology in international politics in the 1950s. This is apparent in the importance that has 
been given to human rights since the Second World War as well as debates concerning the way in 
which warfare is conducted (Brown, 1992, pp. 91-92). More importantly Kant has had a major 
influence on contemporary democratic peace theory. Fukuyama believes Kant to be champion of 
liberalism and the founder of the democratic peace theory (as cited in Buchan, 2002, p. 409). 
Fukuyama supports this democratic peace theory claiming that liberal-democratic regimes “manifest 
little distrust or interest in mutual domination... [because they] share with one another principles of 
universal equality and rights.” (as cited in Buchan, 2002, p. 409). Michael Doyle has also used a 
Kantian framework in his writing on democratic peace theory (Doyle, 1983, p. 225; Doyle, 2005, p. 
463). The work of Kant is used to explain the contemporary phenomena of “the tendencies of liberal 
states simultaneously to be peace-prone in their relations with each other and war-prone in their 
relations with nonliberal states.” (Doyle, 2005, p. 463). These examples demonstrate how much Kant 
has influenced contemporary liberal theorists and has contributed to the predominance of liberal 
internationalist discourses in contemporary international politics. It is with liberal internationalism, 
in turn, that we find a striking prevalence of ideas based on the concept of common humanity. 
31 
 
Liberal Internationalism  
Liberal internationalism entails many different interpretations but the common traits include “an 
optimist assumption... that states can overcome constraints and cooperate to solve security 
dilemmas, pursue collective action, and create an open, stable system.” (Ikenberry, 2009, p. 72). 
Alongside this “[l]iberal internationalists also share the view that democracies are- in contrast to 
autocratic and authoritarian states- particularly able and willing to operate within a open, rule-based 
international system and to cooperate for mutual gain.” (Ikenberry, 2009, p. 72). Like Kant, there is a 
belief that international politics would benefit from all states adhering to the same form of 
governance, principles, and values. 
Liberal internationalism was prevalent in the twenty first century with Woodrow Wilson epitomising 
this liberal internationalist spirit. The concept of common humanity is very much a part of Wilsonian 
statecraft as it represented a shift towards imposing liberalism onto the rest of the world for the 
benefit of humanity as a whole. Wilson, “sought to transform the old global system based on the 
balance of power, spheres of influence, military rivalry, and alliances into unified liberal international 
order based on nation-states and the rule of law.” (Ikenberry, 2009, p. 75).  In order to achieve this, 
Wilson was willing to push American concepts of liberalism onto the international community 
believing that it would be to the benefit of the rest of the world: 
He projected American nationalism onto the Old World as the basis for his foreign policy... He wanted 
to redeem the Old World from its outmoded system of alliances that depended upon a discredited 
balance of power. He sought to establish a new community of nations that would rely instead on 
collective security. (Ambrosius, 1991, p. 3). 
This Wilsonian vision of statecraft did not take hold as the US did not join the League of Nations and 
it failed to live up to the expectations placed upon it, eventually crumbling on the eve of the Second 
World War (Henig, 2010, pp. 59, 172, 173). However, it was an important insight into changing 
perceptions of international relations and liberal internationalism continued to rise. In the post war 
world “[t]he United States found itself not just the sponsor and leading participant in a new liberal 
international order-it was also owner and operator of it. The vision of liberal order turned into liberal 
hegemonic order” (Ikenberry, 2009, p. 76). However, Ikenberry argues that with the end of the Cold 
War the emphasis shifted from the US towards the international community. The international 
community became the “repository for new human rights and national security norms.” (Ikenberry, 
2009, pp. 79-80). Whether or not this is true is up for debate as many see the ‘international 
community’ as a Western creation with the United States being the leaders of changing the 
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international system towards a system that reflects human rights and permits intervention when 
gross atrocities are being committed (Krieg, 2012, p. ix). What remains significant, however, is the 
enormous influence that liberal internationalist theory and practice has wielded in the development 
of international order post-WWII. 
Liberal Human Rights Law, International Law, and Sovereignty 
This liberal internationalism has led to changes in interpretations of human rights, international law 
and perceptions of sovereignty. Previously, international law was characterised by the power of the 
state; states had autonomy and the right to their territorial integrity. New forms of international law 
reflecting the values of common humanity have been elaborated on by some theorists in an attempt 
to make common humanity the touchstone for international or global politics.  
Regarding human rights law the idea of universal standards and natural rights date back thousands 
of years. This stems from the belief that all people are born with certain rights bestowed upon them 
by a higher authority than humankind. Every person in the world is born with certain rights that can 
never be removed that are inherent to all human beings, rather being human constructs they are 
instilled naturally (Renzo, 2012, p. 450). These natural rights stem from natural law that dates back 
to the Ancient Greeks and was expanded upon further in later years. In the New World  Las Casas 
spoke of the inherent rights that the native people were born with and thus they should be treated 
as human beings and not be subject to barbaric treatment (Ishay, 2007, pp. 165-167). The belief in 
natural rights means that every life is of equal importance with no group of people having any more 
rights than another group. This is tied to the concept of common humanity because if all people 
have the same universal rights one cannot stand by while people’s inalienable rights are destroyed. 
Natural concepts are applied to contemporary international law. To Abella, such things as universal 
human rights vastly outweigh the importance of state sovereignty and other laws that undermine 
the importance of universal human rights (Abella, 2010, pp. 874- 875). The argument made is that 
the creation of the United Nations was always for the betterment of the global community with the 
objective of bringing the world together to cooperate peacefully on matters; after all it emerged 
from the devastation wrought by the Second World War (Abella, 2010, pp. 874-875). Legal 
positivism does not enter the equation. Law and morality are intrinsically linked with it being 
necessary for international law to closer reflect universal morality. Here, Abella makes the case that 
international human rights law should be framed in a way that reflects universal morals and values, 
stating that all people belong to the same humanity (Abella, 2010, p. 877). 
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The power of jus cogens norms, an element of customary international law, provides a platform to 
argue for the existence of universal human rights in international law. In the pursuit of a world that 
embraces liberalism it has been argued that human rights have become a jus cogens norm that 
cannot be broken by rogue states that do not recognise them. The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties states that any treaty law is rendered invalid if it conflicts with a peremptory norm or a 
norm that is recognized by the international community as a whole (Sivakumaran, 2009, p. 146). This 
is because customary law overrides treaty law and if there is an ambiguity, or a contradiction in 
international law the customary jus cogens law overrides treaty law. The question is: has universal 
human rights and all that entails become jus cogens? Many believe that norms against aggressive 
war, slavery, and genocide all fall into this category (Boucher, 2011, p. 764). Particularly in the case 
of the law against genocide, it appears that it has become part of customary international law, even 
if a state has not signed the Genocide Convention it is still bound by it as it has become a norm of 
the international community (Thornberry, 1980, p. 255).4 This demonstrates how human rights 
principles have developed from abstraction into being a part of international law. A state cannot be 
against a jus cogens norm and thus in certain circumstances will have to adopt certain provisions 
conforming to universal human rights even if they have not ratified any human right declarations 
and do not agree with them. The argument made here is that the acknowledgment of human rights 
in international law has contributed to the concept of common humanity and those who do not 
agree with common humanity should be overridden by the rest of the international community.  
Further to the jus cogens aspect of the concept of common humanity is the very similar term erga 
omnes that liberal internationalists have also used as a way of arguing for universal principles and 
values relating to humanity. An erga omnes law is a law that applies to all. Violations of peremptory 
norms have often been argued to be conscience-shocking and thus it must be made illegal to violate 
such norms (Sivakumaran, 2009, p. 148). Adding to this idea that human rights laws are erga omnes 
are statements made that stress the obligation states have to protect the rights of their own citizens 
with The Barcelona Traction (Sivakumaran, 2009, pp. 136-137). This demonstrates that a state must 
do all it can in its power to prevent human rights abuses to people under its jurisdiction. The 
International Law Commission (ILC) has stated that a state is responsible for an act that is in breach 
of an international obligation (McCorquodale, 2009, pp. 238-239). The emergence of erga omnes 
norms has created an international community whereby states can impose themselves onto other 
                                                          
4
 So as a practical example if a collection of states decided to make a pact to agree to slavery the states in 
question cannot do so because of the jus cogens element of customary international law that holds that such a 
practice is illegal. 
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states if peremptory norms are violated as these peremptory norms are argued to be erga omnes. 
This is a further example of liberal principles being absorbed into international law.  
Alongside jus cogen norms and erga omnes laws, some have argued that the power of opinio juris 
has been limited, which makes it easier to reshape international politics. This in conjunction with jus 
cogens and erga omnes can be used to make a legal order in international politics that reflects 
Western liberal beliefs. To Boucher, state practice is more important than opinio juris in the need to 
create moral international law: 
I have been putting forward... the recognition that moral rights, or moral claims... which are immanent 
in society, somehow precede their legal recognition... My point is... that the right has already in some 
sense been created by customary practices before its legal recognition or acknowledgement. (Boucher, 
2011, p. 764).  
Traditionally, in order to create customary law there must be two things: firstly state practice, and 
secondly opinio juris, which is when something is believed to be a part of law (Boucher, 2011, p. 
763). A key to preventing something becoming customary international law is by being the 
‘persistent objector’, one who does not follow the same practice as other states and thus does not 
recognise the opinio juris element of customary international law (Boucher, 2011, p. 763). This is a 
way in which states can, and have, resisted against universal human rights as customary 
international law. However, the crux of this problem, as mentioned above, is that it is not necessary 
for all states to partake in a certain state practice in order to create customary international law 
(Boucher, 2011, p. 766). This nullifies the power of the persistent objector. If a less powerful state 
does not recognize a part of customary international law, their opinion can be overridden by other 
states’ commitment to these practices, and this, in turn, can lead to practices and ideologies being 
imposed on less powerful states.  
Liberal internationalist thought extends into matters of sovereignty with support given for popular 
sovereignty at the international level. There has been a shift away from traditional state sovereignty 
towards that of popular sovereignty that places much greater emphasis on how a state must act in 
accordance with human rights. Breaking down the importance of state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity are important parts of building an international community that ties the globe together 
(Linklater, 2007, p. 116). From a legal perspective it is dubious as to how far the notion of popular 
sovereignty has come, although it is true that human rights have become an important part of 
governance. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the international community has passed 
numerous universal human rights conventions that have impacted on the status of sovereignty as 
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states are now expected to adhere to external standards of morality whereas before they were the 
sole judge of how people were treated (Enabulele, 2010, p. 410).  
Other human centred perspectives on security relate to popular sovereignty and the erosion of the 
state. It has been argued that it is necessary to move away from traditional security approaches that 
focus on state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and replace them with human-based security 
approaches (Thomas & Tow, 2002, p. 177). This entails placing the emphasis on the welfare of 
people above state concerns as the security of peoples’ lives is the most important element of 
security (Thomas & Tow, 2002, p. 178). Proponents of human security argue that the international 
community has a duty to protect people no matter where they live, and if need be interventions are 
a legitimate course of action in order to protect people and to bring about positive change (Thomas 
& Tow, 2002, pp. 178-189). Popular sovereignty has become an alternative to state sovereignty and 
is a movement stemming from liberal thought and is increasingly becoming a topic of debate. Closely 
tied to this notion of sovereignty is sovereignty as responsibility. Sovereignty as responsibility stands 
in contrast with the tenets of ‘traditional’ state sovereignty. Here it is argued the protection of 
citizenry has entered into the realm of customary international law as heads of state are now 
accountable for the treatment of their citizens (Bernstein, 2012, p. 326). This will be further explored 
in the final section of this chapter on intervention. 
Liberal Internationalism as the Answer to Global Threats  
Liberal internationalism has been seen as an answer to new threats that pose a risk to international 
security. To a liberal internationalist the crises that present themselves pose a threat to global 
security and liberalism could have a mitigating effect on these crises. As Ignatieff has argued: 
There has been a corresponding shift in the area of international peace and security, resulting from the 
steady decline of interstate wars relative to various types of “internal” armed conflicts, which became 
particularly pronounced in the 1990s. Since 1991 more than fifteen new states have emerged, and 
while some have made the transition to stability, many of them... are struggling... Where states cannot 
control their territory and are fighting insurgencies or ethnic separatism, massacre and ethnic cleansing 
become ways of life. As a result, chaos has replaced tyranny as the new challenge to human rights in 
the twenty-first century. (Ignatieff, 2003, p. 299). 
The international community felt the need to assist in solving these problems and in response the 
UN and its member states attempted to find solutions to these human rights abuses with the 
response sometimes taking the form of humanitarian intervention (Ignatieff, 2003).  The problems of 
the 1990s  reflected that international relations now, “projects more deeply into the domestic policy 
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sphere of states.” (Ruggie, 2005, p. 311). States can no longer act without regard for the 
international community as the entire world is linked together. 
A theory that liberal internationalists believe could put an end to these humanitarian crises is the 
democratic peace theory that argues democracies lead to peace and stability and do not attack each 
other. The key reasons why democracies lead to peace and stability is because they have, “due 
process; an independent bar and judiciary; protection for minorities; a free press; as well as rights-of 
association, religion, and expression.” (Abella, 2010, p. 877). Abella is proud of these democratic 
principles stating, “I, for one, am not the least bit embarrassed to trumpet them, because when we 
trumpet these core democratic values, we trumpet the instruments of justice.” Hence it is wise to 
promote democracy throughout the world as a means of achieving state and global security as well 
as it being instrumental in facilitating the observance of human rights (Abella, 2010, p. 877). If every 
state is democratic the fear of attack disappears as every state shares the same ideology removing 
any tension and hostility between states. After the collapse of the Soviet Union President Clinton 
declared that democratic peace theory was a pillar of the United States’ foreign policy as it would 
ensure the security of the United States. States that are liberal democracies are defined as states 
that have free speech, regular elections, are built upon freedom, and support peace (Owen, 1994, p. 
89). The argument follows that when liberal regimes are faced with other liberal regimes they are 
more willing to deal with diplomacy and because of free speech the citizens of these states can 
protest a war so the prospect of war peters out. In cases where there is an illiberal regime war is 
more likely to break out as sometimes it is determined that war is an acceptable action against these 
illiberal regimes (Owen, 1994, p. 89). The democratic peace theory argues that with liberal 
ideologies such as freedom and democracy world conflicts can be significantly reduced or potentially 
stopped all together. In this scenario the ideology of liberalism is deemed beneficial to all of 
humanity and so it can be imposed upon other states. 
The belief that democracy promotion leads to a more peaceful international community that 
upholds universal human rights and better reflects a common humanity stands in contrast to 
arguments made in favour of cultural relativism. Both Ignatieff and Tesόn disregard cultural 
relativism arguing that some things are right and others are wrong regardless of cultural context. In 
response to cultural relativist claims against liberal internationalism, Tesόn states, “I have never 
been able to see merit in relativism as a general philosophical view. If... our philosophical judgement 
that all persons have rights is sound, then it is universally sound. It does not really matter if the 
historical origin of that judgement is Western or something else.” (Tesόn, 2003, p. 100). This 
argument is backed up by the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, ratified in 2001, stating 
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that cultural diversity cannot be used as a justification to violate human rights that are a part of 
international law (Xanthaki, 2010, p. 43). This decision encompasses forced marriages, dowry 
deaths, female circumcision, acid attacks, and honour killings, stating that they are incompatible 
with all religious and cultural values (Xanthaki, 2010, p. 45). This reinforces the idea that democracy 
is not only a way of stopping mass atrocities and shifting towards world peace but it is also the mode 
of governance that best suits the interests of all mankind. For this reason democracy is the best 
representation of common humanity. 
The question then arises as how best to support the creation of liberal regimes the world over. One 
method is from external states supporting the establishment of democratic institutions in states that 
are moving towards democracy but need a helping hand, this is about creating a political 
environment conducive to democracy (Miller, 2010, p. 564). Alternatively another approach to 
creating democracy externally comes in the form of intervention, there have been times when 
dictatorial regimes have been ousted from the outside through war and democratic states have 
been created in their place (Pei, 2002, pp. 6-8). Liberal internationalism supports the democratic 
peace theory and desires a world where states stand for the values of liberalism and respect 
freedom, democracy and peace. This ties to common humanity as the liberals clearly believe in one 
set of universal values, the values of liberty and are not afraid to criticize or confront regimes that do 
not conform to their outlook on what the world should be. 
Liberalism in international relations is inextricably linked to the concept of common humanity. 
Liberalism stresses the importance of liberty in politics, promoting human rights, as well as 
democracy and freedom. This interpretation stresses that liberalism is a universal concept that 
transcends national and cultural divides promoting peace and security (Miller, 2010, p. 571). This 
best summarizes the ties between liberalism and common humanity. Tied to liberalism is 
cosmopolitanism which forms the main theoretical framework in favour of humanitarian 
intervention for the sake of common humanity. 
Part Two: Cosmopolitanism and Common Humanity  
Drawing upon the liberal theory discussed above, cosmopolitan theorists draw more radical political 
arguments from a basic belief in the universal values of common humanity. From this perspective, 
there is a need to establish a more cosmopolitan world to reflect the multipolar nature of 
international politics as the West can no longer dominate as it once did (Held, 2010, p. 2). The core 
beliefs of the majority of cosmopolitans are that all human beings belong to the same community, 
with a shared morality linking us all. As Krieg puts it, “[c]osmopolitanism... [characterizes] the 
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international system as a community of individuals and only secondarily as a community of states... 
Concepts of race, nationality or gender are not deemed important.” (Krieg, 2012, pp. 24-25). This is 
reflected in a large segment of cosmopolitans believing everyone should be free, regardless of the 
political regime they live under (Owen, 1994, p. 94). Cosmopolitan thought is heavily influenced by 
the writings of Immanuel Kant whose theories imply that there is a human community that have 
shared rights and obligations (Kaldor, 1999, p. 115). Firstly the major principles of cosmopolitanism 
need to be established and how these tie into the concept of common humanity.  
Cosmopolitan principles draw from liberal foundations and relate to the concept of common 
humanity. Held lists the principles of cosmopolitanism that he believes to be important and essential 
in being upheld, explaining that all are universally shared and being of equal significance: firstly, all 
people are considered equal; secondly all people have agency, they can act and have responsibilities 
to act in a certain way; they have personal accountability; the right to vote; and all have the right to 
live in conditions where they will not meet serious harm (Held, 2010, p. 69). There is an emphasis on 
rules and principles encompassing all peoples. The ‘metaprinciple of impartialist reasoning’ rejects 
principles and practices that not all could adopt, principles must be established that all can 
reasonably accept and none can discard (Held, 2010, p. 88). However, Held believes his core 
principles of cosmopolitanism stand this “test of impartiality and form, moral and political elements 
upon which all could act.” (Held, 2010, p. 88). These cosmopolitan principles reflect the concept of 
common humanity as they represent the rights of people to live a life free from persecution and 
have a say in their domestic politics.  
Cosmopolitanism requires a belief in the universalism of humanity. The world should be a certain 
way and the international community must strive towards achieving this. For example, Kaldor argues 
that there must be a shift towards, “embracing tolerance, multiculturalism, civility and democracy, 
and to a more legalistic respect for certain overriding universal principles which should guide 
political communities at... the global level.” (Kaldor, 1999, p. 116). The proponents of this 
perspective argue that people are global citizens; they have as close of a connection with people 
from other states as within their own states (Griffiths, Levine, & Weller, 1995, p. 34),  and that there 
is no reason to hold people from their own country in higher regards than people in foreign 
countries (Linklater, 2007, p. 116). The importance of people is placed above other concerns and so 
the rights of people come before the rights of institutions and states (Griffiths et al., 1995, p. 34). 
Because of this thinking all states have to conform to a certain set of guidelines when governing and 
if these standards are not met then they are liable to face the consequences the international 
community deems necessary. To the cosmopolitans it is urgent to refine the bounds of what are and 
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what are not acceptable practices in the international arena (Christopher, 1996, p. 115). Freedom, 
democracy, justice and humanity are the principles of liberty, self-determination, and the sanctity of 
life, which Held believes are principles applicable the world over as they form a fair, and humane 
society (Held, 2010, p. 129). The beliefs of cosmopolitans are, therefore, built on the concept of 
common humanity or human conscience, as their world view is a manifestation of the belief that 
there are universal values that apply to all the citizens of the world. 
 An important part of establishing a cosmopolitan international political system appears through the 
deployment of cosmopolitan concepts of sovereignty as a way of ensuring states act in a manner in 
line with the concept of common humanity. It has been argued that state sovereignty is now 
obsolete because of the impacts of globalization with states being heavily affected by international 
politics and economics (Linklater, 2007, pp. 120-121). Proponents of cosmopolitanism see changing 
the way in which sovereignty is interpreted as a way of enhancing the welfare of people across the 
world. Traditionally states had complete power over their territory, however, the rise of human 
rights led to the changing of sovereignty. States’ authority and legitimacy in international politics 
comes from their status as protectors and providers of their citizens. States do not have power, 
authority, or legitimacy if they commit crimes against humanity against their citizens, they lose their 
sovereignty in this sense (Slaughter, 2009, p. 110). To Held, this is liberal sovereignty where a state is 
responsible for the protection of basic human rights and without this it loses its political legitimacy. 
Going further than this is the concept of cosmopolitan sovereignty which “challenges the very idea 
of fixed borders and territories governed by states alone.” (Held, 2010, pp. 18-19). States make 
decisions as a wider part of the international community and so decisions are only legitimate if they 
conform to the principles of the international community, as “legitimate decision making is 
conducted in different loci of power within and outside the nation-state.” Held states that the world 
must adhere to this framework in order to deal with contemporary issues the world is faced with 
(Held, 2010, p. 19). To summarize Held’s point of view, “[e]ntrenched in certain legal instruments is 
the view that a legitimate state must be a democratic state that upholds certain common values.” 
(Held, 1995, p. 104). This is a cosmopolitan extension to popular sovereignty and sovereignty as 
responsibility, sharing many attributes of the latter.  
The objective of many cosmopolitans is to build cosmopolitan democracy that supports the spread 
of universal human standards and global political institutions. Theorists such as Archibugi have 
argued the case for a cosmopolitan democracy that promotes democracy within nations, between 
states and at the global level. This would result in new institutions based on world citizenship being 
created in order to limit existing state functions, manage global issues and intervene in rogue states 
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when human rights abuses are committed (Archibugi, 1998, p. 216). Under this model it is necessary 
to reform the UN Charter in order to reflect cosmopolitan democratic law and provide a new charter 
of rights and obligations that states have to adhere to. For a cosmopolitan international system to 
take shape it would require a second chamber of the UN that would take the form of a global 
parliament; enhanced political regionalization, entailing the formation of more institutions like the 
EU; the creation of a human rights court that is interconnected in the global legal system; and the 
establishment of an international military force made from a proportion of a nation states military 
resources (Held, 1995, p. 279). The concept of cosmopolitan democracy requires a substantial 
overhaul of current international politics to greater reflect an international community. This would 
reform the world based upon a singular identity, common humanity, that the cosmopolitan believes 
best represents the interests of humanity.  
Cosmopolitanism reflects the concept of common humanity and has been accompanied by attempts 
to alter international politics to better reflect this common humanity. So far it has been established 
that liberal internationalists and cosmopolitans believe that states have an obligation to protect 
their citizens from human rights abuses. In the final section of this chapter I will examine how they 
believe the international community should react to states when they fail to fulfil their obligation to 
their citizens. 
Part Three: Liberalism, Cosmopolitanism and Humanitarian Intervention 
To certain liberal internationalist and cosmopolitan thinkers there is an obligation to intervene in 
order to uphold the universal values they represent and protect those that cannot protect 
themselves. In the event of intentional widespread catastrophic human suffering a state relinquishes 
its right to non-intervention (Christopher, 1996, p. 112). As discussed above, when situations of 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity occur it paves the way for the 
justification of a humanitarian intervention (Pattison, 2007, p. 302). Even in cases that do not have 
the backing of the United Nations these proponents argue that for the sake of common humanity 
there should be an intervention (Christopher, 1996, p. 111). Likewise, the cosmopolitan theory 
described above rests upon the concept of common humanity and that our common humanity must 
be upheld across all countries and cultures. It is unacceptable for a state to hide behind a wall of 
state autonomy, territorial integrity, and cultural or religious practices if these get in the way of 
peace and safety for humanity. If need be, humanitarian interventions are considered necessary in 
order to prevent atrocities that shock our collective conscience.  
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Liberal internationalism supports the use of force in order to protect those that cannot protect 
themselves and the establishment of governments that reflect the concept of common humanity. 
Tesόn states that, “[h]umanitarian intervention is morally justified... on a standard assumption of 
liberal political philosophy: a major purpose of states and governments is to protect and secure 
human rights... rights that all persons have by virtue of personhood alone.” (Tesόn, 2003, p. 93). 
Furthermore, “[w]e all have the obligation to respect those rights; the obligation to promote such 
respect for all persons; depending on the circumstances, the obligation to rescue victims of tyranny 
or anarchy, if we can do so at a reasonable cost to ourselves.” (Tesόn, 2003, p. 94). Ignatieff agrees 
with this sentiment arguing that there is an obligation on behalf of the international community to 
create stable governments. Most importantly, this is viewed by Ignatieff as “both a matter of 
conscience – since without governance human beings are unlikely to have any human rights 
protection worth the name – and a matter of state interest.” (Ignatieff, 2003, p. 306). This is a case 
that demonstrates the belief on behalf of liberal internationalists that humanitarian interventions 
can be justified on liberal grounds that are in line with the concept of common humanity provided 
that it also accords with the perceived self-interests of the intervening states. 
Support for humanitarian intervention relates to the liberal internationalist concepts of sovereignty 
and international law mentioned earlier. Both Bouchard and Elihu Lauterpacht believe that in 
circumstances where there are human rights being violated by a state there is a legitimate cause for 
the international community to launch an humanitarian intervention legally if the human rights 
violations ‘shock the conscience of mankind’ (as cited in Duke, 1994, p. 33). Based upon a liberal 
internationalist critique the nature of crimes against humanity is that they attack a specific group of 
people and are so barbaric that they violate the dignity of the victims which concerns the 
international community. The result of this can be an intervention (Renzo, 2012, p. 444). As 
mentioned above, under this interpretation whether or not treaties had been signed is irrelevant as 
these crimes breach customary international law. This overrides the lack of signatories to any given 
declaration and holds these states accountable for their human rights abuses if universal human 
rights are jus cogens (Boucher, 2011, p. 766). Under treaty law, many states have not ratified 
treaties, rendering them non-binding. However, these treaties do not need to be ratified by all as 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity are all illegal under customary 
international law (Duke, 1994). This demonstrates the liberal internationalist belief that if acts are 
particularly barbaric they violate the concept of common humanity and thus make intervention 
lawful. 
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Somewhere between liberal internationalist and cosmopolitan advocates of military force are RtoP 
proponents who draw upon sovereignty as responsibility in justifying humanitarian intervention. 
This redefiniton of sovereignty was proposed by the ICISS report and holds three main attributes: 
the first attribute of sovereignty as responsibility is that a state is responsible for protecting the 
safety and lives of its citizens. Secondly, the state is responsible to the international community and 
the United Nations. Thirdly, the state is responsible for its actions. Hence, according to the ICISS 
report: 
Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility... has a threefold significance. First, it implies that the state 
authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion 
of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political authorities are responsible to the 
citizens internally and to the international community through the UN. And thirdly, it means that the 
agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their acts of 
commission and omission. (ICISS, 2001, p. 13).  
Under this interpretation of sovereignty, states do not enjoy the privileges of immunity and non-
intervention they enjoyed under traditional legal conceptions of state sovereignty, as they are 
required to uphold certain international standards. If they commit atrocities or other acts 
condemned by the international community they can be held accountable and lose their sovereignty 
(Henderson, 2014, pp. 13-14). Under this form of sovereignty if a state fails to protect the rights of 
its citizens then the international community has a responsibility to respond and to intervene in the 
state in question (Pattison, 2007, p. 301). This is made apparent in the ICISS report: 
When preventive measures fail to resolve or contain the situation and when a state is unable or 
unwilling to redress the situation, then interventionary measures by other members of the broader 
community of states may be required. These coercive measures may include political, economic or 
judicial measures, and in extreme cases... they may also include military action. As a matter of first 
principles, in the case of reaction just as with prevention, less intrusive and coercive measures should 
always be considered before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied. (ICISS, 2001, p. 29). 
External state sovereignty is, therefore, no longer an uncontested part of international law. RtoP and 
sovereignty as responsibility have been used as a way of asking questions regarding certain state’s 
practices, altering perceptions of what a sovereign must adhere to (Henderson, 2014, pp. 14-16). 
RtoP advocates hope that their theory becomes the recognised form of sovereignty in international 
relations as they believe it is the best way of preventing atrocities that shock the conscience of 
mankind. 
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Many cosmopolitan thinkers, like liberal internationalists and RtoP proponents, believe that the use 
of force is permissible in certain circumstances in order to uphold the concept of common humanity. 
However, cosmopolitans tend to be stricter on the military operations involved with an intervention. 
The humanitarian interventions of the 1990s were criticized for being too motivated by state 
interests rather than humanitarianism. In response to this there was a push to create new non-
governmental authorities that could legitimately push for democracy in the global order (Archibugi, 
1998, p. 210). The cosmopolitan theorists that propose such action generally draw up a large list of 
criteria that the intervention must follow in order for it to be conducted in a manner reflecting the 
concept of common humanity. In order for humanitarian interventions to become an accepted part 
of international politics, trust must be built with states outside the West that see intervention as 
being motivated by state interests. To build legitimacy, all human rights abuses must be condemned 
and dealt with all of the time so the rest of the world sees and is convinced that the West is not 
intervening for political and economic reasons (Held, 2010, p. 135). This leads to the importance of 
post intervention reconstruction as there must be, “restructuring of political and economic 
arrangements so as not to repeat the conditions that gave rise to war.” Both law and order have to 
be restored so normal life can resume and refugees and those who were displaced in the conflict can 
return to their lives (Kaldor, 1999, pp. 133-134). Cosmopolitans believe that the principles of 
liberalism can be enforced through military means if certain conditions are met by the international 
community. This is a way in which the cosmopolitan concept of common humanity will grow in 
international relations. 
Archibugi proposes a comprehensive plan to guide future humanitarian interventions to ensure that 
they are in line with the concept of common humanity and prevent human rights violations. 
Interventions should only take place when there are ‘collective violations of human rights’, and the 
UN International Law Commission is the most fitting organisation to create guidelines for 
humanitarian intervention (Archibugi, 2004, p. 6). From Archibugi’s perspective, individual states or 
intergovernmental organisations should not decide on when to intervene because they hold bias. 
However, if a World Court or collection of experts from NGO’s decide on such issues it is more likely 
that the decision will be impartial (Archibugi, 2004, p. 10). After deciding whether or not there is a 
justification for intervention, Archibugi then proposes methods to improve the required military 
operations. Firstly, the UN should be responsible for creating new methods of intervention; currently 
the intervening governments are responsible for the intervention plans, this should be changed with 
the UN being the authority that decides on what course of action to take: 
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A successful humanitarian intervention ought to have available a much wider battery of instruments 
than airstrikes... Sometimes smart sanctions such as the confiscation of the financial assets of the 
leaders of foreign countries would be much more effective, and certainly much less damaging, than air 
strikes. The role of the International Criminal Court will, hopefully, be to charge those responsible for 
crimes against humanity individually. Then, when military intervention is needed, it is important that 
the armed forces be prepared to use the methods of policing, rather than those of war. (Archibugi, 
2004, pp. 12-13).  
The final major change Archibugi proposes to the current international system is the implementation 
of a UN standing army that is trained to be peacekeepers rather than soldiers with this being 
comprised of soldiers from countries that have a good record of upholding human rights (Archibugi, 
2004, pp. 13-14). The adoption of these measures is the best way the Western-led international 
community can fight human rights violations (Archibugi, 2004, p. 14). If a state was to oppose such 
measures Archibugi questions their sincerity in invoking humanitarian motives for previous 
interventions. This plan of Archibugi’s is the way future humanitarian interventions can reflect the 
concept of common humanity. 
Kaldor expands on how best to mix cosmopolitanism with military force by stating how a 
cosmopolitan military should be structured. Force should be used in cases of civil war with the 
international community taking on a mix between policing and soldiering: soldiering requires 
separating belligerents, maintaining ceasefires, controlling airspace, protecting safety zones and 
relief corridors, while policing entails ensuring freedom of movement, providing safety to 
individuals, and capturing war criminals (Kaldor, 1999, p. 125). These cosmopolitan troops should be 
a “new kind of soldier-cum-policeman which will require considerable rethinking about tactics, 
equipment and, above all, command and training.” (Kaldor, 1999, p. 130) and are best suited to 
being comprised of multilateral forces (Kaldor, 1999, p. 131). Kaldor concludes that: 
The new cosmopolitan troops have to become the legitimate bearers of arms. They have to know and 
respect the laws of war and follow a strict code of conduct... Whereas the soldier, as the legitimate 
bearer of arms, had to be prepared to die for his country, the international soldier/policeman risks his 
or her life for humanity. (Kaldor, 1999, p. 131). 
To Kaldor this shift towards cosmopolitan troops is a way in which interventions can become less 
controversial and better represent the universal values of the international community. 
Liberal internationalists, RtoP advocates, and Cosmopolitans have used liberal ideals, values, and 
thought in order to push international politics further towards an international community that 
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reflects the concept of common humanity. Their objective is to establish a global system based on a 
universal set of principles that best represent humanity. If the circumstances are right, this utopian 
ideal can even be enforced through military force, although this is considered a last resort. The 
cosmopolitans propose that military power can be used to enforce liberal ideals but it has to be used 
consistently and carefully otherwise it does not hold up to cosmopolitan values. This issue is a 
continual problem for humanitarian intervention as will be discussed in chapter four. 
Conclusion 
The rise of liberalism and cosmopolitanism represents support for the concept of common humanity 
in international politics. The proponents of both philosophies believe it is important for international 
politics that the concept takes hold so all people can live in freedom. The liberals and cosmopolitans 
discussed believe that all humans are born with certain rights that states are obliged to uphold. 
When they see that these rights have not been upheld they seek ways of making the concept of 
common humanity a practiced part of international relations through new interpretations of 
international law and sovereignty. The argument put forth is that there must be change in 
international politics where states have to start taking better care of their citizens, abiding by 
universal morals that transcend territorial boundaries. In extreme circumstances when a state is 
reneging on its commitment to its citizens and committing conscience shocking acts the 
international community is obligated to act under new interpretations of international law in order 
to protect the human rights of those that cannot protect themselves. As Tesόn states, “[n]on-
interventionism is a doctrine of the past. It feeds on illiberal intellectual traditions (relativism, 
communitarianism, nationalism, and statism) that are objectionable for various reasons and that, 
where implemented, have caused grievous harm to persons.” (Tesόn, 2003, p. 128). The belief that 
law should be based on conceptions of morality leads liberal and cosmopolitan theorists and policy-
makers to push their moral compass out onto the rest of the world believing that what they stand 
for is right and people that stand against them are wrong. The contradiction that these proponents 
fail to address is that they are promoting the enforcement of an ideology and a set of principles that 
champions freedom upon the rest of the world. Critics of this position argue that this deployment of 
universal values is problematic and it is these critiques that I will explore in the following chapter.
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Chapter Three: Critics of the Concept of Common Humanity 
In contrast to the liberal and cosmopolitan theorists discussed in the preceding chapter, there are 
those who are critical of the concept of common humanity and argue that such an idea should not 
become a regular part of international relations. This is explored from a communitarian perspective 
that rejects the political salience and desirability of a universal humanity. From this perspective, the 
concept of common humanity is flawed as our identity and values stem from the community to 
which we belong rather than from universal concepts. The middle sections of this chapter will 
examine Schmitt’s realist position on the concept of common humanity and then Orford’s post 
structuralist critique. The final section argues that the problematisation of the concept of common 
humanity makes its application to international law and politics more complicated. The conclusion 
reached is that the concept of common humanity cannot be effectively applied in the real world 
because, despite the treaties and rhetoric surrounding human rights, the practice of the 
international community indicates that there is not a universal concept of community and morality 
that binds us together. In practical cases the critics of common humanity argue that it is merely 
rhetoric used to gain popular support and legitimacy for an intervention into a state. These 
interventions based upon universalism are undesirable as the politicization of the concept of 
common humanity leads to the subjugation and exploitation of states that do not conform to the 
powerful states notion of values and morality. The critics of the concept of common humanity use 
communitarianism, realist political theory, and post-structuralism as platforms for critiquing it and I 
will examine each of these positions in turn. 
Part One: Communitarianism 
Communitarianism stresses the importance of community in shaping identity and understandings of 
rights. There are many varieties of communitarianism, as the field “is complex and contains within 
itself more than one theory of politics.” (Brown, 1992, p. 75). However, one strand rejects the liberal 
and cosmopolitan claims made in international politics. As Brown argues, “communitarian 
positions... contrast to cosmopolitanism [as they] attempt to deepen an understanding of communal 
and social solidarity rather than theorise the relationship between the individual and humankind” 
(Brown, 1992, p. 55). People are shaped by the community they belong to; different communities 
have different cultural, religious, social, and traditional values that shape the identity of a person. 
Under this interpretation there is no universal humanity or concept of morality, we form our 
opinions on the world from the communities we come from, not because of what someone in a far 
distant land thinks we should believe in. It is important to clarify that communitarianism is a field 
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that encompasses many differing opinions (Watson, 1999, p. 216), and some such as Michael Walzer 
support humanitarian intervention, however, this chapter explores communitarianism from a 
position that rejects humanity as a political concept and thus humanitarian intervention as it 
politicizes humanity.  
Communitarianism emphasises the importance of community in shaping values and morality. This 
argues against the cosmopolitan notion of universal community and morality and the attempts to 
make the world a singular entity. There is no evidence that all people want to belong to the same 
international community, they want to belong to their own community and for their community to 
govern itself. Communitarians believe that our identities and personalities come from, at least in 
part, one’s community (Gutmann, 1992, p. 121). This identity manifests itself in all societies 
conceptions of how people of  a state should be treated, this leads to individual states producing 
their own balance between rights, responsibilities and a common good depending on their own 
particular cultural and historical context (Etzioni, 2014, p. 246). There is no set of universal standards 
that influences when and to what extent a society will adopt rights and responsibilities, rather there 
are a set of temporal and historically specific conditions that result in a state, or community, being 
the way it is. There are a whole host of reasons why communitarians emphasise community over 
cosmopolitan citizenship, including the lack of globalized commemorations (we commemorate 
events at the state level to foster national pride but have few international commemorations done 
that build international identity); the fact that there is no social contract with the international 
community, as well as the complexity of determining and deciding upon rights and duties at the 
global level (Linklater, 2007, pp. 110-111). In addition to scholarly scepticism towards 
cosmopolitanism, the general populace seems to have a general sense of apathy towards the global 
community. McFarland conducted an experiment in order to establish whether or not people 
consider themselves part of humanity as a whole or if they identify more closely with their 
community or their country. In the survey conducted, fewer than 15 percent identified with all of 
humanity as much with their community and their country (McFarland, 2011, p. 14). This raises 
questions as to the political reality of common humanity, demonstrating that people feel more 
attached to their own community than the universal human community. 
A problem communitarians have with cosmopolitanism is the difficulty of accommodating plural 
systems of morality or values. One of the strongest criticisms made by communitarians is regarding 
the universalistic mentality of liberalism being biased against certain ways of life and communities as 
it does not allow for the incorporation of varied forms of identity (Moore, 2009, pp. 328-330). 
Instead it presumes to know what is good and what is not, undermining the importance of 
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community in shaping peoples beliefs and values (Moore, 2009, p. 323). This leads to those living in 
the developing world resenting cosmopolitanism as a Western form of imperialism as the 
proponents of cosmopolitanism believe that sovereignty can be broken down in order to protect 
human rights whilst others, such as Dyzenhaus, believe that under no circumstances should 
universal liberalism be used to impose its perceptions of ‘good’ onto the rest of the international 
community in an imperialistic manner (Dyzenhaus, 1999, p. 79). The communitarians explored in this 
chapter believe that concepts of morality are built from communities and that this allows for greater 
acceptance of differing social, cultural, and religious practices, opposed to the cosmopolitan 
perspective that emphasises the conception of humanity and its importance in encompassing the 
rest of the world. 
Communitarian ideas reject the concept of common humanity, instead arguing that people identify 
with their own communities rather than the international community. Universal morals and 
concepts are not possible as our understandings of values, morals, and concepts of humanity come 
from within the communities we are born into. If morals come from community and are not 
universal it leads to scepticism of cosmopolitanism and the rejection of the concept of common 
humanity. Such a critique of universal values comes through clearly in realist international relations 
theory, to which I now turn my attention. 
Part Two: The Realist Critique of Common Humanity 
In much realist literature on international relations, the concept of common humanity is subject to 
critique insofar as it may lead to misguided and dangerous state behaviour. Power is the most 
important guiding principle of much realist discourse with any ideas about the values of ethics being 
mute in the face of raw power. When faced with situations of war, the sovereign will demonstrate 
its power in order to maintain its interests, with any notions of universal morality exiting the 
equation (Vallianos, 2013, p. 211). However, as with the communitarian literature, realism has a 
diverse range of theories that vary significantly and come to considerably different conclusions. The 
realists discussed here that disagree with the concept of common humanity do not, therefore, 
necessarily reflect the beliefs of all realist scholars. For example, Hans Morgenthau, a realist, 
believed that the world had to work together when dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons as it 
was matter of life or death for humankind (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985, p. 450).  
Most realist theorists reject the idea that a state would act out of moral concerns for another state. 
A common line of argument used by classical realists is the criticism that moral discourse ignores the 
political realities of the international system (Korab-Karpowicz, 2013). Realists such as Machiavelli, 
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Spinoza, Hobbes and Hegel all believed that morality and ethics had a limited role in international 
relations (Carr, 1946, p. 153). Likewise, Hans Morgenthau, a prominent realist political scientist in 
the twentieth-century, did not dismiss morality being considered by politicians but argued that it 
had to be weighed against prudential concerns. A state cannot act in the name of morality if it puts 
its citizens at risk of harm; the consequences of action have to be taken into account and prudence 
must be used (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985, p. 12). However, as mentioned above, when it came 
to nuclear weapons, he did support arms control and eventual nuclear disarmament as this was “a 
question of life or death for all mankind” (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985, p. 450). 
In The Twenty Years Crisis, Carr criticises the use of ethics and concepts of universal justice in 
international politics. Carr first published The Twenty Years Crisis in 1939 and was reacting to the 
utopian idealism of the League of Nations. He challenged the idealists who believed that war is an 
aberration in the course of normal life and the way to prevent it is to educate people for peace, and 
to build systems of collective security such as the League of Nations or today's United Nations (Carr, 
1946). Carr criticised the rhetoric of statesmen associated with liberalism such as Woodrow Wilson, 
who declared that it was necessary to “not only think first of America, but... also... think first of 
humanity.” Further, when speaking on the First World War to the US Senate he stated, “[t]hese are 
American principles, American policies. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.” (Carr, 
1946, pp. 78-79). This concept of universal principles is dismissed by Carr, who questions moral 
universalism, declaring that “morality can only be relative, not universal” (Carr, 1946, p. 19). He 
believes that these concepts of humanity can only be created by the superpowers, or a collection of 
like-minded powers. Smaller states or communities do not have the same power to impose their 
beliefs onto the international community (Carr, 1946, p. 79). This leads Carr to reject 
internationalism and cosmopolitanism, based on the belief that powerful states support 
internationalism and cosmopolitanism “to justify and maintain their dominant position.” (Carr, 1946, 
p. 75). The states that support a unified world do so as they have the power to control such a world 
(Carr, 1946, p. 85- 86). States are concerned with their own affairs and when they refer to universal 
values and interests they are actually acting to enhance their own interests (Carr, 1946, p. 71). Carr’s 
Twenty Years Crisis was a reaction to the League of Nations, but the thoughts expressed can also be 
related to other institutions that promote collective security based on explicit or implicit references 
to common humanity, such as the United Nations. 
Carl Schmitt was another prominent realist thinker, writing in Germany during the Weimar Republic 
(Korab-Karpowicz, 2013), who rejected the concept of humanity as politically illogical and potentially 
dangerous. Schmitt was very critical of ideas associated with liberalism, humanism, pacifism, and 
50 
 
social equality (Vallianos, 2013, p. 211). He was convinced that the turn towards liberal 
cosmopolitanism in twentieth century international law would undermine the conditions of stable 
and legitimate international legal order (Korab-Karpowicz, 2013). To natural law and liberal-
individualistic doctrines, humanity is universal, a social ideal, and a system of relations between 
individuals. Schmitt argues that if this existed there would be no nations, class struggles, and no 
enemy groupings as everyone would subscribe to the same set of beliefs (Schmitt, 2008, p. 55). The 
fact that there are nations, class struggles and enemy groupings means that the liberal theory of 
humanity is incorrect. Schmitt, therefore, is critical of attempts to realise the idea of universal 
humanity, claiming, “an emotion that does not transcend the limits of the subjective cannot be the 
foundation of a community.” (Schmitt, 1986, p. 161).  Even if common humanity was a recognised 
part of international law, all law is situational, and the existence of a state places it above legal 
norms. If a state desires, therefore, it can break from normative ties in order to fight for its self 
preservation (Schmitt, 1985, pp. 12-13). This demonstrates Schmitt’s rejection of the concept of 
common humanity and follows the communitarian argument that concepts of humanity are 
particular to specific communities. 
Expanding on this, Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction demonstrates how international politics is 
fragmented, and that a universal conception of humanity does not affect a state’s practice. The 
world political system is compromised of friend/enemy groupings rather than a universal political 
society (Schmitt, 2008, p. 45), with states deciding between who is and who is not the friend and 
enemy (Schmitt, 2008, pp. 43-44). Schmitt’s belief in a fragmented world comprised of alliances and 
tensions between states is incompatible with a concept of common humanity as shown by him 
stating that “[a] world state which embraces the entire globe and all of humanity cannot exist. The 
political world is a pluriverse, not a universe.” (Schmitt, 2008, p. 53) Furthermore, Schmitt argues 
that only if states did away with the friend/enemy relationship would common humanity be 
theoretically possible. Hence, “[i]f the different states, religions, classes, and other human groupings 
on earth should be so unified that a conflict among them is impossible and even inconceivable... 
then the distinction of friend and enemy would also cease” (Schmitt, 2008, p. 53). In other words, 
the definition of politics in terms of a friend/enemy distinction and the permanent possibility of war 
between these groupings, nullifies the realisation of the concept of common humanity. The 
friend/enemy concept means that there is always the possibility of fighting with other states given 
the right circumstances (Schmitt, 2008, p. 27). Schmitt’s approach removes any notion of common 
humanity existing in international politics, believing states choose to ally with some communities 
whilst denouncing others as enemies. Schmitt rejects the idea of common humanity as illogical, for if 
common humanity really existed there would be no politics and no wars, as it would be impossible 
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for us to commit such acts against our fellow human beings. If common humanity was a reality, we 
would see states attempting to come together instead of power blocs forming based upon the 
friend/enemy complex.  
Following his friend/enemy critique in international politics, Schmitt goes on to elaborate on the 
state of humanity and war. For Schmitt, in theory humanity cannot wage war and yet it has been 
used to justify wars: 
Humanity as such cannot wage war because it has no enemy... The concept of humanity excludes the 
concept of the enemy, because the enemy does not cease to be human being-and hence there is no 
specific differentiation in that concept. That wars are waged in the name of humanity is not a 
contradiction of this simple truth; quite the contrary, it has an especially intensive political meaning 
(Schmitt, 2008, p. 54). 
This quote reinforces Schmitt’s rejection of the existence of common humanity but also illustrates 
why such a notion should be treated with caution. The invoking of humanity in war is a political 
move undertaken by a state to mobilize its people against the enemy. Justice and morality do not 
belong with war with the supporters of a just war usually being motivated by a political agenda 
(Schmitt, 2008, p. 49). For this reason Schmitt paraphrases Proudhon stating, “whoever invokes 
humanity wants to cheat.” (Schmitt, 2008, p. 54). These wars can be particularly barbaric and 
contradictory to the rhetoric used by common humanity as declaring the enemy to be an outlaw of 
humanity allows for a war to be waged with extreme inhumanity (Schmitt, 2008, p. 54). In wars for 
humanity, the enemy is degraded to the status of a monster that must be completely destroyed 
(Schmitt, 2008, p. 36). To Schmitt the term humanity has been invoked to justify wars, but this is a 
political tool as there is no common humanity that binds humans together and those that argue that 
there is do not do it out of noble moral considerations but to use it as a political tool to separate the 
enemy from friend.  
Schmitt’s criticism of liberalism and rejection of ‘humanity’ has had a lasting influence on 
international politics. The influential discourse theorist, Chantal Mouffe, for example, shares the 
concern of Schmitt:  
Schmitt’s thought serves as a warning against the dangers of complacency that a triumphant liberalism 
entails. Indeed, his conception of the political brings the crucial deficiencies of the dominant liberal 
approach to the fore. It should shatter the illusions of all those who believe that the blurring of frontiers 
between Left and Right, and the steady moralization of political discourse, constitute progress in the 
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enlightened march of humanity towards a new world order and a cosmopolitan democracy. (Mouffe, 
1999, p. 2). 
The realist thought of Schmitt has created scepticism towards the liberal and cosmopolitan concept 
of common humanity and how it has been used in justifying humanitarian interventions. 
This argument naturally leads to the realist critique of humanitarian intervention. Despite liberal 
humanitarian rhetoric, interventions are carried out in order to advance state interests rather than 
being in line with the concept of common humanity. Not all realists reject the ‘humanitarian’ side of 
humanitarian intervention, as “[some] might accept intervention in order to help those in need so 
long as it does not challenge any core security interests of the state or impose high costs in terms of 
financial resources or loss of life.” (Krieg, 2012, p. 43). However, in reality, no state will risk their own 
people solely for the welfare of others outside of their borders (Choi, 2013, p. 122). It comes down 
to political objectives, and a state will readily intervene in another state if it is politically beneficial 
(Hehir, 1998, p. 30). Many realist thinkers do not have a problem with this, claiming that there is a 
duty to serve the interests of their state in an intervention, as opposed to the more conventional 
understanding of humanitarian intervention that promotes a duty to protect those who are suffering 
in a humanitarian crisis (Pattison, 2013, p. 570). Others, Morgenthau included, have been critical of 
states for using morality as a way of masking their pursuits of self interest (Morgenthau & 
Thompson, 1985, p. 13).  
There are various reasons why a state may want to intervene in another state for political reasons. 
The curbing of refugee flows, or the creation of democratic or human rights respecting states for the 
stability of the international system rather than intervening to save civilians from crises (Pattison, 
2013, p. 570). However, whatever the reasons for an intervention it is not legitimate to name it 
humanitarian intervention if it does not serve a humanitarian purpose, it is an intervention for 
furthering the intervener’s interests (Choi, 2013, p. 122). From this realist perspective, humanitarian 
intervention may be seen as being too unpredictable and expensive for it to be used for the good of 
common humanity, with the impossibly difficult objectives of humanitarian intervention being a 
further deterrent to intervention (Hehir, 1998, p. 30). Contrary to the cosmopolitan belief, these 
realists argue that humanitarian intervention is an oxymoron. 
These realist interpretations are in stark contrast with the liberal cosmopolitans regarding matters of 
emotion and morality entering the discourse on humanitarian intervention. Certain realist figures 
dismiss the liberal interpretation of common humanity in international politics. Common humanity, 
from this perspective, will not be used to bring about a utopian world where universal human rights 
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reign supreme, it will be a world where powerful states justify their wars by arguing that they stand 
for humanity while the enemy stands for tyranny. It will be another way of justifying a particular 
state’s foreign policy, raising human rights issues only when it suits their interests. The United 
States’ condemnation and forceful removal of a regime such as Saddam Hussein’s, for example, was 
tied to their overall geo-political interests. It makes sense for them to condemn regimes that they 
are hostile towards. In other states, such as Saudi Arabia, with high human rights abuses, issue is not 
taken as the United States and other Western powers that promote human rights have good 
relationships with them and they offer economic benefits. To the realists discussed here this 
summarizes the use of human rights and the concept of common humanity: it is a manufactured 
political tool used when it is convenient to do so but then is ignored when it becomes inconvenient. 
The way in which common humanity is manufactured by the powerful is discussed in the next 
section.  
Part Three: Poststructuralism and Common Humanity 
In addition to realist critiques, poststructuralist thought has been used to criticize the concept of 
common humanity. Poststructuralism differs from realism in many ways but in terms of the thesis 
and the wider topic of common humanity both schools of thought believe international politics is 
structured around power. Poststructuralist theorists offer insight into the ability to utilize this power 
to create norms in a historically specific time and place and then exploit this to their advantage. One 
of the major themes of poststructuralism is the rejection of absolutes. Instead, poststructuralism 
places an emphasis on the temporal situation in which norms arise, as this makes norms contestable 
as they are very specific to a certain time and context and thus are subject to change (Miller, 1998, 
p. 205). In the context of this thesis, this would mean that our common humanity is a social 
construct particular to a certain place and time (Bevir, 1999, p. 357). Foucault, for example, stresses 
the importance of historical context and on the topic of humanity, in The Order of Things, he states 
that the concept of mankind is not something that has always existed, instead it is a recent invention 
appearing in Europe since the sixteenth century (Foucault, 1970, p. 386). In contrast to the liberal 
and cosmopolitan theorists who regard common humanity as natural and rational, the 
poststructuralists in this section argue it is manufactured and prone to exploitation.  
This section will argue that the powerful states are the ones that give meaning to the norms that 
arise in a specific historical context. Firstly, Foucault’s work on knowledge and power and the 
importance of discourse in shaping the world will be discussed. Both Dalby and Orford build upon 
Foucault’s discourse theory and demonstrate how international politics has been shaped by the 
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powerful. The focus of Dalby’s work was on the hegemony of security discourse. He demonstrated 
that the ideology of the West was championed as hegemon and the Soviet Union portrayed as the 
evil other that could not be trusted, thus the weapons and institutions of the Cold War period were 
justified (Dalby, 1990, p. 12). Orford uses a similar poststructuralist critique but applies it to the topic 
of humanitarian intervention. Like the realist critique the poststructuralist critique focuses on the 
role power plays in shaping international politics, as opposed to altruism or philanthropy. There is 
the rejection of universalist concepts of humanity as absolutes with sections of poststructuralist 
scholarship offering a more nuanced perspective on the concept of morality. 
Poststructuralists stress the importance of the link between power and identity in international 
politics. Foucault’s work on poststructuralism focuses on the relationship of knowledge and power. 
To Foucault, discourse is used to shape understandings of the world. Hence,  “[i]n Foucault’s terms 
discourses are much more than linguistic performances, they are also plays of power which mobilize 
rules, codes and procedures to assert a particular understanding through the construction of 
knowledges within these rules, codes and procedures.” (as cited in Dalby, 1990, p. 5). These 
discourses can be used to include some whilst excluding others: 
Discursive practices are characterised by the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a 
legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of 
concepts and theories. Thus, each discursive practice implies a play of prescriptions that designates its 
exclusions and choice. (Foucault, 1977, p. 200).  
Foucault argues that “[o]therness is inherent in the analysis of discourse.” The other is distanced and 
considered inferior based upon cultural, racial, national, or political difference. (as cited in Dalby, 
1990, pp. 6-7).  
The link between power and identity found in Foucault’s work is carried out by other 
poststructuralists. Morgan draws attention to the importance of power in shaping the world, 
highlighting the exploitation of those without power by those with power. The exploitation of the 
developing world by the industrialized world is a prime example of this (Morgan, 2003, p. 380). 
Identity is a tool used to reinforce hegemony in international politics; “[t]he critical dimension of the 
concept of ideology... refers to its function in maintaining power relations.” (Dalby, 1990, p. 8). 
Powerful states use intellectuals to disseminate commonly accepted conceptions portraying the 
existing economical and political state of affairs as natural, inevitable, legitimate and in the interests 
of all social groups or classes. These theorists use intellectual rationales to perpetuate certain 
political stances that the hegemon wants spread (Dalby, 1990, p. 9). Dalby draws from Mouffe when 
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referring to hegemony and identity. Hegemony is a discourse of political domination, understandings 
of the world do not come from ‘common sense’ they are created by those that support political 
domination: “Thus, in Mouffe’s words a hegemonic class is one ‘which has been able to articulate 
the interests of other social groups to its own by means of ideological struggle.” (as cited in Dalby, 
1990, p. 9). This is how the hegemon dominates international politics: 
In critical cultural studies the term hegemonic is often used to refer to ideological formulations that are 
widely accepted and used to structure social and political life... Here hegemony refers to all political and 
ideological structures of domination, including therefore the mobilization of discourses to render a 
political position acceptable, legitimate, common sense. (Dalby, 1990, p. 10).     
The powerful define their lands, allies, and sphere of influence as well as the ‘other’, this can be 
created out of ideological, cultural, religious, or other social differences (Dalby, 1990, pp. 17-18). The 
other is created by appealing to people’s sense of identity and fear, focusing on the other as one 
that is against ‘us’. The operation of exclusion is used in order to promote one idea, value, or group 
while keeping out other ones (Dalby, 1990, pp. 17-18). This creation of the other is an example of 
ideological hegemony, “[t]hese geopolitical processes of cultural dichotomizing, designating identity 
in distinction from Others, are important in the ways world orders are constructed.” (Dalby, 1990, 
pp. 22-23). Rather than embracing all of humanity with all its differences and nuances, the powerful 
draw distinctions between those that are included as a part of humanity and those that are 
excluded.     
In order to intervene in regions that pose no threat, rhetoric has to be applied in order to legitimize 
these interventionist actions. The violation of a state’s territorial integrity is a serious action to take 
that violates the UN Charter unless authorized by the UNSC, so for this to be undertaken very good 
reasons have to be given to justify it. Most readily accept that there is not a legal case for justifying 
humanitarian intervention, so they don’t even attempt one, rather they argue that sometimes 
international law has to be broken and it should not be mourned as it is no longer applicable to 
contemporary society (Orford, 2003, p. 165). The ‘otherness’ is created to influence the people of 
the hegemonic power into being sceptical, wary, afraid, or hostile towards the other. With this 
hostility the hegemon can then justify its geopolitical interests by alluding to the threat posed from 
the other. The narrative built is that the other is a challenge to Western universalising culture and so 
it must be shut off in its own space and controlled (Dalby, 1990, p. 160).  
The war on terror is an example of how playing on people’s fear has created the other. Terrorists 
have been labelled irrational barbaric criminals who fall outside the realms of humanity; this has 
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been done to reduce any possible legitimate grievances that they may have. The rhetoric used 
alienates them from the civilized world and limits their influence as they are repeatedly labelled as 
people who want to watch the world burn and to destroy ‘our way of life’ (Jackson, 2002, p. 4). This 
is an effective way of defining the enemy as evil and building favour in order to combat this threat 
considered outside the realm of humanity.  
Anne Orford’s work on humanitarian intervention offers an example of how poststructuralism can 
be deployed in order to critique the concept of common humanity. Orford criticizes the liberal 
internationalism that believes “humanitarian intervention has become necessary to address the 
problems of local dictators, tribalism, ethnic tension and religious fundamentalism thrown up in the 
post-Cold War era.” (Orford, 2003, p. 4). In Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and 
the Use of Force Orford develops critical readings of the narratives that underpinned the militarized 
humanitarian interventions of the 1990s (Orford, 2006, p. xiii). The narrative used to justify 
humanitarian intervention is neo-colonial in nature with the native other represented as being in 
need of protection and governance: 
The way in which international law portrayed the need to intervene in order to protect and look after 
the people of ‘failed states’, and the forms of dependence set up in post-conflict ‘peace-building’ 
situations, seemed to rehearse colonial fantasies about the need for benevolent tutelage of uncivilised 
people who were as yet unable to govern themselves (Orford, 2003, p. 11). 
Orford’s critique of the narratives of humanitarian intervention not only builds the other as being 
potentially hostile it also builds the state that is not the other into a ‘white knight’. From this point 
the powerful state can do as it pleases as it claims its actions are in the interests of humanity as a 
whole, “[i]n the texts of humanitarian intervention, the heroic subject is produced according to the 
logic of a narrative which legalises (or at least legitimises) the violence carried out in the name of the 
international community.” (Orford, 2003, p. 190). The international community is given a stature 
that it is not fully deserving of, being portrayed as the holder of values such as peace, security, 
human rights, justice and freedom (Orford, 2003, p. 165). The strong white knight and the damsel in 
distress is a narrative that that has been perpetuated in cases dealing with humanitarian 
intervention:  
Narratives... regularly produce images of the people who live in states targeted for intervention as 
starving, powerless, suffering, abused or helpless victims, often women and children, in need of rescue 
or salvation. The capacity to imagine that a heroic international community is needed to rescue huge 
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numbers of the world’s peoples is made possible against the background of other, similar stories. 
(Orford, 2003, p. 174). 
This narrative leaves the international community with its power and authority as the only ones 
capable of protecting states from their own regimes (Orford, 2003, pp. 169-171). This form of 
narrative makes it easy for a state to justify its actions as “[t]he image of military action being 
conducted by the ‘international community’ in the name of peace, security, human rights and 
democracy ha[s] meant that many inhabitants of industrialised states [are] increasingly willing to 
support militaristic solutions to international conflicts.” (Orford, 2003, pp. 11-12). Identity politics 
has led to Western powers legitimizing their interventions into other states by claiming these states 
fall outside of the realms of humanity and are need of ‘civilizing’. 
The imperialistic interventionism is a concern to Orford as humanity is used as an exploitive civilizing 
mission imposed onto international politics. The idealism of liberalism and cosmopolitanism to 
achieve a world built on universal values and a concept of common humanity does not necessarily 
lead to a desirable outcome: 
As with classical colonialism, the threatening underside of this dream of harmonisation is that, in its 
name, local or indigenous cultures are destroyed, resources are exploited and resistance is quashed. 
Thus while humanitarian intervention seems to promise a world in which self-determination and human 
rights will be privileged over national interests or imperial ambitions, we nonetheless see exploitation, 
domination, invasion and governance legitimised in its wake. (Orford, 2003, p. 189). 
This neo-imperialism will lead to a world void of heterogeneity as the regimes categorised as the 
other will be exposed to intervention and be rebuilt in the image of the intervening state:  
Reading the texts of humanitarian intervention alongside those of postconflict reconstruction reveals 
the dream of a world of sameness or, to adopt the language of free trade, harmonisation. In the ‘Single 
Economic Space’ of this imagined future, any national or indigenous differences, or technical barriers to 
trade, will be swept away by an all-powerful international community in its relentless march towards 
standardised regimes of privatisation, investment deregulation, intellectual property protection, and 
limited health and safety regulations. (Orford, 2003, pp. 188-189).  
Orford is a proponent of pluralism in international relations, warning of the dangers of neo-
colonialism and neo-imperialism. 
Orford is not the only poststructuralist that is a proponent of difference. A key concept put forth by 
poststructuralist authors is the production of difference. Diversity is embraced as an inescapable and 
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positive quality in political and social life. By embracing all cultures and their perspectives it makes it 
impossible to create a single humanity as there are too many differences between cultures, what 
one culture views as moral the other may regard as immoral. The diversity of the world means that a 
morality is only identifiable to a particular community that subscribes to that ‘definition’ of morality 
(Morgan, 2003, pp. 382-383). In relation to humanity this means that poststructuralists embrace 
differences between cultures and lifestyles of people, as opposed to the belief that there is a 
superiority of one way of life (Morgan, 2003, p. 375). According to Morgan, cultural and ideological 
differences should be accepted with a focus on relativism as opposed to absolute values. There 
should not be one way to live in the world we should embrace our differences and accept that no 
one group of people are perfect and hold a monopoly on how morality should be defined (Morgan, 
2003, pp. 377-378). Dalby concludes his work by advocating for a pluralistic understanding of 
international relations, rejecting the hegemony of ideology and a more accepting international 
community embracing diversity where more actors are empowered: 
To tackle the hegemonic discourses of power politics requires taking seriously the multiplicity of 
critiques of existing political discourse, ‘all of which take for their point of departure the right of 
formerly un- or misrepresented human groups to speak for and represent themselves in domains 
defined, politically and intellectually, as normally excluding them, usurping their signifying and 
representing functions, overriding their historical reality. (Dalby, 1990, p. 180). 
The poststructuralists examined do not believe that the concept of common humanity is desirable as 
it can be exploited to eradicate difference in international politics and project the hegemon’s 
identity, ideology and values onto the rest of the world.  
The poststructuralist critique contests the concept of common humanity. As with realism, it leads to 
a scepticism toward an all-encompassing notion of humanity, suggesting that instead of striving for 
universal values the international community should embrace the differences between societies. 
The emphasis on universalism and making the world conform from some (Dalby, 1990, p. 23) led to 
the creation of the other. The other is intrinsically linked to common humanity as the concept of 
common humanity is the manifestation of the global hegemony of the West. In other words it is not 
universal and thus not common humanity as it does not represent the values of all human beings. 
The West has labelled certain regimes as being an affront to the civilised world and our collective 
morality, or universal conscience:  
Narratives present rogue states, ruthless dictators and ethnic tension as threats to the established 
liberal international order. The argument made by those in favour of humanitarian intervention during 
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the 1990s was that the use of force is necessary to address the problems of racist and ruthless 
dictators, tribalism, ethnic tension, civil war and religious fundamentalism thrown up in the post-Cold 
War era. (Orford, 2003, p. 164). 
Those states that do not conform to Western sets of traditions, beliefs, and culture are outside our 
common humanity and are considered the other. It has been determined that they are the enemy 
and they can either conform in order to closer align to the West or they will face potential military 
force if they continue to act in a way that shocks our human conscience. The poststructuralist 
approach used here criticises this, arguing that if the concept of common humanity continues to be 
used in international politics people of difference will be targeted as threats to Western states and 
will be considered outside the realms of humanity, so they will either be destroyed or forced to 
assimilate into the ‘global’ interpretation of humanity. To the poststructuralists examined common 
humanity is not something that is a universal truth that has always existed, it is a social construct in a 
particular political context. The rejection of absolutes and support for diversity reflects a relativist 
and communitarian narrative in constant tension with universal ideals. 
Part Four: International Law, Common Humanity and Humanitarian 
Intervention 
This chapter has offered an overview of the arguments against the concept of common humanity, 
contesting the universal aspect of cosmopolitanism and instead emphasising the plural nature of 
humanity. As there is not substantial evidence that humanity has evolved to represent the concept 
of common humanity, it is illogical and sometimes dangerous to apply this concept to international 
politics. Based upon the previous critique put forward in this chapter this section will demonstrate 
the criticism of altering international law and sovereignty to reflect cosmopolitan beliefs in common 
humanity. Those that find the concept of common humanity in international law to be problematic 
have various reasons for their beliefs; some are realists while others have sympathy for 
communitarianism, while others still are legal theorists first and foremost and do not see sufficient 
legal cause for common humanity to exist in international politics.  
The contestation of the concept of common humanity can be seen in the ambiguous nature of the 
declarations surrounding universal human rights. In contrast to the previous chapter, a contrary 
interpretation of international human rights treaties is that these declarations show that there is a 
lukewarm commitment to the concept. In the case of the Universal Declaration of Universal Human 
Rights, it is treaty but is not legally binding. It is a list of rights that should be upheld but there are no 
legal consequences for failing to adhere, as it still lacks a binding enforcement element (Thornberry, 
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1980, p. 256). The reason for the lack of clarity in regards to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights is because the only way it would be passed was for it to be vague enough to appease all 
signatories as they had different interpretations of what universal standards should be (Boyle, 1960, 
p. 168). This indicates that there is no legal standing in the international arena on the subject of 
universal rights as states are not obliged to uphold human rights. It is a different matter in the case 
of Western Europe and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, signed in 1950 by fifteen countries, as all of the signatories had similar values and so it 
was possible to make a strong document that had legal standing as it was practiced by the states 
that signed it. It also had an enforcement strategy to ensure all states abided by it (Boyle, 1960, pp. 
168-169). The point of this example is that it demonstrates that the world is too varied in terms of 
cultural and religious diversity for universal standards to apply to human rights. The United Nations 
may produce statements promoting human rights but there has not ever been a clearly written, 
unambiguous declaration regarding the upholding of human rights as many states would not 
support it. Many are not comfortable with signing a declaration when it comes to altering notions of 
sovereignty, international law, and promoting humanitarian intervention in order to protect human 
rights, as it stops being compatible with their ethical practice (Boyle, 1960, pp. 171-172).  
In relation to universal human rights there have been many states that have either signed 
declarations and not adhered to them or signed declarations without ratifying them. This further 
demonstrates the lack of commitment to the concept of common humanity. For example the US has 
yet to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (Human Rights Watch, 2009). If the 
international community produces a signed declaration that is not backed up by state practice then 
the document loses its legal validity (Boyle, 1960, p. 167).  In this regard for any state that has either 
not signed a human rights declaration or has not ratified one there is no legal obligation to adhere to 
the declaration through treaty law, these states cannot be held to account if they abuse human 
rights as they have not recognised them.  
One interpretation of the role of state practice in customary international law is to downplay its role 
by looking at the treaties signed and using this as a gauge to determine a state’s practice (Bernstein, 
2012, p. 324). Under this interpretation, if treaties have not been ratified they are not a part of 
customary international law. The lack of ratified human rights treaties indicates that the realisation 
of common humanity is perhaps not desired by broad sections of the international community, and 
if it is undesirable it should not be enforced onto all. Expanding on this, even in cases a treaty has 
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been ratified, if it is not backed up by state practice it cannot be claimed to be an effective part of 
international law.  
In legal circles there has been criticism about the state practice criteria of human rights principles as 
it has been inconsistent. The selectivity of justifying interventions for humanitarian purposes brings 
the sincerity of the call for international law to be built upon the values of common humanity into 
disrepute as it has not represented consistent state practice. In cases of an external state 
committing human rights abuses there has been a lack of understanding in terms of what the 
international community can do to uphold the rights of the citizens living in these ‘rogue’ states 
(Welsh & Banda, 2010, p. 216). However, there has been debate amongst legal scholars as to 
whether or not humanitarian intervention and RtoP have created a new norm in customary 
international law or if it is just a continuation of existing commitments. In order for something to 
become an element of customary international law it must be a part of a consistent state practice 
and must adhere to opinio juris (Enabulele, 2010, p. 413), but this condition of state practice has not 
been met as very few, if any, interventions have been carried out for humanitarian reasons 
(Enabulele, 2010, p. 419). Enabulele argues that there has not been a large enough contingent of 
states that have supported RtoP for it to become a norm of customary international law, despite the 
2005 UN World Summit outcome (Enabulele, 2010, pp. 415-416). In addition, if it had become a 
norm of customary international law then it would be unlawful not to intervene in a state where 
there are human rights abuses. But as we have seen, humanitarian intervention is very selective, 
thus it cannot be considered a part of international law as there are no repercussions if a state does 
not intervene (Enabulele, 2010, p. 416).  
An important part of international law that has been criticised for either being ignored, or redefined, 
as mentioned in the previous chapter is opinio juris. Dahlman states that opinio juris only becomes a 
part of international law if there is a broad acceptance of the law in question. Regarding 
interventions, he states that there have been numerous cases where states have intervened but that 
these have been considered illegal because there has not been widespread approval of 
interventionism (Dahlman, 2012, pp. 335-336). Corten rejects the liberal internationalist belief that 
“[t]he post 1990 era has given... opinio juris even more credibility” as humanitarian interventions 
have become more accepted as a common practice by a large number of major powers (Krieg, 2012, 
p. 13). The manipulation of opinio juris has been argued to more closely reflect neo-imperialism than 
represent a universal concept of humanity. The weight of state practice favours the powerful states 
as their actions are more in the limelight and they can wield their strength in order to manipulate 
other states into following their lead. Gerry Simpson’s Great Powers and Outlaw States highlights 
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how the powerful states have the ability to shape international law while the smaller and middling 
powers have to conform to these new constructs of law. Simpson  labels this phenomena ‘legalized 
hegemony’ (Simpson, 2004, pp. 5-6). In the twentieth century a liberal anti-pluralism took place 
whereby the great powers labelled certain states criminal or outlaw that fell outside the bounds of 
liberalism (Simpson, 2004, pp. 4-5). Corten highlights the prevalence of those that consider opinio 
juris  to be necessary in halting these super powers from completely shaping international law (as 
cited in Boucher, 2011, p. 764). It is important to recognize that smaller states have the right to be 
the ‘persistent objector’5 if they do not agree with emerging norms that are being created through 
state practice.  
Embedded in international law is the concept of sovereignty. The critics of the concept of common 
humanity point to the importance of state sovereignty and the right for a state to exercise its right to 
independence and territorial integrity. Westphalian sovereignty or state sovereignty is the most 
recognised form of sovereignty, in 1758 Vattel declared that ‘[a] dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a 
small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom.’ This idea was reinforced 
in the United Nations Charter that states in Article 2(1) ‘[t]he organization is based on the principle 
of the sovereign equality of all its members’ (Henderson, 2014, p. 3). Under this concept of 
sovereignty states are autonomous with their own set territories and are exempt from external 
intervention having the right to choose their own form of government (Krasner, 2001, p. 21). The 
concept of state sovereignty forbids interference from outside states in local matters; although as 
seen, this interpretation of sovereignty is becoming more highly contested (Steinberg, 2013, p. 68). 
This form of sovereignty is a large hindrance in regards to intervening for the sake of common 
humanity as it opposes intervention based on the right of territorial integrity.  
State sovereignty under international law is most clearly defined in the Charter of the United 
Nations. The charter clearly states under articles 2(4) and 2(7) that states must respect each other’s 
independence and right of rule within their territorial boundaries (Czernecki, 2002, p. 395). It is the 
clear that state sovereignty is both a part of customary international law and treaty law (Enabulele, 
2010, p. 413). It is part of treaty law because of the UN Charter and part of customary law because 
of state practice, as mentioned above. Adding to this the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
strengthened the claim of state sovereignty and rejection of intervention in 1986 when in Nicaragua 
v the United States it was adjudged that, “the principle of non-intervention involves the right of 
every sovereign state to conduct its affairs without outside interference... it is part and parcel of 
customary international law” (Czernecki, 2002, p. 396). This demonstrates the desire from the 
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 Term explained in previous chapter. 
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international community, reflected through the United Nations, to uphold state sovereignty over any 
other form of sovereignty. Despite the a growth in the idea of humanitarian intervention and 
changes in notions of sovereignty many still believe that there has been no suitable alternative to 
state sovereignty and so it should continue to be used in international relations (Traub, 2009, p. 75). 
This demonstrates that there is an opposing argument made that criticises the changing of 
international law and notions of sovereignty to better reflect the concept of common humanity. 
In the absence of a strong commitment from the international community, the idea of common 
humanity is weakened. The critics argue that international law is being manipulated by those that 
wish to impose a universalist form of law upon the world: the reluctance to ratify treaties, mixed 
state practice and the lack of opinio juris illustrate that the concept of common humanity is an 
emerging norm but the notion does not hold sway over all states. If treaties relating to common 
humanity were ratified, and there was consistent state practise and recognition in the form of opinio 
juris then it could be invoked, but it is argued that this has not been the case. Much like international 
law, a similar case is made for state sovereignty to be maintained over sovereignty as responsibility. 
There is not substantial evidence of a shift to embracing a form of sovereignty that supports 
common humanity and so it has been argued that traditional state sovereignty should continue to 
be used in international politics. The critique here does not rule out future change in international 
law to greater reflect common human interests but demonstrates that there has not been strong 
commitment to the concept from the international community and that there are significant hurdles 
to overcome in order to implement the concept without contention from many parties.   
Conclusion 
There are those that are critical of the concept of common humanity, as forms of universalism are 
too simplistic in explaining humanity. This chapter has explored the communitarian concepts of 
identity, Schmitt’s critique of the political use of humanity and the creation of the other. This ‘critics’ 
chapter raises doubts as to whether the concept of humanity should be used in a political situation. 
The communitarian critique questions the universal nature of the concept of humanity. Instead of 
the concept of common humanity being a universal phenomenon it is argued to be a tool used by 
the powerful. This is made apparent in the sections on realism and poststructuralism which both 
emphasise the importance of power and identity in shaping international politics. These sections 
question the ability to wage a war for humanity. Schmitt argues that international politics is built 
upon power relations structured upon the friend/enemy concept and because of this suggests that 
humanity cannot wage war, as wars are built on the premise of distinguishing friend from enemy. 
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Both Schmitt and Carr believe that wars for humanity are really motivated by state interest as the 
powerful are not really concerned about human rights being upheld. Additionally, the concluding 
thoughts of Orford’s work on the other also arrive at the conclusion that a war that conforms to the 
concept of common humanity is prone to exploitation. The critique in this chapter does not rule out 
the possibility of international politics reflecting the concept of common humanity in the future but 
at present there is not enough evidence to demonstrate that there is a real commitment to the 
concept on behalf of the international community. This results in the possibility of the concept being 
used by a few powerful states to restructure international politics to reflect their identity, values and 
concept of morality. The arguments that are put forward by the critics of common humanity in 
international relations extend to intervention debates and the final chapter explores the practical 
implementation of the concept of common humanity in the specific case study of Libya.
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Chapter Four: The Use of Common Humanity in Humanitarian 
Interventions: The case of Libya 
The concept of common humanity is pertinent to the intervention in Libya in 2011. It was reflected 
in the rhetoric used to justify the intervention but, beyond this, it was notable in its uneven 
application both during and after the NATO bombardment. In order to justify using military force in 
distant lands, intervening states have had to use morality as a way of building legitimacy. However, 
beyond using the term to justify the intervention, the way in which the intervention was conducted 
demonstrates the flawed nature of a concept of common humanity, and to the difficulties that are 
bound to arise from any attempt to make it a grounding for humanitarian interventions.  
This chapter will argue that Libya demonstrates the problems associated with the politicization of 
the concept of common humanity and its use in justifying humanitarian intervention, despite Libya 
being considered by some as a triumph of humanitarian intervention. Theorists, such as Pattison, 
have supported the recourse to action as Gaddafi’s imminent attack on Benghazi left no alternative 
but to intervene (Pattison, 2011, p. 273) and that this was grounded in RtoP principles. Thakur, for 
example, praised President Obama for “reject(ing) the traditional, realpolitik definition of US 
interests in favour of an alternative, values accommodating definition” (as cited in Graubart, 2013, p. 
70). Another RtoP advocate, Thomas Weiss, also backed the decision by the Security Council to 
authorize the intervention, proposing that “Libya suggests... that it is not quixotic to say no more 
Holocausts, Cambodias, and Rwandas - and occasionally to mean it” (as cited in Graubart, 2013, p. 
70). While this remains one particular interpretation of the intervention there are reasons to be 
sceptical of this interpretation. This chapter will explore an alternative interpretation where it will 
become apparent that Libya was not an unqualified success story of humanitarian war. In this 
chapter, I will start by outlining the events that transpired in Libya in 2011 and the aftermath. I will 
also show how the concept of common humanity was invoked in Libya. Finally, the last two sections 
examine the conduct of the operation and the difficulties of invoking the concept of common 
humanity in a practical situation. 
Part One: Outline of Events in Libya 
The civil war in Libya during 2011 began after protesters were shot at in Benghazi. In response, on 17 
February 2011, thousands of Libyans started protests on the streets of eastern Libyan cities: 
Benghazi, Ajdabiyah, Darnah, and Zintan (Deeb, 2012, p. 64). Gaddafi refused to give in to the 
protestors’ demands and a civil war erupted as a result. The National transitional Council (NTC) was 
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formed as an alternative to Gaddafi’s regime claiming that they represented the Libyan people and 
Gaddafi did not. The NTC played a crucial role in convincing the international community that they 
were legitimate and needed military support (Deeb, 2012, pp. 64-65). By 20 February, the rebels had 
taken control of Benghazi and other cities in the east of Libya. In response Gaddafi cracked down on 
dissent and rebellion in Tripoli and other parts of western Libya. Then, on 17 March, 2011, the UN 
Security Council passed Resolution 1973 that authorized ‘all necessary means’ to protect Libya’s 
civilians from attacks. The US-led operation, code named Odyssey Dawn, destroyed Gaddafi’s air 
defences, forced his troops to retreat, and established a no-fly zone over most of Libya (Chivvis, 
2012, p. 71). After this initial foray the operation was transferred over to NATO and became 
Operation Unified Protector, from this point onwards Britain and France took control of most of the 
operations, with support from Belgium, Denmark and Norway. NATO were involved in the siege of 
Misrata, one of the major battles of the war, helping the rebels hold onto this important city 
(Chivvis, 2012, p. 73). The fighting continued, and by 24 August 2011, Tripoli was taken by the rebels 
with the assistance of NATO strikes (Chivvis, 2012, p. 73). On October 20, 2011, Gaddafi was 
captured and killed by the rebels after the convoy he was travelling with was bombed by NATO 
forces after leaving Sirte (Gaynor & Zargoun, 2011). By the end of October the NATO forces had 
withdrawn and Libya was left to fend for itself. 
The hope was that post-intervention Libya would transition into a peaceful democracy, but the 
situation rapidly deteriorated. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, anti-Gaddafi armed 
groups roamed the streets detaining, torturing, and killing presumed Gaddafi supporters, while 
others took advantage of the power vacuum by taking part in killings of a political or criminal nature 
(International Crisis Group, 2013, p. i). The elections in 2012 offered promise, with a high voter 
turnout and victories to relatively moderate political candidates (DeVore, 2014, p. 463). However, 
this optimism was short lived and by May 2014 the forces that had overthrown Gaddafi were 
fighting amongst themselves with significant levels of conflict in Benghazi and Tripoli (DeVore, 2014, 
p. 463). The level of fighting in Libya has increased, with bombings and attacks on civilian structures. 
Between 1000 and 2500 Libyans have been killed, many of them civilians. Refugee numbers have 
also increased from 100,000 to 400,000. Additionally, basic resources are becoming harder to come 
by and the post-Gaddafi Libyan state is crumbling into disarray (International Crisis Group, 2015, p. 
i). The situation has not improved with time. Four years on from the intervention, violence and 
anarchy are widespread. With no functioning army, police force, or legal system the government has 
been unable to restore order and fled Tripoli in 2014 (Greenwald & Hussain, 2014). The rise of the 
Islamic State in the region has made matters worse, as they took control of the city of Sirte in the 
early months of 2015 (“Libya profile - Timeline,” 2015). After providing a background to the 
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situation, the rest of the chapter explores the use of the concept of common humanity in regards to 
Libya. 
Part Two: Invoking Common Humanity in Libya  
The best examples of the concept of common humanity being invoked in Libya are the resolutions 
passed by the UNSC. These resolutions invoked principles of the RtoP and, in doing so, tie the 
intervention in Libya to the concept of common humanity. Additionally, there were statements 
made by prominent leaders of the intervention that used rhetoric that reflected the concept of 
common humanity. These leaders, however, also alluded to other motivating factors for the 
intervention. 
Resolutions 1970 and 1973 were passed by the UNSC to stop the atrocities being committed in Libya 
utilising the language of RtoP. This was the first time that the UN Security Council authorized an 
intervention into a sovereign state to protect civilians without the consent of the state being 
intervened in (Glanville, 2013, p. 325). In another first, RtoP was invoked by the United Nations 
Security Council in order to justify the intervention (Berti, 2014, p. 25). The resolutions did not 
directly invoke RtoP, but it stressed that Libya had failed to meet RtoP criteria and as such opened 
itself up to intervention. So even if RtoP was not invoked word for word, the principles of RtoP were 
reflected in the justification for the intervention (Berti, 2014, p. 26). Others are not so sure. Aidan 
Hehir argues that the resolution was not as groundbreaking as the RtoP proponents seemed to 
think, with resolution 1973 drawing from powers that were granted to the Security Council long 
before the advent of RtoP (Hehir, 2012, p. 13). However, whether or not RtoP was invoked does not 
really matter, as the values of the concept of common humanity were used to justify the 
intervention. The first response from the UN to the ongoing crisis came on 26 February 2011 when 
the Security Council passed Resolution 1970 condemning the human rights abuses being committed 
in Libya: 
The Security Council, expressing grave concern at the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and 
condemning the violence and use of force against civilians, deploring the gross and systematic 
violation of human rights, including the repression of peaceful demonstrators, expressing deep 
concern at the deaths of civilians, and rejecting unequivocally the incitement to hostility and 
violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan government 
(United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1970, 2011, p. 1). 
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The resolution stated that the attack on the Libyan people may have amounted to crimes against 
humanity and stressed concern for the plight of refugees who had to flee their homes in Libya 
(United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1970, 2011, p. 1). In response to this abuse the 
resolution called upon the Libyan government’s responsibility to protect its citizens (United Nations 
Security Council: Resolution 1970, 2011, p. 2). Once it was established that Resolution 1970 was not 
having the desired effect the UNSC passed resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011. The resolution 
demanded an immediate cease-fire and an end of attacks on civilians, as well as demanding the 
Libyan government uphold ‘their obligations under international law’, ‘international humanitarian 
law’, and ‘human rights law’ (United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1973, 2011, pp. 2-3). Most 
importantly, if Libya failed to meet these demands the resolution authorized member states of the 
UN to “take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of 
attack” (United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1973, 2011, p. 3). The resolutions passed by the 
UN demonstrate that there was concern expressed for the people of Libya, and the resolutions 
expressed sentiments that reflect the concept of common humanity.  
It was not only the UN that espoused rhetoric that was in line with the concept of common 
humanity. The statements made by international leaders that took part in the intervention in Libya 
were grounded upon the values of common humanity as a basis for justifying intervention. In an 
‘Address to the Nation’, Barack Obama justified the position of the United States in regards to the 
humanitarian intervention by alluding to the morality of the intervention, stating that the United 
States was not willing to stand by and watch Muammar Gaddafi kill the Libyan people: “[i]f we 
waited one more day, Benghazi... could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the 
region and stained the conscience of the world” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2011, para. 11). 
Obama continued on to state that:  
There will be times... when our safety is not directly threatened, but our interests and our values are. 
Sometimes, the course of history poses challenges that threaten our common humanity and our 
common security... We must stand alongside those who believe in the same core principles that have 
guided us through many storms: our opposition to violence directed at one’s own people; our support 
for a set of universal rights, including the freedom for people to express themselves and choose their 
leaders. (Office of the Press Secretary, 2011, para. 34, 40).  
In his address Obama conformed to the principles laid out in RtoP and the rhetoric reflected the 
narrative of humanitarian intervention for common humanity. This follows the argument made by 
theorists and intellectuals that are proponents of common humanity by arguing that the killings that 
are taking place affect the international community as a whole, as opposed to just the victims and 
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their families. However, in the speech he also represented the arguments against such an idea, 
alluding to national interest, the greater importance on US lives than others, and the inevitable 
selectivity of any interventions, as will be mentioned later.  
The British government also expressed disgust at Gaddafi’s response to the protestors and the call to 
intervene drew heavily upon the concept of common humanity. It was considered necessary to stop 
Gaddafi from violently targeting the protestors, with Prime Minister David Cameron stressing that 
Gaddafi had targeted peaceful protestors and threatened to launch a violent attack on Benghazi 
(Davidson, 2013, p. 321). He stated that “Britain could not stand by as Gaddafi slaughtered his 
people” (Gov.UK, 2011, para. 6). Alongside this, Cameron announced that there was no place for 
Muammar Gaddafi in the future of Libya: “[t]he future of Libya belongs to its people”. (Gov.UK, 
2011, para. 21). David Cameron showed that he was outraged over the treatment of the Libyan 
people and pledged to protect them. However, even before the intervention, it is clear that Cameron 
was committed to regime change, which is not necessarily conducive to protecting people.6   
The French were the other major power involved with the intervention into Libya. The rhetoric used 
by French leaders also reflected both RtoP, and the concept of common humanity in general. The 
French believed that Gaddafi was on the brink of mass atrocities and brought up his chequered past 
in order to generate support for Resolution 1973 (Davidson, 2013, p. 315). Sarkozy labelled Gaddafi’s 
government as ‘brutal’, ‘bloody’, and ‘revolting’. Alongside this, Foreign Minister Alain Juppé 
stressed the importance to act quickly before Gaddafi killed the ‘liberty-loving’ Libyan people 
(Davidson, 2013, p. 315).There was a call to action in his address on Libya, stating that Benghazi 
would not be like Srebrenica and that there would be no new massacres like Rwanda (“Speech by 
President Sarkozy at the High Level Meeting on Libya,” 2011). The speech by Sarkozy also alluded to 
democracy building and the international community’s responsibility to act against repressive 
tyrants: “[l]et all the world’s dictators know that the international community is no longer 
condemned to speeches. It is condemned to action. And if necessary, to take up arms in the service 
of democracy” (“Speech by President Sarkozy at the High Level Meeting on Libya,” 2011, para. 11).7 
The rhetoric is similar to that of the UN resolutions, Obama, and Cameron all of whom sought to 
justify the intervention on moral grounds.  
It is important to note, however, that these leaders also justified the intervention for reasons of 
state interest that did not hold the principles of the concept of common humanity in mind. For the 
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 See section three of chapter four 
7
 As discussed in chapter two democracies are often seen by the West as the mode of governance that best 
reflects the concept of common humanity. 
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United States, a combination of factors entered the equation. Libya’s geostrategic importance, 
Gaddafi’s status as a ruthless untrustworthy dictator, as well as the violent, destabilising events 
unfolding in Libya all contributed to the decision (Hehir, 2012, p. 16). Obama readily admitted in his 
address to the nation that the United States had interests at stake, stating that it was against US 
interests to allow Gaddafi to destroy his enemies (Hehir, 2012, p. 16). The overall feeling from the US 
was that they wanted to play a supporting role in the intervention. US Secretary of Defence, Robert 
Gates, declared that Libya was not of vital interest to the US, and they sought to hand over the reins 
of the operation as quickly as possible (Greenleaf, 2013, p. 30). The motivation for Britain and France 
to intervene was also complicated with no single theory of international relations successfully 
explaining why each state decided to push for an intervention (Davidson, 2013, p. 311). 
David Cameron took a keen interest in Libya and upon closer examination it is clear that there were 
mixed motivations for Britain. Cameron alluded to national interests stating that a regime such as 
Gaddafi’s poses a security risk to Europe, including Britain (Gov.UK, 2011), migration and anti-
terrorism played a role in Britain deciding on intervention: if Libya was to descend into civil war it 
would increase refugee flows from Libya into Europe and additionally it was argued by Cameron that 
if Gaddafi remained in power Libya would become a haven for terrorist activity (Davidson, 2013, p. 
323). Thus, Cameron argued:  
We simply cannot have a situation where a failed pariah state festers on Europe’s southern border. This 
would potentially threaten our security, push people across the Mediterranean and create a more 
dangerous and uncertain world for Britain and for all our allies as well as for the people of Libya 
(Davidson, 2013, pp. 323-324).  
Cameron referred to Gaddafi’s past sponsoring of terrorism and argued that there would be a return 
to this if he was not ousted. It is clear that matters of national security were high on the agenda of 
the British.  
Sarkozy had similar concerns as Cameron. Considering the lack of interest from the other 
superpowers, the French saw Libya as an opportunity to demonstrate its power and ability to deal 
with international crises (Davidson, 2013, pp. 317-319).  Alongside this, the threat of refugees 
pouring into Europe was a reason for Sarkozy wanting to stabilise Libya, as a civil war would result in 
a massive increase in refugees. Due to the proximity of France to Libya, Sarkozy stated that France 
would be one of the first affected by any events in Libya (Davidson, 2013, p. 316). Added to this was 
a tension between France and Libya as Gaddafi was already demanding five billion Euros a year in 
order to stop illegal immigration from Libya. This outraged the French government, who likened it to 
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extortion, resulting in Sarkozy taking a hard line with Gaddafi (Kern, 2011). Demonstrating French 
power, tackling refugee flows, and condemning a dictator may have been a way of increasing polling 
figures. Sarkozy was polling at an all time low and believed taking the initiative on a world issue 
would demonstrate French prestige in the international community (Kern, 2011). It is clear, then, 
that France had other reasons other than humanitarianism for intervening in Libya in 2011. 
Beyond the three main contributors to the intervention, the abstention of Russia and China from the 
vote on Resolution 1973 was crucial in allowing the UN to authorize the intervention. This was less 
motivated by humanitarian concerns and more to do with practicalities. Both abstained from voting, 
citing that they did not believe the operation would be successful or that the mandate was clear 
enough (Dunne & Gifkins, 2011, pp. 523-524). This was the official line but the most likely reason for 
the abstention was because the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organisation of Islamic Conference 
and the Arab League pressured these countries into supporting the intervention, this led Russia and 
China to consider their relationship with this region and they decided it would be against their 
interests to veto the intervention (Hehir, 2012, p. 14). China had a growing relationship with Saudi 
Arabia; it had overtaken the US as being the number one buyer of Saudi oil and in 2009 Saudi Arabia 
gave more aid to China’s Sichuan earthquake appeal than any other country. Given Saudi Arabia’s 
presence on the Gulf Cooperation Council, it suggests that China did not exercise its veto in order to 
maintain favour with one of its most important trade partners (Glanville, 2013, p. 337). The decision 
of Russia and China to abstain allowed the intervention to legally go ahead but other than that it is 
not of great importance to the politicization of common humanity as the these two states did not 
play a role in the intervention. 
Yet despite the mixed reasoning for the intervention it is clear that the concept of common 
humanity was invoked in regards to Libya. The concept of common humanity was invoked in Libya 
by the UN and its resolutions based upon the principles of RtoP. The leading political figures involved 
in the intervention also made statements that reflected the concept of common humanity. It was 
clear that there were other motivating factors behind the intervention but this does not necessarily 
mean the conduct of the intervention could not be in line with the concept of common humanity. 
The ICISS report admits that state interests will always play a role in determining intervention (ICISS, 
2001) and there are arguments that an intervention can still be humanitarian despite not being done 
purely for the sake of humanity (Krieg, 2012). The protection of common humanity was not the only 
reason for the international community getting involved in Libya but it is a significant example of the 
politicization of the concept of common humanity. The rhetoric used is, however, only one part of 
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this story. In the next section the military operation itself is examined, illustrating some of the 
difficulties of implementing the concept of common humanity in a humanitarian intervention. 
Part Three: The Mission and Common Humanity  
As discussed in the previous section, the motivating factors for the intervention were much more 
complicated than a concern for humanitarianism. However, the primary purpose of Resolution 1973 
was to save people’s lives, which ties the military operation back to the concept of common 
humanity. The language of the resolution was in line with the concept of common humanity and it 
was argued that not acting was not an option in the face of such atrocities. However, applying the 
concept of common humanity to a real world scenario is fraught with difficulties. The objective may 
be to stop atrocities and protect civilians but there are many challenges to this. There is no certainty 
that the intervention was a triumph for humanity: the decision to pursue regime change, uncertainty 
regarding causalities, and the inability to bring justice to those that committed crimes against 
humanity all raise doubts about the applicability of common humanity to international politics. This 
section explores some of the problems the intervention raised in regards to implementing a concept 
of common humanity in practical cases.    
The United Nations Security Council did not authorize regime change but NATO decided to pursue it 
regardless. This course of action was fraught with danger and not necessarily a positive step towards 
a Libya that reflects the morality of humankind. The objective of the mission was to protect the lives 
of civilians. Despite this, Gaddafi was targeted by NATO and his convoy was bombed. He was 
subsequently caught and killed by revolutionary fighters. The resolution did not grant NATO forces 
the right to target Gaddafi, as the Security Council does not have the power to authorize the 
targeting of a head of state or to take part in an operation to remove a head of state legally (Gazzini, 
2011, p. 3). This point was not lost on the critics: Russia, China, and other states criticized NATO and 
its allies for the ‘mission creep’ that occurred. The targeted strikes, they argued, exceeded the 
mandate given by the Security Council, and went beyond protecting civilians (Glanville, 2013, p. 
338). The importance of ‘mission creep’, or in this particular case exceeding the mandate, is that it 
raises questions as to how, or if, the concept of common humanity can be used to guide an 
intervention. The decision to exceed the mandate certainly does not appear to have been for the 
interests of the Libyan people, as the offer of a ceasefire only on the condition Gaddafi leave Libya 
immediately and face trial by the International Criminal Court left him with little choice but to fight 
as he would face severe charges at any international tribunal. This meant a ceasefire was impossible 
and prolonged the conflict, putting more civilians in danger (International Crisis Group, 2011, p. ii).  
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Considering a ceasefire and diplomatic negotiations as an avenue to pursue may have been a better 
alternative early in the conflict. International Crisis Group believed that this was the case, arguing 
that the Western powers should have been more willing to negotiate a ceasefire and a transition to 
a post-Gaddafi Libya before the violence escalated into a full blown civil war (International Crisis 
Group, 2011, p i). The sincerity of Gaddafi’s call to a ceasefire and negotiations is not known and it 
will remain unknown as it was not considered by NATO or the protesters (Kuperman, 2013, p. 116).  
Gaddafi had implied he would carry out mass killings of those who rebelled against him, so it is 
understandable that the international community wanted to act. However, Pattison, who supported 
the intervention, argues that the threshold for regime change is higher than for humanitarian 
intervention:  
The dangers of regime change are generally greater than that of humanitarian intervention: a larger 
number of innocent individuals are likely to be killed; the potential for instability in neighbouring 
regions is greater; and the costs of intervening in terms of the intervening soldiers’ lives may be much 
higher, given the likely need for a significant deployment of ground troops. Given these harms, the bar 
for permissible regime change should be much higher than that for humanitarian intervention. 
(Pattison, 2011, p. 272).  
The refusal of a ceasefire by the intervening states and the insistence on regime change raises the 
possibility that the intervention did not save as many lives as could have been saved.  
Perhaps a reluctance to pursue regime change would have been beneficial but a difficulty in invoking 
common humanity to justify an intervention is that it is always impossible to know if an intervention 
will save lives, with the case of Libya being no exception. The difference between the Libya 
intervention and most other interventions was that the push to intervene was in order to prevent 
atrocities from happening, as opposed to reacting to mass atrocities that had already taken place. 
For this reason the intelligence was vague, with firm figures being difficult to come by. Instead of 
firm statistics, emotive terminology and vague language were used to describe the number of lives 
being lost (Davidson, 2013, p. 315). Demonstrating the lack of well-founded evidence, at a March 
2011 European Union summit one diplomat stated that there was no substantial evidence apparent 
of deliberate attacks on civilians that would make an intervention into Libya legitimate (Davidson, 
2013, p. 315). Obviously this was not the opinion of the NATO leaders, but it does show the difficulty 
in coming across solid facts and figures regarding atrocities being committed and the number of 
people being killed in war zones. This demonstrates the problem of invoking common humanity to 
intervene when solid intelligence is lacking, as the objective should be to alleviate the suffering of 
human beings, when an intervention may in fact exacerbate the issue.  
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The intervention cost the lives of thousands of people, with far more people being killed during the 
intervention than before it. The numbers are speculation to a certain extent, but it seems that 
between 10,000 and 15,000 people were killed on both sides in total by early June 2011 (Boudlal, 
2011). Any attempt at making a more precise figure is difficult. Other figures include The National 
Transitional Council stating that up to 30,000 people in total were killed in conflict (Laub, 2011), 
although this is the highest estimate and is open to bias given they were in opposition to Gaddafi. 
Various NGOs documented the conflict, with International Crisis Group stating that there were 
significant effects on civilian populations with the intervention resulting in a large number of 
causalities as well as a significant rise in the number of refugees (International Crisis Group, 2011, p. 
i). Additionally, Human Rights Watch released a report identifying eight NATO airstrikes that in total 
killed 72 Libyan civilians and wounded many more with there being no evidence that these were 
legitimate targets for NATO (Human Rights Watch, 2012, pp. 6, 7, 10). Overall the civilian casualties 
caused by NATO airstrikes were relatively low but there needs to be suitable explanations as to why 
these people were killed (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 15), and neither France nor Britain pursued 
an answer from NATO forces regarding these civilian deaths (Davidson, 2013, p. 316). Others, such 
as Ben Barry, disagree with these arguments believing that the number of civilians killed was 
sufficiently low and that overall the NATO intervention saved more lives than would have been lost 
otherwise. Statements by Gaddafi that 1100 civilians were killed and 4500 wounded by NATO were 
found to be a gross exaggeration and it is most likely the figure was either five or ten percent of this 
(Barry, 2011, p. 7); numbers that are supported by the Human Rights Watch report mentioned 
above. Regardless of the exact number of people killed, the intervention did result in a large number 
of deaths, demonstrating the difficulty in implementing a successful intervention that reflects the 
concept of common humanity. Would an alternative strategy in Libya yielded more lives saved? It is 
impossible to know, but intervention was decided upon and there was a high death toll. 
The complexity of the situation in Libya demonstrates the difficulties in implementing the concept of 
common humanity in a practical situation. The international community decided to side with the 
rebels to halt the atrocities being committed, mirroring Schmitt’s friend/enemy complex and 
Orford’s other. However, it was short sighted if they believed bringing an end to Gaddafi would halt 
atrocities as it was not only Gaddafi committing crimes against humanity. Understandably, the 
international community told Gaddafi in Resolution 1973 that he had a responsibility to protect his 
people, after the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that the violence against the 
protestors may amount to crimes against humanity. If he did not this would lead to an intervention 
from the international community (Williams & Bellamy, 2012, p. 276). The request was reasonable 
as the violence from Gaddafi was escalating but isolating and pressuring Gaddafi was not a 
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guarantee that peace would reign, and atrocities cease. The vast majority of protestors were 
peaceful but there was a violent streak to the rebellion from the outset, with sections of the Libyan 
protestors being armed in the first days (Kuperman, 2013, p. 108). Gaddafi was repressing the Libyan 
people but from very early on in the piece the protestors incorporated violence (International Crisis 
Group, 2011, p. 4). Gaddafi’s repressive crack down on the protests led to the protestors turning 
violent, and some protestors formed themselves into armed opposition groups (Williams & Bellamy, 
2012, p. 275), who were determined to remove Gaddafi from power and destroy any remnant of the 
order he had established (International Crisis Group, 2011, p. ii). The International Commission of 
Inquiry on Libya noted that the rebel forces committed atrocities and war crimes that in the process 
violated international human rights law. The nature of these atrocities took the form of unlawful 
killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, enforced disappearance, indiscriminate attacks, and pillaging 
(Berti, 2014, p. 34). This demonstrates the problematic nature of implementing an intervention 
founded upon a concept of common humanity, as the international community made the decision to 
side with the rebel groups but neither side represented the values of common humanity and there 
was no way of knowing that this decision to side with the rebels would lead to a future Libya that 
would respect human rights and universal values. 
The problem of trialling those that have committed crimes that shock the conscience of mankind 
were apparent during the conflict. Problems in prosecuting those that have committed crimes 
against humanity are not a new phenomenon, as mentioned in the first chapter regarding 
Nuremberg, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and allegations of victor’s justice and show trials. The case of Libya 
has also demonstrated the problem of trying to bring those that have committed human rights 
violations to justice. The International Commission of Inquiry, set up by the UN Human Rights 
Council, stated that there had been crimes against humanity committed by both sides of the conflict 
and that the perpetrators had to be brought to justice: “[t]he Commission confirms its finding from 
its first report that there have been acts of murder, torture, enforced disappearance and certain acts 
of sexual violence committed by Qadhafi forces within the context of a widespread or systematic 
attack against a civilian population... These constitute crimes against humanity.” (Human Rights 
Council, 2012, p. 20). Additionally, “[t]he Commission has also concluded that war crimes and crimes 
against humanity were committed by thuwar... The Commission found acts of extra-judicial 
executions, torture, enforced disappearance, indiscriminate attacks and pillage. No investigations 
have been carried out into any violations committed by the thuwar.” (Human Rights Council, 2012, 
p. 21). In response to these atrocities the Human Rights Council called upon “the interim 
Government of Libya to... [i]nvestigate all violations of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law... and to prosecute alleged perpetrators, irrespective of their 
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location or affiliation, while affording them all their rights under international law.” (Human Rights 
Council, 2012, p. 21).  
The international community largely took a hands-off approach to the prosecution of those that 
committed crimes against humanity. An Amnesty International report condemned the unlawful 
killings being committed, but was initially satisfied with leaving the NTC in charge of prosecuting 
those who committed atrocities opposed to calling upon the international community to do it 
(Amnesty international, 2011, p. 92). In fact, the ICC have only issued three arrest warrants since the 
conflict broke out in 2011, those of Muammar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi 
(Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 2014). However, the warrant for Muammar was 
suspended when he was killed and there has been an ongoing dispute between the ICC and Libyan 
authorities on who should try the remaining two individuals (Coalition for the International Criminal 
Court, 2014; DW, 2012). The Libyan transitional government has attempted to convince the ICC that 
they have the ability to conduct fair trials, while NGOs such as Amnesty have taken a u-turn on its 
previous stance. Amnesty have raised concerns surrounding the legal framework in place in Libya, 
the head of the international justice team at Amnesty International, Marek Marczynski, stated 
“[t]hey hired foreign lawyers to work on the case but that's not enough, they need a justice system 
that works.” (DW, 2012).  
The decision to leave the prosecution to the Libyan authorities has not reflected well upon the 
application of the concept of common humanity. In July 2015, Libya’s government convicted thirty 
al-Gaddafi-era officials, which included nine death sentences. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-
Senussi were among these nine sentenced to death (Amnesty International, 2015). There has been 
criticism regarding the procedure of this trial and concerns about the ability to deliver justice. In 
many cases defendants have been interrogated without their lawyer present, and at other times 
they have only been appointed lawyers well after the trial has began. Additionally, there have also 
been reports that the defendants have been tortured (Amnesty International, 2015). This trial has 
been rife with flaws that demonstrate Libya’s inability to run legitimate trials. Philip Luther, Middle 
East and North Africa Programme Director at Amnesty International, stated, “[i]nstead of helping to 
establish the truth and ensuring accountability for serious violations during the 2011 armed conflict, 
this trial exposes the weakness of a criminal justice system which is hanging on by a thread in a war-
torn country with no central authority” (Amnesty International, 2015, para. 3). Amnesty has 
continued to show support for the extradition of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and the others to the ICC. 
There is a belief that this is the only way he and the others on trial will receive a fair trial (Amnesty 
International, 2015).  
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International military tribunals have had labels of ‘victors justice’ since they began, the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the Military Tribunal for the Far East certainly both fell into this 
category. However, as discussed, the alternative of leaving a state to prosecute their own people 
also has problems. The war trials in Libya have demonstrated the problems of politicizing the 
concept of common humanity. The trials have reflected the political reality of the situation, and that 
is the victor gets to choose who is punished. Unfortunately the trials have not been guided by a 
higher morality that seeks to bring all those that have committed atrocities to justice. 
The humanitarian intervention in Libya demonstrates the difficulties in invoking common humanity. 
Was the intervention successful in bringing an end to the ongoing crimes that shock the conscience 
of mankind? In the case of Libya the high number of casualties, the exceeding of the mandate and 
the difficulty in prosecuting war criminals raised doubts about the ability to wage a war for 
humanity. The last section explores the post intervention, and reconstruction state of Libya with this 
further reinforcing the idea that an intervention that reflects the concept of common humanity is 
not possible. 
Part Four: Post-Intervention Libya and the Lack of Common Humanity  
The intervention in Libya used the notion of common humanity in order to gain legitimacy. It was 
argued that it was essential to intervene in order to protect civilian lives. If the reason for 
intervention into Libya was humanitarian then the question must be asked as to why more support 
was not offered in the rebuilding phase and why there is not further intervention now. Since NATO 
forces left after Gaddafi was killed, Libya has deteriorated into violence and instability. Libya has 
been left to deal with its own problems, as the international community withdrew and believed that 
the Libyans were responsible for picking themselves up from the mess (Chorin, 2013, p. 380). The 
proponents of RtoP and common humanity have ignored the ongoing issues in Libya, with many 
going as far to say that the intervention was successful and a prime example of when humanitarian 
intervention works or is necessary. Romeo Dallaire, in an address to the Canadian Senate, stated 
that Canadian forces had saved lives and helped the country of Libya, while director of the Global 
Center for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P), Simon Adams, described the intervention as ‘the 
lesser of two evils’ (Moses, 2014, p. 115). The deterioration of Libya, however, suggests that the 
intervention was not successful. 
Libya has been left to fend for itself, with there being too little in the way of aid and support to allow 
for a peaceful transition into a functioning state. In October 2011, NATO ended Operation Unified 
Protector and stopped all military operations, thus leaving Libya in a state of instability. The UN 
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Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was not sufficient to meet the social, political, economic, and 
military challenges that it was presented with (Berti, 2014, p. 37). Compounding this issue, only a 
fraction of the international humanitarian organizations that were operating in Libya have stayed for 
the rebuilding phase, and those that have stayed have been criticized for being ineffective by the 
Libyans (Chorin, 2013, p. 383).  
In addition to the lack of ground support there has also been a lack of monetary aid post 
intervention. Financing for the rebuild has been much lower than other rebuilding efforts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, with the money spent being in the millions as opposed to the hundreds of 
billions that was spent in Afghanistan and Iraq (Chorin, 2013, p. 382). It is clear, then, that there has 
been minimal support for the Libyans post-intervention. Before US Ambassador J. Christopher 
Stevens was killed in the attack on the US mission in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, he had 
argued that a strong international effort was needed to restore Libyan confidence in a successful 
transition. Repairing Benghazi, he argued, was the key to a successful transition given that Benghazi 
had suffered the most under Gaddafi and was still extremely underdeveloped (Chorin, 2013, p. 383, 
384).  
The lack of support post-intervention contributed to the fragmentation of Libya and since then 
violence has escalated and has been largely ignored by the international community. The newly-
elected President of Libya only lasted a month before a vote of no confidence was passed and, 
following this, turmoil ensued with revenge killings being undertaken against suspected Gaddafi 
supporters (Kuperman, 2013, p. 125). This form of anarchy is widespread, with human rights abuses 
being carried out by all sides of the conflict as Libya drifts further into lawlessness (Greenwald & 
Hussain, 2014). On this topic, NATO and its allies have remained quiet and there is no longer 
humanitarian enthusiasm being espoused by the West despite Libya falling into anarchy, violence, 
and militia rule (Greenwald & Hussain, 2014). The lack of a call to intervene is in contradiction to the 
rhetoric used to justify the intervention in the first place (Greenwald & Hussain, 2014). This suggests 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a commitment to a principle of common humanity in 
interventions. Certainly in the case of Libya the international community has not responded in a 
manner that reflects our common humanity. If the concept of common humanity was a strong 
motivating factor for interventions there should have been a call to re-enter Libya and to stay until a 
stable, peaceful order had been established.  
The deployment of RtoP in Libya should have prevented Libya falling further into crises. However, 
instead the use of RtoP demonstrates the difficult task in putting a commitment to common 
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humanity into practice. One of the key components of RtoP has been ignored, this being the 
rebuilding phase after an intervention. This takes place in order to assist the state to get back on its 
feet. Without outside assistance a country is likely to enter, or re-enter, a civil war as factions vie for 
power (ICISS, 2001, p. 13). For RtoP to have been appropriately applied there would have to be 
further support from the international community as it is one of the key components of RtoP, yet 
the rebuilding phase has not been carried out. 
Finally, post-intervention there has been reluctance on behalf of the states that either participated 
in or supported the intervention to accept increased refugee quotas, raising further cynicism about 
the humanitarian quality of the intervention. Since the end of the intervention Amnesty 
International has criticised European governments for not accepting more refugees. Over 30,000 
people fled from Libya into Europe and yet only 700 across all of Europe were granted asylum 
(Davidson, 2013, p. 316). Considering the hardship the civilians of Libya face, many have opted to 
flee the country, many of these try to cross the Mediterranean and enter into Europe, with Italy 
having a notably high influx of refugees from Libya. In 2014, 219,000 people arrived in Europe from 
war torn countries in North Africa, not just from Libya, with 3,500 people dying on the journey over 
(BBC, 2015). This has sparked the European Commission to make a proposal at the EU whereby EU 
members will be forced to take a certain quota of refuges per year, with this being discussed in late 
June 2015 (BBC, 2015). The United Kingdom, amongst other European countries, has rejected this 
idea and have declared that it will oppose any move to enforce refugee quotas (BBC, 2015). The 
French have also declared that a refugee quota is out of the question, although in this case the 
government has changed with Sarkozy, who initiated the intervention, not being re-elected (DW, 
2015). If common humanity was really at the forefront of consideration then surely the NATO allies 
should entertain the idea of increasing refugee quotas in order to relieve the number of people 
suffering in a war torn country. Why would a state be willing to kill in the name of humanitarianism 
and then be unwilling to undertake a much more passive form of humanitarian aid in the form of 
increased refugee quotas?  
The post intervention response on behalf of the international community reinforces the problems 
associated with effectively implementing the concept of common humanity in a practical situation. 
There was a lack of commitment to support Libya in the rebuild and then it was ignored when 
further civil war broke out. Additionally, if the intervening states were so concerned about 
alleviating suffering it is rather striking that they have not been more willing to assist the thousands 
of refugees that are coming out of Libya. There has not been a sufficient response from the 
international community to indicate that they care about the suffering of the Libyan people, and 
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they have certainly not responded in a way that shows that they believe in the concept of common 
humanity. If common humanity could be effectively politicized there would be a push to offer 
assistance to Libya in its current plight and an acceptance of increased refugee quotas.    
Conclusion 
The vast majority of wars are justified on moral grounds to gain legitimacy, but in reality there are 
always underlying factors that are of far greater concern to the intervening powers. Libya was no 
different. The intervening states justified the intervention upon two criteria, humanitarianism and 
the defence of state, regional, and world security. The UN called upon the international community 
to respond to the atrocities, invoking RtoP, giving the intervening forces a legal mandate in the form 
of Resolution 1973, however, they did not have a say in how the military operation was undertaken. 
The rhetoric used at the start of the intervention arguing that there was an obligation to act for our 
common humanity in order to save the lives of those that could not protect themselves only went so 
far. The operation demonstrated some of the flaws of politicizing the use of common humanity in a 
practical situation. Alongside this there was a hesitancy to throw full support behind the rebuilding 
effort when human suffering could have been alleviated. The case study of Libya demonstrates the 
difficulties of achieving a successful humanitarian intervention that reflects the concept of common 
humanity. The desire to act in order to stop atrocities and bring about peace for helpless people is 
understandable but when the practical realities of the situation are examined it is clear that the 
political use of common humanity may not bring an end to such suffering. The rise in international 
institutions, RtoP, and the importance of the international community is apparent, but it is naive to 
assume that the sense of ‘global community’ is so strong that it can bring an end to human suffering 
worldwide. 
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Conclusion 
The concept of common humanity has gradually emerged in international politics and has been used 
to justify humanitarian interventions. There was a frequent rise in rhetoric that espoused language 
referring to common humanity and this is best seen as culminating in the ICISS report of 2001 and 
the acceptance of RtoP principles at the UN World Summit in 2005. The arguments put forward 
revolve around the idea that there has been a general rise in liberalism, human rights, and universal 
values and because of this the human race stands above traditional notions of statehood and 
sovereignty. Therefore, in cases where a group of people are being exposed to atrocities, our 
common humanity means that we are obliged to act in their defence because we live in an age 
defined by human rights and universal values and should be striving for a cosmopolitan world. 
However, this is disputed in the third chapter as the claims made by the proponents of the concept 
of common humanity are refuted by the critics, arguing that the concept of common humanity is a 
flawed one. Opposed to the cosmopolitan belief that all people share the same universal rights, the 
communitarian approach examined argues that a group of people get their understandings of rights 
from the community they are raised in. Stemming from this is the rejection of universal conceptions 
of community and universal rights. In reality the world is made up of divisions between groups of 
people/states that have their own identities and concepts of values which creates a very real ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ dynamic to international politics. Because of this dynamic the critics of the concept of 
common humanity are sceptical of the ability to carry out humanitarian interventions for the sake of 
common humanity. The realists and poststructuralists examined concur that identity, values and 
morality come from very specific conditions and states and when these identities are determined to 
be universal and apply to everyone it leads to the exploitation of states who do not conform to this 
‘universal’ set of values and beliefs. 
The final chapter examines the practical implementation of common humanity in international 
politics. In the case of Libya the concept of common humanity was used as a motivating factor 
behind the intervention and RtoP was invoked, however, in practice the objectives laid out in RtoP 
were not achieved. Additionally, the theoretical arguments in favour of the concept of common 
humanity did not come to fruition. During the intervention issues concerning the protecting of 
civilians, trialling the guilty, and rebuilding the state became apparent. The outcome of the 
intervention demonstrates that Libya is a far cry from being part of a cosmopolitan utopia. This may 
be because of a failed interventionist operation, or perhaps more likely, any intervention undertaken 
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under the premise of common humanity will be problematic as the implementation of the concept 
of common humanity is inherently difficult as demonstrated in chapter three.  
The case of Libya demonstrates that the politicization of humanity is problematic, suggesting that 
international politics is not currently guided by universal concepts of morality and values which 
undermines the applicability of the concept. The concept of common humanity was used to 
legitimize the military intervention but without success. The supporters of the concept of common 
humanity will argue that the reason for the lack of success in practically applying this concept is 
down to a lack of political will or resources; it is not to say common humanity cannot be applied in 
order to stop atrocities but rather there needs to be more effort on behalf of the international 
community in order to make the concept of common humanity a reality.8 The critics of the concept 
of common humanity take a different approach arguing that the world is built upon a 
community/state system where difference is a key part of international politics, there is no universal 
bond between peoples and states; rather they operate in their own spheres looking out for their 
own interests. Because there is no shared concept of humanity the concept of common humanity 
can be abused by the powerful in order to coerce other states to conform to the super powers; 
ideology, identity, and values opposed to a real concern for the suffering of others. In relation to 
common humanity this argument pushes toward the conclusion that it is dangerous and undesirable 
to politicize the concept as it serves to eradicate the natural state of pluralism in international 
politics. The case of Libya demonstrates the difficulties of carrying out a humanitarian intervention 
for the sake of humanity. The ideals expressed from the liberals and cosmopolitans have not come 
to pass, instead the region has deteriorated into chaos. In light of the events in Libya perhaps it is 
wise to re-evaluate the use of the concept of common humanity and be more cautious with its use in 
the future.  
Future of Common Humanity and Humanitarian Intervention  
Based upon the criticisms of the concept of common humanity, as illustrated by the failings of the 
intervention in Libya, it would seem as though there is not a bright future for common humanity in 
international politics. However, Libya was not the first and more than likely will not be the last case 
of the concept of common humanity being used to justify an intervention. Certainly in the current 
political climate the concept of common humanity is not applicable but there is always possibility for 
change.  
                                                          
8
 See the cosmopolitan scholarship on this. i.e. Held, Slaughter, etc. In chapter two. 
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International law is constantly in flux and it is possible that the concept of common humanity will 
become a more meaningful norm in the future. The protection of civilians is a recent form of 
international law, one that is still contested but is emerging as a norm in the international arena. 
Javier Perez de Cuellar, the former United Nations Secretary General, declared that, “we are clearly 
witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward the belief that the defence 
of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents” 
(Christopher, 1996, p. 108). To demonstrate the changing face of international law one can look at 
both slavery and genocide, both were considered matters that did not concern external parties. 
Over time, however, these ideas have changed and new international customs have emerged (Duke, 
1994, p. 35). This shows that law is not static. However, turning the norms associated with human 
rights into a theoretical notion of law, and getting other states to agree to these norms is one thing, 
but enforcing these norms is quite another matter (Thornberry, 1980, p. 256). This is the crux of the 
difficulties facing the concept of common humanity; thus far there has not been an answer as how 
to enforce the concept successfully.  
It remains to be seen how the international community will react to RtoP. It may become even more 
polarizing and lose support or it may be embraced as a way to effectively deal with rogue regimes 
and bring the international community together. It also remains to be seen if this is an emerging 
norm or if the aggression is seen as an abuse of the system that may lead states within the UN to 
seek to alter it in the future. It is important to understand the key powers’ positioning on the 
concept of common humanity. As already explained in the third chapter, powerful states have much 
sway when it comes to influencing international politics. Specifically, humanitarian interventions 
normally fall to the world, or a regional hegemon, in terms of the operation. However, there are 
differing opinions on the concept of common humanity in terms of legitimising an intervention. The 
Chinese government, for example, sees human rights as a domestic issue, not a universal issue 
(Duke, 1994, p. 34). It is clear that Chinese foreign policy holds state sovereignty to be above 
universal human rights and in the eyes of the Chinese the concept of common humanity has not 
entered into the international arena as something that can be used in order to justify a humanitarian 
intervention. This is the stance of one of the superpowers and other states’ positions differ, but if 
one of the most powerful states in the world opposes such a concept it looks as though it will face 
significant challenges in the future. For common humanity to become a viable component of 
international politics these superpowers, such as China, have to be committed to the concept, as 
does the rest of the world. 
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The future remains to be seen making it difficult to speculate on the future of the concept of 
common humanity in international politics. Based upon recent events in Libya, the future does not 
look too bright. This was an intervention to showcase RtoP and common humanity and yet it fell well 
short of being considered a success in the name of RtoP or common humanity. There have certainly 
been strides towards universal rights in the last sixty-five years but the successful implementation of 
these rights and the concept of common humanity remain elusive. In the age of promoting 
democracy, human rights, and humanitarian intervention it is important to look at the evidence of 
what exactly humanitarian intervention is achieving. If such interventions are in fact not preventing 
conscience shocking acts, or paving the way for a future without despotic regimes that abuse human 
rights, it suggests that there is a long way to go before the visions of Kofi Annan, the ICISS, and 
certain cosmopolitan theorists can come to pass. 
 
85 
 
Reference List 
 
Abella, R. S. (2010). International law and human rights: The power and the pity. McGill Law Journal, 
55, 871-887.  
Address on Somalia (December 4, 1992) George H. W. Bush. (2015). Retrieved May 12, 2015, from 
http://millercenter.org/president/bush/speeches/speech-3984 
Ambrosius, L. E. (1991). Wilsonian statecraft: theory and practice of liberal internationalism during 
World War I. Wilmington, Del: SR Books. 
Amnesty international. (2011). Libya: The Battle for Libya: Killings, disappearances and torture. 
Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE19/025/2011/en/ 
Amnesty International. (2015). Libya: Flawed trial of al-Gaddafi officials leads to appalling death 
sentences. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/07/libya-flawed-
trial-of-al-gaddafi-officials/ 
Annan, K. (1999). Intervention*. Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 15(2), 115–125.  
Annan, K. (2000). “We the Peoples”: The role of the United Nations in the 21st Century. United 
Nations. Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_The_Peoples.pdf 
Annan, K. (2005). In larger freedom: Towards development, security and human rights for all. United 
Nations. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/in_larger_freedom.shtml 
Archibugi, D. (1998). Principles of cosmopolitan democracy. In D. Archibugi, D. Held, & M. Köhler 
(Eds.), Re-imagining political community: Studies in cosmopolitan democracy (pp. 198-228). 
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Archibugi, D. (2004). Cosmopolitan guidelines for humanitarian intervention. Alternatives: Global, 
Local, Political, 29(1), 1–21.  
Barry, B. (2011). Libya’s lessons. Survival, 53(5), 5–14. 
86 
 
BBC. (2015, May 11). Mediterranean migrant crisis: EU refugee quotas to be proposed. Retrieved 
from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32685942 
Begby, E., Reichberg, G., & Syse, H. (2012). The ethics of war. Part I: Historical trends. Philosophy 
Compass, 7(5), 316–327. 
Bellamy, A. J. (2013). Responsibility to Protect (1st ed.). Oxford: Wiley. 
Bell, D. (2014). What is liberalism? Political Theory, 42(6), 682–715. 
Benac, N. (1993, April 22). Clinton leads tribute at Holocaust Museum. The Associated Press. 
Retrieved from https://global-factiva-com 
Bernstein, S. (2012). The Responsibility to Protect after Libya: Humanitarian prevention as customary 
international law. Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 38, 305-343.  
Berti, B. (2014). Forcible intervention in Libya: Revamping the “politics of human protection”? Global 
Change, Peace & Security, 26(1), 21–39. 
Bevir, M. (1999). Foucault, power, and institutions. Political Studies, 47(2), 345-359. 
Bloxham, D., & Gocek, F. M. (2008). The Armenian Genocide. In D. Stone (Ed.), The Historiography of 
Genocide (pp. 344-372). Basingstoke [England] ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Boucher, D. (2011). The Recognition theory of rights, customary international law and human rights. 
Political Studies, 59(3), 753–771. 
Boudlal, Y. (2011, June 9). Up to 15,000 killed in Libya war: U.N. rights expert. Reuters. Retrieved 
from http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/09/us-libya-un-deaths-
idUSTRE7584UY20110609 
Boyle, D. A. V. (1960). International law and human rights. The Modern Law Review, 23(2), 167–172. 
Brown, C. (1992). International relations theory: new normative approaches. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Buchan, B. (2002). Explaining war and peace: Kant and liberal IR theory. Alternatives: Global, Local, 
Political, 27(4), 407–428. 
Campbell, K. J. (2001). Genocide and the global village. New York: Palgrave. 
87 
 
Carr, E. H. (1946). The twenty years’ crisis, 1919-1939: An introduction to the study of international 
relations: by E.H. Carr (2nd ed). London: Macmillan. 
Charter of the United Nations (1945). Retrieved from 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf  
Chivvis, C. S. (2012). Libya and the future of liberal Intervention. Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy, 54(6), 69–92.  
Choi, S.-W. (2013). What determines US humanitarian intervention? Conflict Management and 
Peace Science, 30(2), 121–139. 
Chorin, E. (2013). NATO’s Libya intervention and the continued case for a responsibility to rebuild. 
Boston University International Law Journal, 31, 365-386.  
Christopher, P. (1996). Humanitarian interventions and the limits of sovereignty. Public Affairs 
Quarterly, 10(2), 103–119. 
Clinton’s statements on Kosovo. (1999). Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/daily/april99/clintonquotes.htm 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court. (2014). Coalition for the International Criminal Court: 
Cases and situations: Libya. Retrieved from http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=libya 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. (1975). Presented at the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe Final Act: Helsinki 1975, Helsinki. Retrieved from 
https://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true 
Czernecki, J. L. (2002). The United Nations’ paradox: The battle between humanitarian intervention 
and state sovereignty. Duquesne Law Review, 41, 391-407. 
Dahlman, C. (2012). The function of opinio juris in customary international law. Nordic Journal of 
International Law, 81, 327–339. 
Dalby, S. (1990). Creating the second Cold War: The discourse of politics. London : New York: Pinter 
Publishers ; Guilford Press. 
88 
 
Davidson, J. W. (2013). France, Britain and the intervention in Libya: An integrated analysis. 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26(2), 310–329. 
Deeb, M.-J. (2012). The Arab Spring: Libya’s second revolution. In D. W. Lesch & M. L. Haas (Eds.), 
The Arab Spring : Change and resistance in the Middle East (pp. 64-78). New York: Westview 
Press. Retrieved from http://canterbury.eblib.com 
DeVore, M. R. (2014). Exploiting anarchy: Violent entrepreneurs and the collapse of Libya’s post-
Qadhafi settlement. Mediterranean Politics, 19(3), 463–470. 
Dijk, P. van, Flinterman, C., & Janssen, P. (Eds.). (1998). International law, human rights (3rd rev. ed). 
Lelystad: Koninklijke Vermande. 
Doyle, M. W. (1983). Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 12(3), 
205–235. 
Doyle, M. W. (2005). Three pillars of the liberal peace. The American Political Science Review, 99(3), 
463–466. 
Duke, S. (1994). The state and human rights: Sovereignty versus humanitarian intervention. 
International Relations, 12(2), 25–48. 
Dunne, T., & Gifkins, J. (2011). Libya and the state of intervention. Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, 65(5), 515–529. 
DW. (2012, 5). Libya challenges ICC, plans own war crimes trials. Retrieved from 
http://www.dw.com/en/libya-challenges-icc-plans-own-war-crimes-trials/a-15920506 
DW. (2015, May 20). Germany, Italy push Europe to accept refugee quota. Retrieved from 
http://www.dw.de/germany-italy-push-europe-to-accept-refugee-quota/a-18462904 
Dyzenhaus, D. (1999). Putting the state back in credit. In C. Mouffe (Ed.), The challenge of Carl 
Schmitt (pp. 75–91). London: Verso. 
Edkins, J. (2003). Humanitarianism, humanity, human. Journal of Human Rights, 2(2), 253–258. 
Enabulele, A. O. (2010). Humanitarian intervention and territorial sovereignty: the dilemma of two 
strange bedfellows. The International Journal of Human Rights, 14(3), 407–424. 
89 
 
Etzioni, A. (2006). Sovereignty as responsibility. Orbis, 50(1), 71–85. 
Etzioni, A. (2014). Communitarianism revisited. Journal of Political Ideologies, 19(3), 241–260. 
Evans, G. (2011). Interview - Gareth Evans. Retrieved from http://www.e-
ir.info/2011/09/02/interview-the-rtop-balance-sheet-after-libya/ 
Foucault, M. (1977). Language, counter-memory, practice: selected essays and interviews. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Foucault, M. (1970). The order of things: an archaeology of the human sciences. London: Tavistock 
Publications. 
Friberg-Fernros, H. (2011). Allies in tension: Identifying and bridging the rift between R2P and just 
war. Journal of Military Ethics, 10(3), 160–173. 
Gaynor, T., & Zargoun, T. (2011, October 21). Gaddafi’s death - who pulled the trigger? Reuters. 
Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/21/us-libya-gaddafi-finalhours-
idUSTRE79J5Q720111021 
Gazzini, C. (2011). Was the Libya intervention necessary? Middle East Report, (261), 2–9. 
Glanville, L. (2013). Intervention in Libya: From sovereign consent to regional consent. International 
Studies Perspectives, 14(3), 325–342. 
Gov.UK. (2011, September 5). Statement on Libya. Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-on-libya 
Graubart, J. (2013). R2P and pragmatic liberal interventionism: Values in the service of interests. 
Human Rights Quarterly, 35(1), 69–90. 
Greenleaf, J. R. (2013). The air war in Libya. Air & Space Power Journal, 27(2), 28-54. 
Greenwald, G., & Hussain, M. (2014). What happened to the humanitarians who wanted to save 
Libyans with bombs and drones? Retrieved from 
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/11/11/happened-humanitarians-wanted-save-
libyans-bombs-drones/ 
90 
 
Griffiths, M., Levine, I., & Weller, M. (1995). Sovereignty and suffering. In J. Harriss (Ed.), The politics 
of humanitarian intervention (pp. 33-91). London ; New York: Pinter in association with the 
Save the Children Fund and the Centre for Global Governance. 
Gutmann, A. (1992). Communitarian critics of liberalism. In S. Avineri & A. De-Shalit (Eds.), 
Communitarianism and individualism (pp. 120–136). Oxford [England] ; New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hayden, R. (2008). Mass killings and images of genocide in Bosnia, 1941-5 and 1992-5. In D. Stone 
(Ed.), The historiography of genocide (pp.487-517). Basingstoke [England] ; New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hehir, A. (2012). The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, reality and the future of humanitarian 
intervention. Basingstoke ; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hehir, J. B. (1998). Military intervention and national sovereignty: Recasting the relationship. In J. 
Moore (Ed.), Hard choices: Moral dilemmas in humanitarian intervention (pp. 29-55). 
Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Held, D. (1995). Democracy and the global order: from the modern state to cosmopolitan 
governance. Cambridge [England]: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers. 
Held, D. (2010). Cosmopolitanism: ideals and realities. Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity. 
Henderson, C. (2014). The Arab Spring and the notion of external state sovereignty in international 
law. Liverpool Law Review, 35(2), 175-192. 
Henig, R. (2010). League of Nations: The makers of the modern world. Haus Publishing. Retrieved 
from http://canterbury.eblib.com 
Hoffmann, S. (1993). Out of the cold: Humanitarian intervention in the 1990s. Harvard International 
Review, 16(1), 8–62. 
Human Rights Council. (2012). Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya. United 
Nations. Retrieved from 
91 
 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A.HRC.1
9.68.pdf 
Human Rights Watch. (2009). United States ratification of international human rights treaties. 
Retrieved October 14, 2015, from https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/24/united-states-
ratification-international-human-rights-treaties 
Human Rights Watch. (2012, May 13). Unacknowledged deaths: Civilian casualties in NATO’s air 
campaign in Libya. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/node/107101 
ICISS. (2001). The Responsibility to Protect. International Development Research Centre. Retrieved 
from http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf 
Ignatieff, M. (2003). State failure and nation-building. In J. L. Holzgrefe & R. O. Keohane (Eds.), 
Humanitarian intervention: Ethical, legal, and political dilemmas (pp. 299–321). Cambridge ; 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Ikenberry, G. J. (2009). Liberal internationalism 3.0: America and the dilemmas of liberal world order. 
Perspectives on Politics, 7(1), 71–87. 
International Crisis Group. (2011, June 6). Popular protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): 
Making sense of Libya. Retrieved from 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Af
rica/107%20-
%20Popular%20Protest%20in%20North%20Africa%20and%20the%20Middle%20East%20V%
20-%20Making%20Sense%20of%20Libya.pdf 
International Crisis Group. (2013). Trial by error: Justice in post-Qadhafi Libya. Retrieved from 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Af
rica/libya/140-trial-by-error-justice-in-post-qadhafi-libya.pdf 
International Crisis Group. (2015). Libya: Getting Geneva right. Retrieved from 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Af
rica/libya/157-libya-getting-geneva-right.pdf 
92 
 
Ishay, M. (2007). The human rights reader: Major political essays, speeches and documents from 
ancient times to the present (2nd edition). New York: Routledge. 
Jackson, R. (2002). The discourses of terrorism: myths and misconceptions. New Zealand 
International Review, 27(2), 2–6. 
Kahler, M. (2011). Legitimacy, humanitarian intervention, and international institutions. Politics, 
Philosophy & Economics, 10(1), 20–45. 
Kaldor, M. (1999). New and old wars: organized violence in a global era. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Kant, I. (1996). Practical philosophy. (M. J. Gregor, Trans.). Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kern, S. (2011, March 23). Why France was so keen to attack Libya. Retrieved May 28, 2015, from 
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1983/france-libya-attack 
Kiernan, B. (2008). Documentation delayed, Justice denied: The historiography of the Cambodian 
Genocide. In D. Stone (Ed.), The historiography of genocide (pp.468-487). Basingstoke 
[England] ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Korab-Karpowicz, W. J. (2013). Political realism in international relations. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013). Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/realism-intl-relations/ 
Krasner, S. D. (2001). Sovereignty. Foreign Policy, (122), 20–29. 
Krieg, A. (2012). Motivations for humanitarian intervention : Theoretical and empirical considerations 
(1st ed.). Dordrecht: Springer. 
Kuperman, A. J. (2013). A model humanitarian intervention?: Reassessing NATO’s Libya campaign. 
International Security, 38(1), 105–136. 
Laub, K. (2011). Health minister estimates 30,000 died In Libya war, 4000 still missing. Retrieved July 
15, 2015, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/08/libya-war-died_n_953456.html 
Libya profile - Timeline. (2015). Retrieved July 22, 2015, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-13755445 
93 
 
Linklater, A. (2007). Critical theory and world politics: citizenship, sovereignty and humanity. New 
York, NY: Routledge. 
Locke, J. (2005). The selected political writings of John Locke: texts, background selections, sources, 
interpretations. (P. E. Sigmund, Ed.). New York: W.W. Norton. 
Malta Independent. (2012). Turkey’s EU Minister, Judge Giovanni Bonello and the Armenian 
Genocide - “Claim about Malta trials is nonsense” - The Malta Independent. Retrieved 
October 6, 2015, from http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2012-04-19/news/turkeys-
eu-minister-judge-giovanni-bonello-and-the-armenian-genocide-claim-about-malta-trials-is-
nonsense-308828/ 
Margolin, J.-L. (2008). Mao’s China: The worst non-genocidal regime? In D. Stone (Ed.), The 
historiography of genocide (pp. 438-467). Basingstoke [England] ; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Marjanovic, M. (2011, March 28). Is humanitarian war the exception?. Retrieved June 20, 2015, from 
https://mises.org/library/humanitarian-war-exception 
McCorquodale, R. (2009). Impact on state responsibility. In M. T. Kamminga & M. Scheinin (Eds.), 
The impact of human rights law on general international law (pp. 235-254). Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
McFarland, S. (2011). The slow creation of humanity. Political Psychology, 32(1), 1–20. 
Miller, B. (2010). Democracy promotion: Offensive liberalism versus the rest (of IR theory). 
Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 38(3), 561–591. 
Miller, P. A. (1998). The classical roots of poststructuralism: Lacan, Derrida, and Foucault. 
International Journal of the Classical Tradition, 5(2), 204–225. 
Mill, J. S. (1977). On Liberty. In J. M. Robson (Ed.), Collected works of John Stuart Mill: Essays on 
politics and Society (Vol. XVIII) (pp.213–310). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Monroe, K. R. (1996). The heart of altruism: perceptions of common humanity. Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press. 
94 
 
Moore, M. (2009). Liberalism, communitarianism, and the politics of identity. In T. Christiano & J. P. 
Christman (Eds.), Contemporary debates in political philosophy (pp. 322–342). Chichester, 
West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Morgan, M. J. (2003). The reconstruction of culture, citizenship, and military service. Armed Forces & 
Society, 29(3), 373–391. 
Morgenthau, H. J., & Thompson, K. W. (1985). Politics among nations: the struggle for power and 
peace (6th ed). New York: Knopf : Distributed by Random House. 
Moses, J. (2013). Sovereignty as irresponsibility? A realist critique of the responsibility to protect. 
Review of International Studies, 39(01), 113–135. 
Moses, J. (2014). Sovereignty and responsibility: Power, norms and intervention in international 
relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mouffe, C. (1999). Introduction: Schmitt’s challenge. In C. Mouffe (Ed.), The challenge of Carl Schmitt 
(pp. 1–6). London: Verso. 
Neff, S. C. (2012). Hugo Grotius on the law of war and peace : Student edition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Office of the Press Secretary. (2011, March 28). Remarks by the President in address to the nation on 
Libya. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-
president-address-nation-libya 
Orford, A. (2003). Reading humanitarian intervention: human rights and the use of force in 
international law. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Orford, A. (Ed.). (2006). International law and its others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Owen, J. M. (1994). How liberalism produces democratic peace. International Security, 19(2), 87–
125. 
Pattison, J. (2007). Humanitarian intervention and international law: The moral importance of an 
intervener’s legal status. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 
10(3), 301–319. 
95 
 
Pattison, J. (2011). The ethics of humanitarian intervention in Libya. Ethics & International Affairs, 
25(03), 271–277. 
Pattison, J. (2013). Is there a duty to intervene? Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. 
Philosophy Compass, 8(6), 570–579. 
Pei, M. (2002). Implementing the institutions of democracy. International Journal on World Peace, 
19(4), 3–31. 
Piiparinen, T. (2012). Sovereignty-building: Three images of positive sovereignty projected through 
Responsibility to Protect. Global Change, Peace & Security, 24(3), 405–424. 
Powell, C. (2012, April). Libya: A multilateral constitutional moment? American Journal of 
International Law, 106(2), 298–316. 
Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1978). Retrieved from 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtocolII.aspx 
Pustogarov, V. V. (1999). The Martens Clause in international law. Journal of the History of 
International Law / Revue D’histoire Du Droit International, 1(2), 125–135. 
Reichberg, G. M. (2007). Preventive war in classical just war theory. Journal of the History of 
International Law, 9(1), 5–34. 
Renzo, M. (2012). Crimes against humanity and the limits of international criminal law. Law and 
Philosophy, 31(4), 443–476. 
Rhea, H. M. (2008). The Nuremberg effect on contemporary international criminal justice. Criminal 
Justice Studies, 21(4), 361–372. 
Ruggie, J. G. (2005). American exceptionalism, exemptionalism, and global governance. In M. 
Ignatieff (Ed.), American exceptionalism & human rights (pp. 304–338). Princeton University 
Press. Retrieved from http://ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz 
Sadat, L. N. (2013, April). Crimes against humanity in the modern age. American Journal of 
International Law, 107(2), 334–377. 
96 
 
Sayyad, A. S. (1995, November 1). UNESCO’s program for peace. UNESCO Courier, Retrieved from 
http://global.factiva.com 
Schmitt, C. (1985). Political theology: four chapters on the concept of sovereignty (G. Schwab, 
Trans.). Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Schmitt, C. (1986). Political romanticism (G. Oakes, Trans.). Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Schmitt, C. (2008). The Concept of the political : Expanded edition (G. Schwab, Trans.). Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. Retrieved from http://www.canterbury.eblib.com 
Simpson, G. J. (2004). Great powers and outlaw states: Unequal sovereigns in the international legal 
order. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Singer, P. (2002). One world: The ethics of globalization (2nd Ed.). New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press. 
Sivakumaran, S. (2009). Impact on the structure of international obligations. In M. T. Kamminga & M. 
Scheinin (Eds.), The impact of human rights law on general international law (pp. 133–150). 
Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Slaughter, A.-M. (2009). Wilsonianism in the twenty-first century. In G. J. Ikenberry (Ed.), The crisis of 
American foreign policy: Wilsonianism in the twenty-first century (pp. 89–117). Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Smart, N. (1981). Beyond ideology: Religion and the future of western civilization. London: Collins. 
Speech by President Sarkozy at the High Level Meeting on Libya. (2011, September 20). Retrieved 
April 7, 2015, from http://www.ambafrance-rsa.org/Speech-by-President-Sarkozy-at-the 
Steinberg, M. (2013). Reforming the notion of national sovereignty by external intervention. Defense 
& Security Analysis, 29(1), 68–75. 
Straus, S. (2008). The historiography of the Rwandan Genocide. In D. Stone (Ed.), The historiography 
of genocide (pp. 517–542). Basingstoke [England] ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
97 
 
Stromseth, J. (2003). Rethinking humanitarian intervention: The case for incremental change. In J. L. 
Holzgrefe & R. O. Keohane (Eds.), Humanitarian intervention : Ethical, legal and political 
dilemmas (pp. 232–272). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tanguy, J. (2003). Redefining sovereignty and intervention. Ethics & International Affairs (Wiley-
Blackwell), 17(1), 141–148. 
Tesόn, F. (2003). The liberal case for humanitarian intervention. In J. L. Holzgrefe & R. O. Keohane 
(Eds.), Humanitarian intervention: Ethical, legal, and political dilemmas (pp. 93–129). 
Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
The Avalon Project - Laws of War : Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV); October 18, 1907. 
(n.d.). Retrieved from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague04.asp#iart1 
The Nuremberg Principles. (1950). Retrieved August 16, 2015, from 
http://www.nurembergacademy.org/the-nuremberg-legacy/the-nuremberg-principles/ 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Retrieved from 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf  
The White House: Videotaped remarks by the President to the Serbian people. (1999, March 29). M2 
Presswire. Retrieved from https://global-factiva-com 
Thomas, N., & Tow, W. T. (2002). The utility of human security: Sovereignty and humanitarian 
intervention. Security Dialogue, 33(2), 177–192. 
Thornberry, P. (1980). Minority rights, human rights and international law. Ethnic & Racial Studies, 
3(3), 249–263. 
Transcript of Clinton remarks at close of the Washington Summit. (1999, April 25). U.S. Newswire. 
Retrieved from https://global-factiva-com 
Transcript of President Clinton’s speech on Bosnia. (1995). Retrieved May 12, 2015, from 
http://edition.cnn.com/US/9511/bosnia_speech/speech.html 
Traub, J. (2009). Absolute fiction: The perversion of sovereignty. World Affairs, 171(3), 73–83. 
Tusan, M. (2014). The Armenian Genocide and foreign policy. Phi Kappa Phi Forum, 94(2), 13–15. 
98 
 
United Nations General Assembly: 2005 World Summit Outcome (2005). Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf 
United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) (n.d.). Retrieved May 13, 2015, from 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html  
United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1970 (2011). Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970(2011) 
United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1973 (2011). Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011) 
US Department of State. (1993, May 10). Building a collective security system. U.S. Department of 
State Dispatch. Retrieved from https://global-factiva-com 
Vallianos, P. S. (2013). Romanticism and politics: from Heinrich Heine to Carl Schmitt – and back 
again. The Historical Review/La Revue Historique, 10(0), 189–218. 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993). Retrieved from 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/vienna.pdf  
Watson, B. C. S. (1999). Liberal communitarianism as political theory. Perspectives on Political 
Science, 28(4), 211–216. 
Welsh, J. M., & Banda, M. (2010). International law and the Responsibility to Protect: Clarifying or 
expanding states’ responsibilities. Global Responsibility to Protect, 2, 213–231. 
Werth, N. (2008). The Crimes of the Stalin Regime: Outline for an inventory and classification. In D. 
Stone (Ed.), The historiography of genocide (pp. 400-419). Basingstoke [England] ; New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Wheeler, N. J. (2005). A Victory for common humanity? The Responsibility to Protect after the 2005 
World Summit (pp. 1–13). Presented at the “The UN at Sixty: Celebration or Wake?,” 
Toronto. 
Williams, P. D., & Bellamy, A. J. (2012). Principles, politics, and prudence: Libya, the Responsibility to 
Protect, and the use of military force. Global Governance, 18, 273–297. 
99 
 
World Court reaffirms Bosnia genocide order. (1993, September 13). Reuters News. Retrieved from 
https://global-factiva-com 
Xanthaki, A. (2010). Multiculturalism and international law: Discussing universal standards. Human 
Rights Quarterly, 32(1), 21–48. 
 
